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ABSTRACT

Government Enforcement of Morality
A Critical Analysis of the Devlin-Hart
Controversy
(December 1975)

Peter August Bittlinger, B.S., Canisius College
M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by:

Professor Felix E. Oppenheim

Is it justifiable to use the criminal law to pro-

hibit and to punish conduct merely because it is generally

thought to be morally wrong?

The recent controversy between

Patrick Devlin and H. L. A. Hart has been waged over this

normative question.

This study critically analyzes their

arguments which are themselves comprised of complex combinations of normative views, factual assumptions, and philosophical theories.

I

approach these diverse elements system-

atically by treating them independently.

A three-fold

classification of theory-types is employed.
First,

I

deal with Devlin's and Hart's normative

theories, i.e., their generalizations about the desirable

extent and limits of' penal legislation and of individual
liberty.

Devlin is an advocate of legal moralism, the view

that certain kinds of conduct should be criminalized simply

because they violate public morality, and of legal paternalism, the view that the law should protect persons from the

harmful consequences of their own actions.

He offers

vi

several reasons, all of which

I

criticize, for holding these

views. Hart, on the other hand, opposes legal
moral! sm— but

only with respect to the consensual sexual
practices of
adults in private; he justifies a limited form of
legal

mor-

alism for the sake of protecting moral and religious senti-

ments from offensive public activities, and he adopts a

limited (and confused) form of legal paternalism.

I

agree

with Hart, against Devlin, that penal sanctions for "mere
immorality" are unjustifiable, but

I

criticize his views on

public offense and paternalism.
Second,

I

examine the factual assumptions underlying

these normative theories, i.e., Devlin's and Hart's empirical generalizations about political society and human

nature.

Devlin's assumptions appear unfounded.

some of Hart's fare little better,

I

Although

agree with him, against

Devlin, that neither society's survival nor the individual's

well-being requires a governmental policy of legal moralism.
Third,

analyze Devlin's and Hart's positions on

I

the philosophical question whether certain intrinsic moral

principles can be shown to be objectively true independently
of anyone's subjective value commitments.

Devlin explicitly

propounds the value-cognitivistic view that the moral judg-

ments of a given social community are objectively valid; his
reasons belong to the naturalistic and intuitionistic metaethical types.

I

agree with Hart's implicitly value-

noncognitivistic view which denies that ultimate moral prin-

vii

ciples can be objectively validated.
Finally,

I

review the present state of the contro-

versy by analyzing recent views on the
issues of public
offense, paternalism, and so-called 'victimless
crimes

Against both Devlin and Hart (and some others),

I

1

.

agree with

Michael Bayles and Hugo Bedau that public activities
should
not be criminalized for their mere of f ensiveness to
others,

and that the penal code is an inappropriate means to pre-

venting self- harm.

I

also agree with Bedau that the concept

of 'victimless crimes' is both unnecessary to and sometimes

incapable of justifying proposals to decriminalize certain
activities.

With Bayles and Bedau,

I

defend J. S. Mill's

harm to others principle as a criterion of justifiable
criminal legislation.

viii
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Oh who is that young sinner with the handcuffs on his
wrists?
And what has he been after that they groan and shake their
fists?
And wherefore is he wearing such a conscience-stricken air?
Oh they're taking him to prison for the colour of his hair.
•Tis a shame to human nature, such a head of hair as his;
In the good old time 'twas hanging for the colour that it is;
Though hanging isn't bad enough and flaying would be fair
For the nameless and abominable colour of his hair.

Oh a deal of pains he's taken and a pretty price he's paid
To hide his poll or dye it of a mentionable shade;
But they've pulled the beggar's hat off for the world to see
and stare,
And they're haling him to justice for the colour of his hair.

Now 'tis oakum for his fingers and the treadmill for his
feet

And the quarry-gang on Portland in the cold and in the heat,
And between his spells of labour in the time he has to spare
He can curse the God that made him for the colour of his
hair.
A. E. Housman
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CHAPTER

I

THE DEVLIN-HART CONTROVERSY
What part should the fact that most members of a

given public think an activity to be "immoral" play in the

decision whether to make it a criminal offense?

If the pro-

hibited practice is strenuously condemned by public opinion,
should this fact be regarded as conclusive of the issue

whether a particular crime ought to be retained?

Does the

fact that some criminal laws punish certain practices for

their "immorality" preclude moral criticism of those statutes?

Such questions go back at least as far as Sophocles' s Antigone

,

and thus are as old as the history of poli-

tical thought itself.

The desirable relationship between

public morality and positive law is a perennial political
issue which was last ventilated in the mid-nineteenth cen-

tury controversy between John Stuart Mill and James
i

Fitzjames Stephen.

Today this issue is once again the

subject of public discussion and scholarly interest.
For nearly twenty years a well-known controversy

about the desirability of enforcing by means of criminal
1

John Stuart Mill, On Liberty ed. Currin V.
Shields, Library of Liberal Arts (New York: Liberal Arts
Press, 1956); and James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equal187^)
ity, Fraternity 2nd ed. (London: Smith Elgard & Co
,

,

.

,

2

legislation the conventional moral standards of society
has
been conducted in the Anglo-American countries. Presently
this debate shows no sign either of abating or of being
resolved.

The principal antagonists in the controversy are

Patrick Devlin, retired Justice of England's highest court,
and H. L. A. Hart, former Professor of Jurisprudence at
Oxford.

Devlin states the case for legal moralism, the view
that certain kinds of conduct ought to be prohibited and

punished by the law simply because they are "immoral"
according to the prevailing moral norms of a given society.
For Devlin, the "immorality" of an act is a sufficient

reason for its legal proscription, even when the act is
performed in private and apparently harms no one in particular, not even the actor himself.

He thinks that "immoral"

practices are capable of injuring society, and that the
law's tolerance of activities which are considered morally

wrong can lead to society's "disintegration."

Devlin holds,

therefore, that it is morally right, and even obligatory,

for the government to "preserve" society by means of morals

legislation.
On the other hand, Hart's view is that the law

should never prohibit and punish conduct merely because it
is thought to be morally wrong by an important segment of

society.

For Hart, the "immorality" of a practice is never

a sufficient reason for the enactment of legislation pro-

3

scribing it.

Rather, other conditions must be present in

order to justify the use of the criminal law.

Among these

criteria, says Hart, are the harm to others and even to the

actor himself which an activity can cause.
A. History of the Controversy

In September 1957, the Wolfenden Committee made its
report to the English Parliament recommending that homosexual practices in private between consenting adults should
no longer be a crime.

Among its reasons the Committee gave

"the importance which society and the law ought to give to

individual freedom of choice and action in matters of
private morality":
Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society,
acting through the agency of law, to equate the sphere
of crime with that of sin, there must remain a realm of
private morality and immorality which is, in brief and
crude terms, not the law's business. To say this is
not to condone or encourage private immorality. 2

Legislative action on the Committee's recommendation was
unfavorable for the next ten years; in I967 Parliament voted
to decriminalize private homosexual practices between con-

senting adults.
In 1958 Devlin was invited by the British Academy to

deliver the second Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence, and
he took as his topic a defense of the Wolfenden Report which

Great Britain, Parliament, Report of the Committee
Wolfenden
on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution ("The
61.
para.
Report"), Cmnd. 2^7, 1957,
2

had stirred much public discussion and
controversy.

Devlin

himself favored the recommended reform and had
given testimony to that effect before the Wolfenden Committee.
His

initial reaction to the Report was therefore one of
"

compl e t e appro val "

As to the subject-matter of my lecture, what I had
in mmd_to do was to take other examples of private
immorality and to show how they were affected by the
criminal law and to consider what amendments would be
necessary to make the law conform with the statement
of principle in the Report.
However, Devlin's reading of Mill's On Liberty in prepara-

tion for the lecture compelled him to rethink his attitude

toward the desirable relationship between law and morals in
general and the Wolfenden Report in particular: "But study

destroyed instead of confirming the simple faith in which
had begun my task; and the Maccabaean Lecture

...

statement of the reasons which persuaded me that

I

I

is a

was

wrong.

Devlin's Maccabaean Lecture, "The Enforcement of

Morals," was delivered on March 18, 1959-

I"ts

interest lay

primarily in its rejection of the Wolfenden Committee's
principle distinguishing public from private morality and
its advocacy of criminal legislation against conduct (such
as homosexuality and abortion) which is popularly regarded

-^Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965), "Preface," pp. vi-vii.

k

Ibid.

,

p.

vii

as morally wrong regardless of
other considerations (such as
the consequences of the conduct itself).
Contrary to the

Committee, Devlin held that it is "wrong
in principle" to
require "special circumstances to be
shown to justify the
intervention of the law."-^

Critical response to the lecture came
quickly, and
Hart's reactions stood out against the rest.
His
first

attack on Devlin's views was broadcast over
radio and first
published in the Listener of July 30, 1959. In
"Immorality
and Treason," Hart argued, contrary to Devlin,
that there is
a meaningful distinction between public and private
moral-

ity, and that there are several criteria (including
the

probable consequences of a practice) which must be met in

order to justify legal impingements on individual liberty. 6
His "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," first published

in The Oxford Lawyer in 1961, held that it is an abuse of
the criminal law to use it merely to enforce the conventional moral standards of a given community.

Here Hart marshal-

led a series of objections to a governmental policy of legal
moralism.

With the notable exception of Eugene Rostow's
5 Ibid.,

p.

11.

6

H. L. A. Hart, "Immorality and Treason," in The Law
as Literature, ed. Louis Blom-Cooper (London: The Bodley
Head, 1961), pp. 220-27.
7r

"The Use and Abuse of the Criminal
nos. 2 & 3 (I965): ^7-51.

H. L. A. Hart,

Law," The Lawyer

8,

article, g the bulk of critical commentary was unfavorable
to

Devlin's views.

He continued, nevertheless, to propound

them in four lectures. 9
Lecture,

Of these, the Owen J. Roberts

"Law, Democracy and Morality," given at the Univer-

sity of Pennsylvania on September 28, 1961, was a significant supplement to the Maccabaean Lecture.

Whereas in the

latter Devlin sometimes appeared to hold that only Christian

moral principles should be legally enforced, in the former
he explicitly advocated a theory of moral populism, the view

that the intensely felt moral convictions of the majority

should be enacted into criminal statutes.

Here, too, Devlin

replied for the first time to some of the views of his
...

critics

10

In I963 Hart formulated his most systematic state-

ment on the question of legal moralism in a series of Harry
Camp Lectures presented at Stanford University, published
that year under the title Law, Liberty, and Morality

.

Hart

took the view that John Stuart Mill's harm to others principle ought to be the test applied to the question whether
"immoral" sexual practices can justifiably be interdicted by
the criminal law.

In the absence of demonstrated harm, Hart

Eugene V. Rostow, "The Enforcement of Morals," The
Cambridge Law Journal (November I960), pp. 1 7^-98.
9 Three of these

lectures are relatively insignifiissue of legal moralism; they are
the
to
respect
cant with
Devlin,
IV
and
in
pp. 26-85.
Chs. II, III,
10

Ch.

V in Ibid.,

pp. 86-101.

held, the law should not interfere
with, and is unjustified
in intervening in, the private
sexual behavior of oonsenting
11
adults

During the following year
Devlin answered with three
lectures which dealt more with
criticizing Hart's book than
with developing his own views. In
"Morals and Contemporary
Social Reality," Devlin claimed that
Hart's position
is not

that of Mill, is not stated clearly, is
revealed only accidentally in discussing Mill's harm to
others principle, and
is in need of revision if it is to mean
anything to contemporary social reality. 12 The Ernst Freund
Lecture, "Mill on
Liberty in Morals," criticized the normative views
of both
Mill and his disciples"-viz., Hart' and the Wolfenden
Com,,

mittee.

13

The last lecture, "Law and Morality," was a

rather sketchy review of the chief arguments contained in
the previous two lectures. 1 ^

Excepting the last, all the

lectures were published in I965 as a book, The Enforcement
of Morals

,

with a "Preface" and new footnotes which qualify

some of the arguments in the original addresses.

While Devlin's contributions to the controversy
11

H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty,

and Morality (London:

Oxford University Press, 1963)
l2
13

14

Devlin, Ch. VII, pp. 124-39.
Ibid., Ch. VI, pp. 102-23.

Patrick Devlin, "Law and Morality," Manitoba Law
School Journal 1, no. 3 (1964-65): 243-54.

8

ended with his book, Hart added
two articles which dealt
more with empirical problems than with
normative issues.
One of the Lionel Cohen Lectures,
"The Enforcement of Morality," given at the University of
Jerusalem
in 1964, first

reviewed the salient issues of the controversy
and then
analyzed the recent law reform movements in
15
England.

Hart's last piece criticized in detail
Devlin's "disintegration thesis," the claim that society will
disintegrate if
conventional moral standards are not legally enforced. 16
In neither one did Hart attempt to answer Devlin's

criti-

cisms of Mill's or his own normative principles.
The Devlin-Hart controversy did not end with the

retirement of the protagonists from the central arena.

Others have continued the debate on legal moralism to the
present time.

A book-length commentary on the controversy,

from a point of view favorable to Devlin's position, appeared in I967. 1

An anthology of critical articles and court

cases was published in 1971.
1

1 Pi

In recent years the contri-

*)

^H. L. A. Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law
(Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1964), pp. 31-54.
i6

L. A. Hart,

"Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality," The University of Chicago Law Review 35
(Autumn I967): 1-13.
H.

17
'Basil Mitchell, Law, Morality, and Religion in a
Secular Society (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
18

Richard A. Wasserstrom, ed., Morality and the Law
(Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971).

9

butions of philosophers, lawyers, and social scientists have
centered on the issues of government paternalism and preser-

vation of public decency by means of the criminal law.
B.

Plan of Analysis

The purpose of this study is to provide a critical

analysis of the arguments which comprise the Devlin-Hart
controversy.

These arguments are themselves made up of

complex combinations of normative views, factual assumptions,
and philosophical theories.

I

intend to approach these

diverse elements systematically by treating them independently.

Thus, a threefold classification of theory-types

will be employed.

Chapters II and III will deal, respectively, with

Devlin

1

s

and Hart's normative theories, i.e., their general-

izations about the desirable extent and limits of criminal

legislation and individual liberty.
Chapter IV will examine the factual assumptions

underlying the normative views of the protagonists.

The

subjects of analysis will therefore be Devlin's and Hart's

empirical generalizations about human nature and political
society.
A philosophical issue of metaethics will be treated

in Chapter V.

There

I

will analyze Devlin's and Hart's

positions on the question whether certain intrinsic moral
judgments can be shown to be objectively true independently

10

of personal value commitments.
Finally, in Chapter VI

I

will conclude with a

summary and criticism of recent works on the
issues of legal
paternalism, legal prevention of public indecency,
and so-

called victimless crimes.

11

CHAPTER

II

NORMATIVE THEORIES--I

Normative theories of politics are concerned with
the standards of right political conduct.

questions of political ethics are:

The two basic

'What political actions

are morally right?* and 'What outcomes of political actions
are intrinsically good?

1

The central theme of the Devlin-

Hart controversy is a special case of such questions.
Specifically, the debate raises the issue of whether
the criminal law should be used to enforce a society's con-

ventional moral standards.

In their- replies Devlin and Hart

develop theories concerning the desirable scope of individual freedom and the desirable limits of governmental power.

The purpose of this chapter and of the next is to provide a
critical analysis of these theories.
As a preliminary to such an analysis

I

will first

distinguish between several general types of normative
theory, and then answer those critics who reject the view

that the debate's central issue is one of normative ethics.
A. Theories of Political Ethics

There have been, traditionally, two views concerning
the criteria of moral rightness: teleological theories and

deontological theories.

According to the criteria of deon-

tological ethics, conduct is morally right when it conforms

12

to certain principles cf
duty or rules of obligation.

But

since governmental policies
and acts of legislation are
usually justified in terms of
their probable consequences,
deontological theories (which ignore
consequences
in the

moral assessment of action) are
seldom invoked in political
Philosophy. The issues of the
Devlin-Hart controversy, with
their concern for the effects of
criminal legislation o,m
both individuals and society, are
therefore best viewed i:
the context of teleological theory.

According to the criteria of teleological
ethics,
conduct is morally right when its results
or outcomes

are

better (by whatever valuational standards)
than those of
alternative actions open to the actor. Therefore,

one ought

to do that which will have the best consequences
or do the

most good.
But good consequences for whom?

Egoism claims that

it is morally right, or at least permissible, for an actor
to pursue only his own interest.

Altruism requires, on the

other hand, that the actor forego his own interest and promote only the interests of others.

Universalism prescribes

that an actor take into account both his own interest and
the interests of everyone who- may be affected by his conduct.

As we shall see, both Devlin and Hart advocate universal

standards in their consequence theories.
What kind of consequences are good, and should therefore be promoted?

Utilitarianism, in the broad sense, re-

13

quires that some welfare goal be advanced for
an action to
be morally right. Such an action may be done

for the sake

of deriving any kind of utility (happiness or
pleasure)

either for oneself or for others.

These welfare considera-

tions are contrasted with actions performed for some non-

utilitarian goal, i.e., any end which conflicts with welfare.
Examples of some goals which may be incompatible with
welfare are justice, national liberation, and upholding the
"true faith."

Although liberty and equality are often con-

sidered means to welfare, they too may conflict with utili-

tarian goals when taken as ends in themselves.

We shall see

that Hart advocates both utilitarian and nonutilitarian
goals, but that it is questionable whether Devlin advocates

the promotion of welfare goals and hence whether his theory
is utilitarian even in the broad sense.

Utilitarianism, in the narrow sense, is a special

kind of consequence theory which combines welfare goals with
universalism.

Thus, like Jeremy Bentham's dictum that one

ought to promote "the greatest happiness of the greatest

number," utilitarianism, narrowly construed, requires that
the results of right conduct advance the well-being of as

many as possible, and preferably of everyone.

We shall see

that at least one of Hart's normative theories is utilitar-

ian in this sense.

14
B. The Controversy a Normative One

The issues which divide Devlin and Hart are primar-

ily normative ones.
deny this.

However, there are a few critics who

For example, Yves Caron says that "Lord Devlin

and Professor Hart, and a few of their followers, do not

even speak the same language," and that therefore "their

debate is in fact a non-debate, for they hardly speak from
the same standpoint."

But this is precisely what gives the

debate its interest: Devlin and Hart address themselves to
the same ethical problem from separate perspectives.

Indeed,

this difference in points of view is what makes a contro-

versy between them possible.

Differing standpoints can

"speak" to a common normative question and hence do not pre-

clude a meaningful exchange of views--a conclusion which is

implicit in Caron

1

s

own lengthy gloss on the controversy.

On the other hand, there are some commentators who
claim that Devlin and Hart speak from identical standpoints.

For instance, Jeffrie Murphy asserts that the debate raises
no "moral issues" because he thinks both antagonists are

utilitarians.

For Murphy, the debate "has been carried on

in a completely utilitarian framework" in which the partici-

pants "play the dubious game of 'more utilitarian than

thou

1

In particular, Devlin supposedly "attempts to

."

defend legal moralism on purely utilitarian grounds, having
1

Yves Caron, "The Legal Enforcement of Morals and
the So-Called Hart-Devlin Controversy," McGill Law Journal
15, no. 1 (1969): 21, 45.

15

no recourse to deontological or intuitionistic
considera-

tions," while Hart appeals to identical grounds
in justifying his opposition to legal moralism. 2 From
Murphy's point

of view, then, because Devlin and Hart are united
in a
shared "utilitarian" ethic their real differences
occur

only

with respect to questions of fact.
I

think Murphy is mistaken for these reasons.

First,

his argument implies that deontological principles are the

only alternatives to any given utilitarian ethic.

This is

not the case, for we have seen that utilitarianism--even in
the broadest sense--is only one type of consequence theory,

opposed not only to deontological but also to nonwelfare
teleological moral principles.

Second, the argument also

implies that "intuitionistic considerations" can play no
role in either utilitarian or general teleological theories.
But, as we shall see, both Devlin and Hart rely on such con-

siderations whenever they foresake factual evidence that

certain conduct causes harm or injury to society in general
or to specific individuals in particular.

Contrary to

Murphy, the analysis will show that Hart is not a "pure"

utilitarian and that it is doubtful whether Devlin is a

utilitarian at all.
Richard Hare also styles the debate as "one between
utilitarians," although he differs from Murphy in saying:
2

Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Another Look at Legal Moralism,"
Ethics 77 (October 1966): 50-51-

16

'The punishment of wickedness
and vice (merelv hpo.no.
reqUireS it} 13 not advocated by
a y
r
to**
these discussions, and both Professor
Hart
and
Lord
Devlin seem to make their criterion
for the righ?ness
of legislation the good of the
people in societv
tLv
ab ° Ut What iS neces ^r? in
order^^ichiSvJ
1

S°H-

^good^

Here it is suggested that Devlin and
Hart are utilitarians
who disagree merely over how to achieve
universal welfare
goals or well-being for everyone.

Contrary to Hare,

I

will show that Devlin does favor

"the punishment of wickedness and vice" simply
because

certain activities are generally considered
"immoral"— but
not "because justice requires it."^ Furthermore,
it

is not

true that Devlin and Hart advocate the same goal,
"the good
of the people," but differ only over means. Devlin
favors
the realization of transpersonal ends rather than individual

welfare while Hart subscribes to welfare goals in at least
one of his theories.

Therefore, as we shall see, there is a

significant theoretical difference between Devlin and Hart

over the "good" which penal legislation should achieve.

Bernard Crick holds that "the real point at issue"

between Devlin and Hart is "how changing judicial rules of
3

Hare, review of Law, Morality, and Religion
in a Secular Society by Basil Mitchell in Philosophy V3
(October 1968): 379.
^R. M.

,

h

,

Therefore I disagree with another's suggestion that
the Devlin-Hart controversy is essentially "a debate about
justice" (A. R. Blackshield, "The Hart-Devlin Controversy in
1965," Sydney Law Review 5 [October I967]: ^52). Arguments
from justice are advanced only by Hart, but are actually
peripheral to the central issue of the controversy, as we
shall see.
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interpretation give more (or less)
tolerance to old laws in
new circumstances.^ This is an
empirical question- and,
though an interesting subject for
political science,

it does

not occupy a significant place even
among the factual assumptions of the controversy. Henry Aiken,
too, alleges that
Devlin and Hart hold substantially similar
normative views
as to the desirability of legal moralism,
but that their
differences concern only "matters of fact and of
meaning." 6
However, critical analysis of Devlin and Hart's
differences

of "meaning" reveals that their chief disagreements
are over
a normative issue.

It is a moral question regarding the

desirability of government enforcing positive morality by
means of the criminal law.
As Hart has counseled, the central issue of the
debate over legal moralism is both of morality and about

morality.

Specifically, Hart says that "our question is one

of critical morality about the legal enforcement of positive

morality," where by 'positive morality' Hart means "the mor-

ality actually accepted and shared by a given social group,"
and where by 'critical morality' he means "the general moral

principles used in the criticism of actual social institu^Bernard Crick, Political Theory and Practice (New
York: Basic Books, 1973). pp. 77-78.
6

Henry David Aiken, "There Oughta Be a Law," New
York Review 11 November I965, p. 17.
,
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tions including positive morality." 7

Critical morality ans-

wers the question whether and to what
extent the criminal
law ought to incorporate positive morality.
In Hart's words,
"It is the question whether the enforcement
of morality is

morally justified; so morality enters into the
question in
two ways."

Or, rather,

there are two different concepts of

morality: first, general principles of evaluation
(critical

morality), and second, generalizations about what in
fact a
given social group regards as morally right and wrong

(posi-

tive morality)

The importance of Hart's distinction between critical and positive morality lies in the difference between

normative judgments and empirical statements.

The recommen-

dations of critical morality express judgments concerning
the moral rightness or wrongness of conduct, e.g., the desi-

rability or undesirability of certain kinds of criminal
legislation.

All moral principles are "critical" in the

sense that they are criteria by which individual actions and

governmental policies are judged morally right or wrong.
The function of critical morality is to appeal to general

moral principles when justifying normative judgments such as
'x is immoral

1

or valuational judgments such as 'y is evil

7 H. L. A.

1
.

Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (London:
I963), p. 20.
One critic finds the
University
Press,
Oxford
(Richard
Brandt,
review of Law, Libdistinction "puzzling"
in
The Philosophical
Hart,
erty, and Morality by H. L. A.
Review 73 April 196k]: 273-74-).
,

I

8

Ibid., p. 17.
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On the other hand, the statements of positive
morality are
reports about the actual moral judgments of a
given
social

community.

That x is immoral according to the moral stan-

dards of some society is a factual assertion, e.g.,
'In

society A, x is immoral

1
;

it means that most persons in

society A morally disapprove of x.^
Close attention to this useful distinction has been

lacking on the part of some commentators on the Devlin-Hart
controversy.

As a result, some believe that the opponents

of legal moralism either deny that morality has anything to
do with the law or affirm that the law ought to be severed
10
from morality.
On the contrary, both the advocacy of and

opposition to legal moralism are normative views, i.e., conflicting replies to a question of critical morality.

Both

the legal moralist and his opponent evaluate the moral right

ness of criminal laws (among other things) by virtue of the

different moral principles each respectively espouses.

Henc

Q

'Therefore I cannot agree with the recent proposal
that Hart's distinction be interpreted as a difference
between "critical" and "conventional" roles of moral principles (Max Atkinson, "Interpreting Retributive Claims,"
Ethics 8-5 [October 19?4]: 80-81). Atkinson's distinction
does not correspond to Hart's and hence cannot be used in
its place; rather, it might be viewed as a distinction between 'active' and 'passive' 'moral principles.
10

See, e.g., Shirley Robin Letwin, "Morality & Law,"
Encounter ^3 (November 197*0: 35-^3; A. R. Louch, "Sins and
Crimes," Philosophy ^3 (January 1968): 38-39, ^7-^9; and
J. R. Lucas, The Principles of Politics (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, I966), pp. 345-^-8. A recent critique of Louch
corroborates my view: Robert L. Schwager, "'Sins and Crimes'
Philosophy 50 (January 1975): 88-93-

20

both Devlin's commitment to the preservation of
society's
positive morality and Hart's commitments to individual

lib-

erty and the prevention of suffering are commitments
to just
such principles of critical morality. 11
C.

Devlin's Normative Theories

Devlin's advocacy of legal moralism emerges from his

responses to the question: "To what extent, if at all,
should the criminal law of England concern itself

v/ith the

enforcement of morals and punish sin or immorality as
such?" 12

First, Devlin replies that "the enforcement of

morals" by means of the criminal law of England is morally
justifiable because it is morally right in any society that
the penal code punish "sin or immorality as such."

Thus, he

espouses the moral principle that conduct which is contrary
to a given society's positive morality ought to be legally

punishable
Second, Devlin also replies that the criminal law

should enforce positive morality only to the extent necessary to insure society's "preservation from disintegration":
But if society has the right to make a judgement {[concerning the rightness or wrongness of certain practices]
and has it on the basis that a recognized morality is as
necessary to society as, say, a recognized government,
then society may use the law to preserve morality in the
same way as it uses it to safeguard anything else that

U See
12

Hart, p. 82.

Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965), P« 2.

.
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is essentia^ to its existence.
If therefore
proposition is securely established with all the first
cations, society has a prima facie right to its implilegislate
against immorality as such. 13

Ostensibly, then, Devlin's justification of legal
morali:.sm
rests on a means-end relationship between a society's

posi-

tive morality and its "continued existence."

Indeed, Devlin

claims that legal proscriptions of "immorality as such"
are

justifiable precisely because each society's existence and

survival depend on its positive morality, whose moral standards must be legally enforced in the absence of voluntary

compliance
Devlin's exposition of the theory advocating legal

moralism as a means to society's survival reveals that he
actually considers the enforcement of morals desirable for
the sake of preserving traditional social institutions and

positive morality itself, as we shall see.

He also offers

other reasons justifying criminal punishments for "immorality": one is moral populism, the view that in a democracy it
is morally right that the moral beliefs of the majority be

enforced by the criminal law; another is the claim that the

positive morality of each society is objectively morally
right, hence worthy of legal enforcement.
^Ibid., p. 11. But cf. Blackshield (p. ^8, n. 66)
who thinks for no apparently good reason that Devlin
rejects the view that "sin or immorality as such" may justifiably be punished by the law. Julius Stone Social Dimensions of Law and Justice [Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1966 j, p. 377, esp. n. ^63) also takes this strange
view.

—

—

(
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So, then, Devlin deploys several theories supporting

his advocacy of legal moralism.

The analysis which follows

will consider each in turn, beginning with the theory

derived from society's preservation.
1.

Preservation of society

.

Devlin's case for the legal

enforcement of positive morality on this view is that its

maintenance is necessary to prevent the disintegration of
society:

Societies disintegrate from within more frequently than
they are broken up by external pressures. There is
disintegration when no common morality is observed and
history shows that the loosening of moral bonds is
often the first stage of disintegration, so that
society is justified in taking the same steps to preserve its moral code as it does to preserve its government and other essential institutions 1^
.

Devlin holds that there is in principle no realm of
conduct which should be immune from legal control and punishment: "Any immorality is capable of affecting society

injuriously and in effect to a greater or lesser extent it
usually does; this is what gives the law its locus standi
1
It cannot be shut out." ^

.

Devlin means that the law should

not be "shut out" of the realm of even private "immoral"

conduct because he believes such activity affects society in
a harmful way.

Society's survival is, then, the intrinsic

value (or, in Hart's terms, the general principle of Devlin's

^Ibid.,
1

p.

13-

See also J. N. D. Anderson, Moral^Ibid., p. 15.
ity, Law and Grace (London: Tyndale Press, 1972), p. 72.
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critical morality) which justifies government
enforcement of
positive morality and the theoretically unlimitable
legal

restrictions on individual freedom that enforcement
requires.
Hence Devlin holds that society has a moral right to preserve itself and should possess the unlimited legal right
to

enforce the positive morality necessary to its existence. 16

Devlin also claims that it is impossible both in

theory and in practice to draw a distinction between public
and private morality:
do not think that one can sensibly talk of a public
and private morality any more than one can of a public
or private highway. Morality is a sphere in which
there is a public interest and a private interest,
often in conflict, and the problem is to reconcile the
two .17

I

Despite this talk of reconciliation, Devlin actually consi16

Eugene V. Rostow ("The Enforcement of Morals," The
Cambridge Law Journal [November i960], p. 195) disagrees
with this interpretation of Devlin's theory because of his
"Hohfeldian" equation of 'right and 'power': if 'right*
means 'power', then it cannot be denied that government, if
it is in fact the authoritative decision maker, has "the
right" to enforce positive morality. Hence, Rostow says,
Devlin should not be criticized for espousing a view which
(at least on Rostow' s interpretation) he does not hold.
However, Rostow does not distinguish between 'moral right'
and 'legal right' (or 'power'). Therefore he fails to see
that the exercise of governmental power may legitimately be
passed under the scrutiny of critical morality. Certain
uses of power may be legally right yet not morally right.
This is precisely the issue over which the controversy is
waged: Does government have a moral right to possess the
legal right to enforce positive morality?
1

^Devlin, p. 16. In my view, Devlin's concession
that there can be both a public and a private interest contradicts his claim that it is impossible to distinguish
between public and private morality
.

.

2k

ders the public interest in the
maintenance of common moral
beliefs to be paramount. The "private
interest," it appears,
counts for very little in his scales,
for all "immoral" conduct, even that of consenting adults
in private, constitutes
an occasion of harm both to the moral
consensus and to
society's existence. 18
Thus, Devlin apparently thinks that
merely by being

thought "immoral" by many members of a given
social community certain activities become affected with
a public inter-

By assuming that "any immorality is capable of
affecting society injuriously" he implies that there is
a public
est.

interest in suppressing "immoral" practices by means of
penal legislation— because there is an undisputed public

interest in preserving society* s existence.

Hence legal

impingements on individual freedom are morally permissible
and even desirable whenever they result in consequences conducive to the preservation of society.
Some think that in basing his theory on this argu-

ment "Devlin is adopting a utilitarian justification--!

.

e

because the consequences of immorality are harmful society
has the right to intervene."

7

"Devlin

...

is a sort of

utilitarian, giving to a commonly accepted morality the
18

Fred M. Fro hock, Normative Political Theory
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 197*0, p. 88.
1

^F. W. M. McElrea,

"The Legal Enforcement of Non1 (July I967): 214,

Utilitarian Morality," Otago Law Review
n. 51.
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instrumental value of helping to preserve
society." 20
"Devlin's theory, as I understand it, is
really a form of
utilitarianism or, more exactly, an application
of the

public harm principle." 21

"Thus Devlin has seen that a con-

sistent utilitarianism must agree with his position
that in
any serious conflict between the good of society and
individual freedom, it is individual freedom that must
22
give way."

Even Hart has suggested that Devlin's theory "is a
utilitarian one

.

.

.

;

it is Utilitarianism without benefit, of

facts." 23
It is true that, like a utilitarian, Devlin places

individual liberty in an inferior position relative to "the
good of society."
itself.

In his words, "Freedom is not a good in

We believe it to be good because out of freedom

there comes more good than bad.

.

.

.

But no good can come

from a man doing what he acknowledges to be evil.

.

.

.

Freedom to do what you know to be bad is worthless."
20

ity

,

D. D. Raphael, review of Law, Liberty, and Moralby H. L. A. Hart, in Mind n.s., 75 (October 1966):
,

308.
21

Joel Feinberg, "'Harmless Immoralities' and Offensive Nuisances," in Issues in Law and Morality ed. Norman
S. Care and Thomas K. Trelogan (Cleveland: The Press of Case
Western Reserve University, 1973) P« 90.
,

>

22

Vincent C. Punzo, "Morality and the Law: The
Search for Privacy in Community," Saint Louis University
Journal 18 (Winter 1973): 180.
23 Hart,
2

p.

55.

^Devlin, p. 108.

Lav;
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That is, freedom to do what
most people consider to be morally wrong cannot result in
a greater good for either
the
society or the individual actor;
hence it is always undesirable. Devlin allows that
"there must be toleration of the
maximum individual freedom that
is consistent with the integrity of society." 25 But given
that he thinks "immoral"
conduct incompatible with society's
"integrity," this means
that only freedom to do what is
considered morally
right in

the given society should be
tolerated by the law. 26

However, as Hart attests, utilitarians
"are committed at least to the general critical
principle that the use
of legal coercion by any society calls
for justification as

something prima facie objectionable to be
tolerated only for
the sake of some countervailing good." 27
Because legal

coercion entails moral wrongs (e.g., deprivation of
freedom
and frustration of desire) which contravene the welfare
of

the individual actor, utilitarianism--even in the broadest
sense of the term--requires that such wrongs be justified as

means to the attainment of some competing yet more desirable
welfare goal.

For instance, it might be shown that conduct

contrary to the standards of a given society's positive mor-

ality produces palpable injury to the interest either of
-\Lbid.

,

p.

C. L. Ten,

16.

"Crime and Immorality," The Modern Law

Review 32 (November 1969): 656.
2

?Hart, p. 20.

"
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some persons or of all members
of the social collectivity.
Then it might plausibly be argued
that legal coercion is

required to protect such interests
and to promote the welfare of that society's members.
But,
apart from a vague

allusion to the lessons of history
("history shows that the
loosening of moral bonds is often the
first stage
of disin-

.

tegration"), Devlin makes no attempt to
marshall the factual
evidence required to substantiate the claim
that legal moralism is necessary to prevent the alleged harm
of social
dissolution.
Not only is Devlin's so-called utilitarian theory

"without benefit of facts," but, more important, it
also

lacks conceptual clarity.

First, whether Devlin values the

preservation of society as a means to the general welfare of
its citizens is questionable.

He does pay lip service to

utilitarianism by holding that "an established morality is
as necessary as good government to the welfare of society

1,28
.

As we shall see, Devlin has in mind only the moral good of
society.

He also denies that "the criminal law exists for

the protection of individuals," for

"

the true principle is

that the law exists for the protection of society." 2 ^

But

Devlin, p. 13 (emphasis added).
29

/

\

'Ibid.
Peter Winch
p. 22 (emphasis added).
(review of The Enforcement of Morals, by Patrick Devlin, in
The Sociological Review n.s., 13 July I965]: 213-1*0
writes: "Astoundingly, he [Devlin] states this principle in
the very passage in which he has pointed out Wolfenden's
'error of jurisprudence* in searching for some single prin,

,

ciple

.

1

28

will that be a protection of
the members of society
and
their interests, or of particular
social institutions which
are valued, not for the benefits
they may provide, but for
the conservative reason of
preserving tradition?

As we
shall see, the latter is the
more likely meaning,
that
case Devlin would be in the position
of justifying legal
coercion and deprivation of liberty
for the sake of transpersonal and nonutilitarian goals.

m

Second, when Devlin allows that in
certain circum-

stances "practical limitations" may stay
the law in enforcing positive morality, even then the four
limitations which
he enumerates are so ill-defined as
to provide no guidelines
whatsoever as to how and in what cases the law
should be
30
limited.
Here especially Devlin could have argued that

sometimes the welfare of both individual persons and
society
can be advanced by limiting the criminal law's
interference

with certain activities despite their being popularly
regarded as morally wrong.

But his continual stress on the impor-

tance of society's survival and his disavowal of the value
of freedom to do that which is generally considered "immoral"

prevent him from making this utilitarian argument.
Third, Fred Frohock has shown that some of Devlin's

most important conceptual difficulties stem from the conflation of two quite different characteristics of an activity:
30

Ibid., pp. 15-24, passim.
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(1) its being contrary to society's positive
morality, and
(2) its effect on society's survival prospects.

Devlin

assumes that the latter is implied by the
former: ••immoralconduct always threatens society's existence.
This overlooks the possibility of conflict between
society's positive
morality and its survival requisites. For
example, a given
society may accept birth control practices as
morally
right,

or at least permissible, and have its existence
endangered

because birth rates are lower than death rates.

Also, a

society which morally condemns abortion and contraception

may well legalize and encourage both practices in the face
of a severe overpopulation problem.

An "immoral" activity

may therefore constitute a survival requisite, and

a prac-

tice which is not morally condemned may constitute a survival threat.

According to Frederick Carney, since Devlin

... is willing to legislate the positive morality as
such of society upon its members
his basic test
does not (as with Hart) center on actual harm to persons
either^ directly or indirectly.
Rather it hinges on the
determination of whether some norm or ideal is an actual
part of the society's positive morality. If it is, it~«
is eligible for penal legislation to enforce it,
.

.

.

.

If this is (as

I

.

believe) a correct interpretation, then

Devlin's theory derived from society's preservation cannot
be considered utilitarian, for the "harm" which he wishes to
-^Frohock, pp. 90-92.
32
J
Frederick S.

Carney,

"Religion and the Legislation

of Morals," Soundings 51 (Winter 1968): kk2.
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prevent through morals legislation is
not the kind which is
capable of contravening anyone's (or even
society's) welfare
goals. The "harm" which he imputes to
"immoral" conduct
derives, not from the consequences of the

activity, but from

the fact that it is regarded as morally wrong.

In society A,

x may be considered "immoral" while in society
B, x may be

considered morally permissible or even "virtuous."

Devlin's

criteria require him to treat x as harmful (both to the
actor and to the social collectivity) in society A but not
in society B.

Thus, homosexuality in England and the United

States "must" cause harm to the homosexual himself and to
the moral beliefs of society, while in ancient Sparta it had

neither of these effects.

As C. L. Ten points out, if drunk-

enness, drug taking, prostitution, and homosexuality really

are harmful to anyone,

"they are so quite independently of

whether they violate the shared morality of society," for
"it is perfectly possible that the debaucheries of one

society would form part of the shared morality of another
33
society. " JJ

Fourth, Devlin characterizes the good consequences

of legal moralism for society in terms of its "cohesion,"
"integrity," "continued existence," and "preservation."

Without a more precise description of what is being recommended, most critics agree with Hart that these ultimate goals

-^C. L. Ten,
82 (July 1972): 323.

"Enforcing a Shared Morality," Ethics
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are ambiguous.

What, for instance, does it mean to say that

a society is being preserved or protected from disintegra-

tion?

What empirical indicators enable us to determine

whether a society possesses integrity or cohesion?

Indeed,

how can one determine whether and to what extent deviant
behavior or even overt violence brings about society's dissolution?

For example, does civil war destroy society?

Has

revolution disintegrated the society of France, Russia,
Spain, China, Vietnam, Cambodia?

How great and what kind of

change is necessary to say that a society has ceased to
exist?

Because it is difficult to understand what is being

asserted when Devlin holds that a society either succeeds or
fails in preserving itself it follows that it is impossible
to determine whether or not he advocates welfare goals;

hence it is impossible as well to classify this view as

either utilitarian or not.

Devlin's later lectures afforded

opportunities for clarifying and refining his basic concepts
in order to meet the objections voiced by the several
critics

.of

the Maccabaean Lecture.

Unfortunately, however,

he has declined to specify any empirical referents by which
to describe the kinds of outcomes which would constitute the

realization of his goals.

"The kind of threat to survival

Devlin envisages is as difficult to specify conceptually as
it is to identify empirically.

^Frohock,

p.

93.
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Most critics (including Hart) concede that Devlin's

disintegration thesis rests on a "factual claim," but

I

argue that it does not, because factual claims are
empirical

hypotheses which state relationships between descriptively
defined concepts.

Is the proposition »x (any specific class

of "immoral" conduct) is harmful to society* an empirical
statement?

Not in Devlin's theory, for there the concept of

•harm* is given no unambiguous empirical referent.

More generally,

I

agree with these criticisms of

most (including Devlin* s) attributions of "harm":
Calling conduct he wishes to prohibit "harmful" is
the lawmaker's pet gambit; attaching the label seems to
discharge the onus of justification. An aura of legitimacy surrounds rules designed to prevent harm. And
yet, while there is agreement that harm, in the abstract,
may justify legal coercion, disputes arise over whether
specific human conduct is harmful. That this is so
should not be surprising.
"Harm" is a normative word
suffering the fate of normative words generally the
notorious dearth of unanimity over when the word properly applies. Thus, it is simply useless to assert
that behavior is harmful without more. Specifically,
what interest or interests of what person or persons has
been interfered with as a consequence of that behavior ?35

—

Devlin fails to specify what interests of assignable individuals are interfered with as a consequence of "immoral" conduct; moreover, as we have seen, he does not even specify

what interest of nonassignable individuals (i.e., the public

interest) is apt to be affected adversely by such activity.
-^Robert N. Harris, Jr., "Private Consensual Adult
Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality," UCLA Law Review lk (January I967): 58I
(emphasis added).
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Prom what Devlin has given
us, there is no empirical
hypothesis by whioh to test the
so-called

factual claim of the

disintegration thesis.

Indeed, there is no factual
claim

deserving of the name.
Ernest Nagel points out that,
like "much talk about
societies," Devlin's theory is
based on an organic model
which compares human communities
to living organisms, "and
there is a point to the analogy":
some social processes,

such as maintenance of food
supplies and education of the
young, are likened to biological
vital functions, such as
assimilation of food and respiration.
"But the analogy is

misleading if it leads us to assume that
a society can die
or flourish in the same sense that a
biological organism

does."

With the "possible exception" of the extreme
case,

such as the permanent dispersal of a
population or the death
of all its members including progeny (e.g.,
genocide),
"there appears to be no general agreement on the
activities
that define what it is for a society to be destroyed,
rather

than to be undergoing some alteration in its modes of
organ-

izing human conduct."

Thus, without adequate explanations

of what is to be understood by either the "preservation" or
the "disintegration" of a social order (as distinct from the

persistence or collapse of, say, its form of government) it
is impossible, according to Nagel,

"to distinguish between

the supposition that a social order has been destroyed and
the supposition that there has been only a change in some

3^

pervasive pattern of institutionalized
behavior." 36
Nagel suggests, then, that Devlin's legal
moralisra
has as its ultimate goal the preservation,
not of every
society's existence in general, but of each
society's pecu-

liar "modes of organizing human conduct" in
particular.
Thus, the legal proscription of "immoral"
conduct is justified as a means to preventing, or at least inhibiting,
alter-

ations in a given society's actual institutions.

But if

this is what preserving society's "existence" means,
then

Devlin's theory is reduced to a conservative ethic which
opposes change in the particular "pervasive pattern of insti-

tutionalized behavior" of a given society.

That Devlin's

view is, after all, one of moral conservatism is suggested

by his discussion of social institutions which, he says,
both are and should be protected by the criminal law as a

matter of moral principle.
2.

Preservation of essential institutions

.

Devlin's examples

of law "enforcing a moral principle" reveal his concern for

resisting change in each society's "essential institutions":
Christian morality in the Western nations and both marriage
(be it monogamous or otherwise) and government in every

society.

(a) Christian morality.

J

In the Maccabaean Lecture,

Ernest Nagel, "The Enforcement of Morals," Humanist 28 (May-June 1968): 24.

35

Devlin emphasized that the morality
which the law should
enforce (at least in England, but
also in most other Western
countries) is Christian morality-the
absolute
and eternal

morality of divine revelation:

"I

suppose that moral stan-

dards do not shift; so far as they
come from divine revelation they do not, and I am willing
to assume that the moral

judgements made by a society always
remain good for that
society." Thus, in England the moral
standards of the
Christian religion "always remain good for
that society."
Indeed, "for the purpose of the limited
entry which the law
makes into the field of morals, there is no
practical
dif-

ference

.

.

.

between Christian morals and those which every

right-minded member of society is expected to hold."

Yet

the nature of positive morality is such that
"without the

support of the churches the moral order, which has its

origins in and takes its strength from Christian beliefs,

would collapse," taking with it both society and the law. 37
Even one of Devlin's supporters thinks this assertion "raises issues of difficulty, reaching far beyond the
scope of his paper." 38

Devlin makes an assertion of fact

without attempting to show that any given society's positive

morality (let alone that of England) is dependent on the
37

-"Devlin, pp. 18, 23. See also Basil Mitchell, Law,
Morality, and Religion in a Secular Society (London: Oxford
University Press, 1967), pp. 103-18.
38

Rostow, p. 182.

36

religious teachings of an organized church.

He implies,

nevertheless, that should the law not enforce
religious moral
rules the churches would not support the secular
laws which
39
Jy
remain.

Consider Devlin's statement of the argument:
A man who concedes that morality is necessary to
society must support the use of those instruments without
which morality cannot be maintained. The two instruments
are those of teaching, which is doctrine, and of enforcement, which is the law. If morals could be taught simply
on the basis that they are necessary to society, there
would be no special need for religion; it could be left
as a purely personal affair.
But morality cannot be
taught that way. Loyalty is not taught that way either.
No society has vet solved the problem of how to teach
morality without religion
So the law must base itself
on Christian morals and to the limit of its ability enforce them not simply because they are the morals of
most of us, nor simply because they are the morals which
are taught by the established Church--on these points the
law recognizes the right to dissent--but for the compelling reason that without the help of Christian teaching
the law will failT ^
.

,

2

One wonders what Devlin may think of Rome under the Antonines

or Russia under the Soviets: Does he regard the Stoics and
the Communists as being without capacity to teach morality?

Does atheism or agnosticism generally preclude the possibil-

ity of inculcating secular moral values?

Is any morality

possible only if predicated on religious doctrine?

Surely

there are many principles of -morality which can be taught
-^Glanville Williams, "Authoritarian Morals and the
Criminal Law," Criminal Law Review (March I966), pp. 141-42.
Devlin, p. 25 (emphasis added). Hart does not
attempt to answer this argument. See the effective refutation in Graham Hughes, "Morals and the Criminal Law," The
Yale Law Journal 71 (March I962): 681.

(and learned) without religion.

But even if they could not,

it would not follow either that the law should
enforce any

given religious morality or that the law could not
successfully be enforced without the support of religious

teaching.

While it is not inconsistent to advocate that a society
accept freedom of religious thought and practice but reject

freedom to engage in activities which are morally condemned,
it is inconsistent to say that a society which accepts free-

dom of religious thought and practice should limit freedom

on purely religious grounds.
(b) Marriage

.

Concerning this "essential" institu-

tion, Devlin says:

Whether a man should be allowed to take more than one
wife is something about which every society has to make
up its mind one way or the other. In England we
believe in the Christian idea of marriage and therefore
adopt monogamy as a moral principle. Consequently the
Christian institution of marriage has become the basis
of family life and so part of the structure of our
society. It is there not because it is Christian. It
has got there because it is Christian, but it remains
there because it is built into the house in which we
live and could not be removed without bringing it down.
Thus, Devlin thinks the removal of Christian marriage (i.e.

monogamy) would "bring down" or "destroy" his society--or,
rather, alter that society in a fundamental way such that h

would no longer recognize it as typically English.

According to Basil Mitchell, Devlin's most capable
defender,
Ibid., p. 9»

.
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insists nevertheleqq that

-t-h

Q

becure society,

i

the ramifications, of the institution
of Lrriage" its
a ons to
e insti ^tions of
parenthood and property
,
5ni
for *i
example, which are so complex that
there is no'
question of our trying to replace
Christian
marriage
by
Muslim marriage. It is obyious that
a great deal of our
sexual morality is intimately bound
up wi?h the institution of monogamous marriage, so that
if Lord Devlin
right
holding that the law has a proper concern is
with
monogamy, it is at least plausible to
suggest that it
cannot wholly disinterest itself in sexufl
morality"^

^

.

.

.

m

But then the law's "proper concern" with
sexual relations
would be institutionalizing marriage in general
rather than
any given form of marriage (monogamy, bigamy,
polyandry,

polygamy) in particular.

any society's existence— i

Even if marriage is essential to
.

e

,

,

legal arrangements providing

for parenthood, legitimacy of progeny, family property rights,
inheritance, etc., being required in any social community-it does not follow that monogamy or any other particular form

of marriage is essential to a given society's continued
existence

Mitchell points out that the minimum essentials of a
public morality cannot be confined to that set of rules without which no society could survive: some institutions must be

regulated in a way which is common for all members of one
society, although the way in which they are regulated might

be quite different from the mode of regulation in some other
itchell, pp. 25-26.

See also Anderson, p.
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society.

^

This his opponents could easily
grant, though
they would still consider justification
for a single set of
regulatory rules to be necessary. Does
social continuity
require that all members of the same society
conform to the
same code of sexual conduct? Some,
perhaps a majority in
the Anglo-American countries, sincerely
accept Christian
moral standards; but it does not follow that
others should
have to accept and to live by the same standards

'

for the

sake of social cohesion.^

We are therefore left with the conclusion that an
"essential" institution is merely one which happens to be
a

major part of a given society's life, or that it is essential because it exists in that society.

This being so, the

failure of the law to protect such an institution would not

necessarily result in harm to those who live within it.
Neither Devlin nor Mitchell has established that giving up

monogamy is productive of harm; all they have established is
that it would result in a significant change in England's

way of life and positive morality.

Although it may be true

that the "protection of individuals from harm is not a purpose which can be realized independently of the protection

of the institutions under which they live,

^ it is not true

^Ibid., pp. 35-37.
C. L. Ten, "Religious Morality and the Law," Australasian Journal of Philosophy ^7 (August 1969): 1 69-73 and
Idem, "Enforcing a Shared Morality," pp. 327-28.
»

itchell, p. 68.
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that all the institutions under which they live must be

legally protected in order to prevent injury to individuals.
The category of 'essential institutions* does not help us to

determine which institutions need legal protection for this
reason. 46
It turns out, then, that both Devlin's and Mitchell's

ultimate goal is the preservation, not of "society," but of
existing social institutions such as monogamy.

Thus, accord-

ing to Mitchell,
Devlin is right in holding that the law may take
.
the line that monogamy as an institution is essential to
our society and be justified in taking it. This does
not mean that monogamy is essential to any society-obviously it is not. Nor does it mean that the law can
never, or ought never, to alter on this point. It means
simply that at any given period the law on marriage must
be definite and that change, if it comes, must come
slowly and must result in a law which, though different,
is equally definite. ^7
.

.

If this is the case, then monogamy is not "essential" at
all

— either

to any society or only to England

— for

both

Devlin and Mitchell admit that change from monogamy to other
forms of marriage may come someday, although it ought to
"come slowly."

But this, too, is a view of moral conserva-

tism.
^6

Carney, pp. 440-41.

This argument is of the same kind
30.
that each society's characteris40-43)
as Letwin's view (pp.
justifiably be legally enformay
civility"
tic "standards of
Morality (London:
Sexual
Atkinson,
See also Ronald
ced.
Hutchinson, 1965)1 P*

^Mitchell,

p.

(c) Government.

In his theory of social disintegra-

tion Devlin treats sexual "immorality"
(especially homosexuality) as if it were as harmful to society
as direct

attacks on the state.

Even private "immoral" practices are

seen by him to be just as potentially injurious
to society
as acts of public sedition against the legitimate
govern-

ment; therefore such conduct should be just as
punishable by
the criminal law:
.

The suppression of vice is as much the law's business as
the suppression of subversive activities; it is no more
possible to define a sphere of private morality than it
is to define one of private subversive activity.
It is
wrong to talk of private morality or of the law not
being concerned with immorality as such or to try to set
rigid bounds to the part which the law may play in the
suppression of vice. There are no theoretical limits to
the^ power of the State to legislate against treason and
sedition, and likewise I think there can be no theoretical limits to legislation against immorality. 48
Hart rightly takes issue with this thesis, saying

that the analogy with treason is "absurd" because

... it is grotesque ... to think of the homosexual
behaviour of two adults in private as in any way like
treason or sedition either in intention or effect. We
can make it seem like treason only if we assume that
deviation from a general moral code is bound to affect
that code, and to lead not merely to its modification
but .to its destruction. The analogy could begin to be
plausible only if it was clear that offending against
this item of morality was likely to jeopardize the
whole structure. ^9
ho

Devlin, pp. 13-14; see also pp. 33, 112. Although
he is uneasy with the treason analogy, Rostow (pp. 183 191)
>

defends it.
L. A. Hart, "Immorality and Treason," in The
Law as Literature ed. Louis Blom-Cooper (London: The Bodley
Head, 1961), p. 225,
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Even if sexual practices which deviate from
positive morality were tolerated by the law and would in fact
change
con-

ventional moral attitudes in a permissive direction,
we
would scarcely be led to say that the society in
question
was being destroyed or even subverted.

Rather, Hart says

"we should compare such a development not to the violent

overthrow of government but to a peaceful constitutional
change in its form, consistent not only with the preserva-

tion of society but with its advance."^ 0
The treason analogy may be more illuminating than

Devlin probably intended, for successful rebellions do not

typically "destroy" societies; rather, they change the distribution of political power within those societies.

"Much

of our anti-rebel legislation is designed to preserve not
the existence of the society but the particular system of

government."^

Hence we cannot be convinced by this analogy

that the legal enforcement of positive morality is meant to

achieve anything more than the continued observance of the

particular moral precepts (such as preservation of the exist
ing government) to which Devlin is committed.

It is, in

other words, another argument favoring moral conservatism.

*

See also
Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality p. 52.
Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 39.
,

^T. G. Ison, "The Enforcement of Morals," UniverColumbia Law Review 3 (March I967): 2?3«
British
sity of

^3

This discussion illustrates how Devlin's examples of

law enforcing a moral principle often confuse the point of
his original theory derived from the preservation of society.

There the point was that there is a public interest in

legally proscribing conduct generally thought to be "immoral"
because such activity is presumed to be harmful in some undefined way.

Brian Barry has shown that this earlier argu-

ment is different from that considered here

— viz.,

that

certain social institutions are desirable because they exist,
and that they ought to be protected from alteration by the

criminal law because they are traditional, hence presumably
"good for people":

But what Devlin has to show is that even where there is
no institution such as marriage at stake there is a
public interest in suppressing immorality because there
is a public interest in maintaining a like-thinking
community. Or to put it another way, he has to show
that over and above particular institutions there is
the institution of 'public morality' which is as worthy
of protection on grounds of public interest as the
institution of the state. As far as I can see Devlin
offers no evidence for this beyond his repeated assertion of it, and it seems to me a good deal more plausible to suggest that the Mill-Wolf enden criteria offer
a guide to the matters about which the members of a
community can safely agree to differ without threaten- Ding the dissolution of the community as a going concern.
Thus, Devlin's original theory is marred by a con-

fusing use of examples (which change that theory to one of

preserving existing institutions) as well as by the lack of
factual evidence and descriptively defined goals.
^ 2 Brian Barry,

ties Press, 1965).

P.

The plaus-

Political Argument (New York: Humani310-

(ft

ibility of his assertion of
the value of social
institutions
depends, of course, on the
general
theory deployed in its

support.

Edmund Burke valued established
institutions
because they developed as the
result of the adaptation of
men to the diverse conditions of
their lives.
But this

evolutionary defense of tradition
and custom is unavailable
to the legal moralist, for he
desires to use legal coercion
to maintain the institutional
and moral status quo by
arti-

ficially arresting the developmental
process which, Burke
held, gives social institutions their
value. 53 As

we have

seen, Devlin's general theory is
less than adequate because

of conceptual and evidentiary weaknesses.

But what of posi-

tive morality itself-which Barry says Devlin
must show to
be worthy of legal protection on grounds
of public interest?
3j Preservation of positive morality.

We have seen that

Devlin, Mitchell, and Hart (and, apparently, Barry as
well)

regard the public morality of a given community as a social
institution, and that Devlin and Mitchell disagree with Hart
and Barry over the question whether that "institution"

should be legally enforced.

Now, it is questionable whether

positive morality is an institution in the same sense as the
state and marriage and the family are social institutions.
A positive morality consists of the variable moral beliefs

and convictions of a given public

— which

are surely differ-

53
^Hart,
Law, Liberty, and Morality

,

pp.

7^-?5.

:

^5

ent from organized patterns of social
behavior.

Be that as

it may, Devlin and Mitchell argue that
consensual moral
beliefs ought to be enforced by the criminal
law because
they are "essential" to the maintenance of
a like-thinking

community and, hence, to the preservation of society.
Consider Devlin's statement of what he means by
1

society'

What makes a society of any sort is community of ideas,
not only political ideas but also ideas about the way
its members should behave and govern their lives; these
latter ideas are its morals.
[s]ociety means a
community of ideas ;• without shared ideas on politics,
morals, and ethics no society can exist. 5^
.

.

.

In effect, Devlin redefines 'society'

so that its survival

depends on the conformity both of private conduct and of

personal moral convictions to its positive morality, and

then he "slides into the usual meaning of the word to persuade us that the collapse of society would be very alarm55
ing."-^

Given this idiosyncratic meaning of 'society',

however, a given society's survival is

by_

definition depen-

dent on the preservation of a specific and shared moral
code, i.e., the positive morality peculiar to it.

Hart's criticism goes to the heart of this theory:

The short point is that if we mean by "society ceasing
to exist" not "disintegration" nor "the drifting apart"
of its members but a radical change in its common moral-

^Devlin,

pp. 9-10;

see also p. 89.

Ryan, John Stuart Mill (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1970), p. 247. See also Glenn Negley, Political
Authority and Moral Judgment (Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 1965). P- 64.

^Alan
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ity, then the case for using the
law to
ity must. rest not on any disintegration preserve moralthesis but on
some variant of the claim that when
groups of men have
developed a common form of life rich enough
to include
a common morality, this is something
which ought to bl
preserved. One very obvious form of this
claim is the
conservative thesis that the majority have
a right in
these circumstances to defend their existing
moral
environment from change. But this is no longer
an
6
empirical claim. 56

It appears, then, that Devlin must abandon
the theories

advocating legal moralism as a necessary means to
preserving
society and its fundamental institutions in favor of
a

theory advocating legal moralism either for its own
sake or
as a means to preserving positive morality itself— if
there

is indeed a difference between the

two.^

Accordingly, Devlin holds that it is popular moral

beliefs or "ideas about morals and ethics" that matter.

But

these beliefs are "harmed," he says, by "gross immoralities"
and "excessive vice"; hence society's positive morality must
be reinforced by state promotion of virtue.
(a) Gross immorality

.

In this argument Devlin

avails himself of the traditional but discredited distinc-

tion between "natural" and "unnatural" sexual practices.

He

says that the "grosser forms of vice" and "unnatural vice"
H. L. A. Hart, "Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality," The University of Chicago Law Review 35
(Autumn I967): 4.

^See R A. Samek, "The Enforcement of Morals: A
Basic Re-Examination in Its Historical Setting," The Canadian Bar Review 49 (May 1971): 215.

^7

(e.g., homosexuality and buggery)
both physically weaken
those who practice them and threaten
the moral beliefs of
those who learn of the existence of
such unorthodox sexual
practices. But the "harm" which Devlin
wishes to prevent is
not so much the alleged injuries to the
actor as the change
in the moral beliefs of the many. On the
other hand, "natural vice" (e.g., fornication, adultery,
and prostitution)
is also capable of causing

harm— but only when its practice

is either "excessive" or sufficiently offensive
to others.

Devlin leaves little doubt that it is "unnatural"
sexual behavior which is always both physically
debilitating
to the actor and destructive of society's faith in
its moral

convictions.

Therefore, homosexuals should certainly be

punished by the law, but not necessarily fornicators, adulterers, and prostitutes.

And why not the latter as well?

Because these "natural" practices are so "common" that law
enforcement would be "impracticable."^ 8

Apparently Devlin

does not see that the very fact that these activities are so

common might indicate that they do not offend against positive morality.
For Hart this argument simply means that if conduct
is generally considered "grossly immoral" there is no fur-

ther question whether its punishment by law is desirable.
The "immorality" of "unnatural" sexual activities is alone
5 Devlin,

pp.

111-14, 116; see also pp. 17-18, 22.
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sufficient to justify making them crimes because
Devlin presumes them (again by definition) to constitute
occasions of
grave offense to the moral beliefs of most other
59
people.

Apparently he also presumes them to be easier to
detect and
punish— despite their being less common M because the
,,

—

impracticability of enforcement argument (which he uses
to
absolve adulterers and fornicators from penal penalties)

is

brushed aside when it comes to homosexuals.

But "it must

surely be an embarrassment to any theory which assigns to
the law a large place in the 'protection' of the institution

of marriage that fornication and adultery are not crimes." 60
(b) Promotion of virtue

.

Because Devlin presumes

common beliefs about moral right and wrong to be seriously

challenged by even the mere knowledge that acts of "gross
immorality" are being committed by some, he proposes that
legal moralism be adopted to buttress the moral orthodoxy

through government promotion of citizen virtue.

Legal per-

missiveness, says Devlin, encourages sexual "immorality";

therefore government ought to take an active role in fostering "virtuous" ways of living through a policy of moral5 %art,

"Immorality and Treason," p. 225. Cf.
Rostow, pp. 189-90» See also Robert S. Summers, review of
Law, Liberty, and Morality by H. L. A. Hart, in New York
University Law Review 38 (December 1963): 1210.
,

6

J* F. Wolfenden (review of Law,
°Barry, p. 31°»
Liberty, and Morality by H. L. A. Hart, in The Spectator
5 July 1963, p. 19) also argues that adultery, more than
homosexuality, damages marital and familial stability.
,

,
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paternalism, for "the purpose of the law is to conserve
the
61
moral welfare of the State."
Thus, Devlin holds
that,

aside from preserving either society or its existing
institutions, legal moralism is necessary to protect the
moral

consensus from being undermined and altered. 62

Accordingly,

he enjoins the state to become moral tutor to the citizen:

"[Devlin] seems sometimes to be arguing

.

.

.

that society

has a right to punish conduct of which its members strongly

disapprove

play

...

on the ground that the state has a role to

as moral tutor and the criminal law is its proper

tutorial technique." 6 ^
This argument may be viewed as a separate and inde-

pendent theory which values a virtuous citizenry as the

ultimate goal of their government's paternalism.

It seems

to me that such a view was a sub-theme of the Maccabaean

Lecture, although since then Devlin emphatically denied that

such was his intent or meaning.
63

64

Nevertheless, while the

'Devlin, p. 89 (emphasis added).

62

Ibid., pp. 120, 135-37.

6

-^Ronald Dworkin, "Lord Devlin and the Enforcement
of Morals," The Yale Law Journal 75 (May I966): 988. An
American proponent of this view is Walter Berns, Freedom,
Virtue and the Fifth Amendment (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1957). A brief critique of both Berns and
Devlin may be found in Judith N. Shklar, Legalism (Cambridge
Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 90-92.
6

George Anastaplo ("Law and Moral^Devlin, p. 89.
ity: On Lord Devlin, Plato's Meno, and Jacob Klein," Wisconsin Law Review [Winter I967], pp. 241-43) thinks Devlin does
not go far enough in advocating legal promotion of virtue.
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issue was still moot Hart attacked the
suggestion that government promotion of virtue by means of
the criminal law is
desirable, pointing out that legally enforced
morality is
"morally worthless" because abstinence from
"sin" which is
motivated by fear of detection and punishment
is not condu-

cive to fostering moral virtue.^

There is another interpretation, however.

Unlike

the classical theorists (e.g., Plato and Aristotle)
who

would have government enforce some abstract standard of
virtue in order to make citizens "better" or more "perfect,"

Devlin characterizes his standards of moral paternalism in
terms of the conventional virtues upheld by the positive

morality of any given society.

(On this principle, then, he

must hold that the law should not punish homosexuality where
positive morality considers it "virtuous," e.g., in ancient
Greece.)

For Devlin, the virtues which the law should

foster through enforcement are the moral ideals of a given
public* s shared morality.

Of course, this amounts to the

assertion that government ought to enforce the moral ideals
of the majority.

This view is therefore best understood as

a special case of moral populism.

^H. L. A. Hart, "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal
Law," The Lawyer 8, no. 2 (I965): 50* Some have criticized
Hart for failing to see that a legally enforced morality can
be morally worthwhile, e.g., by resulting in fewer antisocial acts. See Mitchell, p. 72} McElrea, p. 210; Maurice
Cowling, The Nature and Limits of Political Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963)> p. 20; and H. J.
McCloskey, "Some Arguments for a Liberal Society," Philosophy ^3 (October 1968): 335-37-
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(c) Moral populism.

This theory and Devlin's adher-

ence to it become apparent when his
argument moves to the
question of determining the morality which
ought to be

enforced.

That is, the theory emerges from Devlin's
recommendations of methods by which to ascertain
the moral judgments on which the legislature should act.
These recommendations make it clear that Devlin has abandoned
his earlier
view that the moral standards to be enforced are
those of

divine revelation or of Christian religious teachings.

It

turns out that he favors the secular doctrine of moral
populism:

.

[0]nly those canons of good and evil which still are
generally obeyed should be taken as the basis of the
secular law. The law must be taken from present and
not from past morality and cannot be justified simply
on the basis that it accords with Christian doctrine. 66

What present-day moral principles should be legally enforced?
[A] moral principle, if it is to be given the force of
should be one which twelve men and women drawn at
random from the community can be expected not only to
approve but to take so seriously that they regard a
breach of it as fit for punishment 67
law,

.

Thus, Devlin holds that the criminal law should correspond
to the conventional morality of the majority, and moral

populism is the critical principle which justifies the penal
sanction.

Hence a given society's government ought to use

the criminal law to enforce positive morality because the

^Devlin, p. 62.
6?

Ibid., p. 90.
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majority has a moral right to the
prevalence of its strongly
held moral convictions. 68
Devlin's discussion of Shaw's case 69
serves to illustrate this theory. Shaw, the publisher
of a directory of
prostitutes (The Ladies Dirsptnrvl was convicted
of three
criminal offenses: obscenity, living off the
immoral
,

earn-

ings of prostitution, and conspiring to corrupt
public

morals.

On appeals the defense argued that conspiracy
to

corrupt public morals was not a statutory offense.

But by a

majority of four to one the House of Lords held that there
was such an offense at common law and that the accused was

rightly found guilty of it.

Of course, Devlin personally

approved of this result: "With this cardinal enunciation of
principle the courts rejected the teaching of John Stuart

Mill and proclaimed themselves keepers of the nation's
morals."

The decision in Shaw's case is therefore per-

fectly in line with Devlin's advocacy of moral populism

because "it makes the jury a constitutional organ for deter68

Dworkin (pp. 992-1002) provides a detailed analysis and critical commentary.
But cf. Case Hoogendoorn, "On
the Legal Enforcement of Morals," The Christian Lawyer ^
(Winter 1972): 11-17; and Rolf E. Sartorius, "The Enforcement of Morality," The Yale Law Journal 81 (April I972):
893-98.
69

^Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecution,
kk6 (1961), A.C. 220 (1962).
70

2

A.E.R.

Devlin, pp. 88-89. Recently Devlin ("Law in a
Society,"
New Law Journal 25 January 1973» p. 87)
Restless
reversed himself, saying he regrets the Shaw decision for
having put a "political" issue "out of politics into the
hands of the judiciary."
'

,
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mining what amounts to immorality and when the
law should be
enforced.

Devlin allows that having a jury decide what
conduct
the law should penalize creates problems: it
reduces the
element of "reasonable certainty" in the law and
requires
the jury to perform "the function of legislator." 72

Never-

theless, he answers that if its results are found undesir-

able the jury may be overridden in the legislative branch:
"If Parliament dislikes the fruits of the judicial process,
it can say so; frequently in the past it has altered the law

declared by the courts.

Devlin does not report the

frequency with which Parliament alters the law declared by
the courts with respect to sexual offenses.

Shaw's case was

not overturned, and one would expect that most others

not all

— have

been left standing.

— if

In the United States the

state legislatures and the Congress seem even more reluctant
to enact reforms of penal statutes, let alone to reverse

common law judicial decisions regarding sexual offenses.
For Devlin, then, the translation of community

morals into criminal law is an intrinsic good.

This view

rests on Devlin's notion of the nature of morality: all mor-

ality is equivalent to positive morality, for all morality
?1

Ibid., p. 91.

72

Ibid., pp. 98-99.

73 Ibid.

,

p.

99.

5^

is determined by the "feelings" of the "reasonable"
and

"right-minded" man.

If such feelings about "immoral" con-

duct are widely held and are strong enough— if the
"collec-

tive judgement of society" expresses "a real feeling of

reprobation" determined by the threshold criteria of "intolerance, indignation, and disgust "--then the criminal law is

justified in bringing such activity within its scope.

^

Thus, Devlin appears to say that the greater someone's

intolerance, the greater his right to have legal effect
75
given to it.'-"

This emphasis is present throughout his

lectures, and is reiterated in his 1965 "Preface": "If there
is not that intensity of feeling

.

,

.

the collective judge-

ment should not be given the force of law."^
Devlin is aware of the relativistic implications of
this view, for he says that every society's "integrity,"
i.e., the cohesion of its individual members, depends on the

strength and not the "truth" of its shared moral beliefs:
have said that a sense of right and wrong is necessary
for the life of a community. It is not necessary that
their appreciation of right and wrong, tested in the

I

^Ibid., pp. -16-18, 78, 90-95- In my view, then,
(review of The Enforcement of Morals by
Tapper
Colin
Patrick Devlin, in The Modern Law Review 29 March I966]:
2l4) errs in thinking that when Devlin spoke of ordinary men
"feeling intolerant, indignant and disgusted he really meant
but at
these feelings to be directed not at practices
convicnot
by
bad laws, and that they were to be expressed
tions but by aquittals."
,

1

.

75 Williams, p. 136.

"^Devlin, p. ix.

.

.
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light of one set or another of those
abstract
tions about which men forever dispute, should proposibe correct.
er ?' only one s °ciety at most could
survive.
ZZ
i
u
What +the
lawmaker has to ascertain is not the true
belief but the common belief. 77
"What is important," according to Devlin, "is
not the qual-

ity of the creed but the strength of the belief
in it.
enemy of society is not error but indifference." 78

The

There-

fore the common moral beliefs of a given public are
entitled
to legal enforcement merely because they happen to
enjoy

popular support.
It is understandable that Devlin's defenders should

shrink from this doctrine.

For example, in a striking pas-

sage on Devlin's moral populism, Mitchell writes:
So his critics, it seems, are right after all.
What
is morality, for the purpose of the law, is to be determined by counting heads, and inquiry into the reasonableness of the morality so determined is superfluous.
We are committed to the view that the positive morality
of a given society is beyond criticism. Apartheid must
be accepted in South Africa, genocide in Nazi Germany.
If the test is survival, any surviving society, however
unjust, has automatically passed the test. 79

But,

"mercifully" says Mitchell, "Devlin is not consistent.

For there are a number of considerations which militate
against this interpretation." 8

0

It is clear, though, that

Mitchell's discussion of these mitigating "considerations"

^Ibid.,
78

p.

9k.

Ibid., p. 114.

"^Mitchell, p. 42.
Ibid.
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is an attempt to escape the unacceptable
implications of

Devlin's normative view, for he is unable to cite
any contrary view which would support his charge of inconsistency.

Mitchell's attempted exculpation of Devlin's moral

populism merely asserts that "there appears to be no necessary connexion between the claim that the law may be used to
enforce morality and moral conservatism," and concludes that

"Devlin need not be indifferent to the character of the morO

ality to be enforced."

-1

Of course Devlin "need not be in-

different," but his personal moral beliefs are not incompa-

tible with his view that the law ought to enforce the majority's moral beliefs; and, although there may be no "necessary" connection between legal moralism and moral conservatism, the latter is a sub-type of the former which (Mitchell

admits) Devlin patently propounds

populism.

I

— in

the guise of moral

agree with C. L. Ten's view that, if the Nazis

and the South African whites had abandoned their theories of

racial superiority and appealed instead to the necessity of

maintaining the distinctively fundamental institutions of
their respective societies, "then they would merely have

invoked the very principle Mitchell is defending."

82

Devlin apparently meant this argument to be taken

within the context of his original theory which derived from
8l
82

Ibid., pp. ^5-^7Ten,

"Enforcing a Shared Morality," p. 327.

"
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the principle of society's preservation.

Indeed, it first

came to light in a discussion of "practical limitations" on

the obligation of government to enforce positive morality:

"Nothing should he punished by the law that does not lie

beyond the limits of tolerance.

It is not nearly enough to

say that a majority dislike a practice; there must be a real

feeling of reprobation.

8^

Thus, before the law may justi-

fiably interfere with an activity "there must be a deliberate judgement that the practice is injurious to society":

There is, for example, a general abhorrence of homosexuality. We should ask ourselves in the first instance
whether, looking at it calmly and dispassionately, we
regard it as a vice so abominable that its mere presence is an offence.
If that is the genuine feeling of
the society in which we live, I .do not see how society
can be denied the right to eradicate it. 8^
In defense of this view Rostow argues--contrary to
Devlin,

I

think

— that

the presence of these intense feelings

is a necessary but not sufficient condition for justifying

laws proscribing homosexuality.

D

I

agree, rather, with

Ten's view that Devlin's arguments for moral populism
already make clear that he believes that there are
occasions when the law rightly suppresses immorality as
In these cases the fact that an action is genersuch.
ally regarded as immoral is apparently sufficient to
outweigh all the other factors he mentions. It would be
interesting to know when he thinks that such a situation
is reached, but whereas his Maccabaean Lecture seems to
oblige on this point, Rostow' s interpretation of his
.

.

.

^Devlin, pp. 16-17.
8
8

^Ibid., p. 17.

^Rostow, p. 180.

See also Anderson, p. 77-
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views leaves the question unsettled. Until this point
is settled one suspects that though Lord Devlin talks
of
weighing different factors, his scales are not altogether fair.
For if mere immorality can be a sufficient
reason for invoking the criminal law, one wants to know
when other principles may be brought to the scales and
still have a chance of tipping them in favour of toleration. 0b
I

conclude, contrary to Devlin's defenders, 87 that the norm-

ative view discussed here is distinct from the earlier

theories derived from the preservation of society and its
"essential" institutions, for it at least permits and may

even obligate the government to enact criminal legislation

proscribing conduct which, by "deliberate judgement" of the
majority, is regarded as sufficiently "immoral."

Viewed this way Devlin appears a populistic democrat
who would admit few, if any, constitutional limitations on

the influence of majoritarian preferences regarding the

framing of criminal statutes. 88

We have already seen that

Devlin thinks that neither in principle nor in practice can
limits be placed on the right of government to suppress

activities which are considered morally wrong; but here it
is instructive to see what he believes about popularly

Ten, "Crime and Immorality," p. 663.
Cf. Stone,' pp. 377-79Ryan, pp. 2^7-^8.

See also

8

See also Christopher Cherry,
?Mitchell, p. 50.
review of Law, Morality, and Religion in a Secular Society
by Basil Mitchell, in Philosophical Books 9 (May I968); 16.
,

88

See Sartorius, pp. 891-92. But cf. Edward H.
"The Collective Morality of a Maturing Society," Washington and Lee Law Review 30 (Fall 1973): ^25-26.

Levi,
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influenced legislation in democracies:
What they [ordinary men] believe may be quite wrong:
but
it is quite contemporary and quite real.
So in a democracy the existing laws contain the best and most comprehensive statement of contemporary social reality.
They are not a perfect statement. There is always
some
unrepealed junk that nobody will make the effort to get
&
rid of .09

Why Devlin does. not consider morals legislation to be included among the "unrepealed junk" should by now be clear.

No

wonder that critics charge that this view "reads like an
abjuration of the notion that reasoning or thinking has much
to do with morality." 90

This is what is meant by the claim

that moral populism is "irrational": it rejects the rele-

vance of reason, educated opinion, and critical morality in
favor of popular feelings, superstitions, and religiously
7
based moral beliefs. 91

Therefore, Richard Wollheim con-

cludes that Devlin entertains "a totally irrational concep-

tion of morals" which serves to illustrate "a paradox that
is recurrent in the history of morals"

— viz.,

that the quest

for moral objectivity leads to a dependence on "arbitrary
and unreliable" subjectivity, this time in the guise of the

ordinary man's feelings.
89 Devlin,
9 °Hart,

9l

See,

p.

92

126.

"Immorality and Treason,"
e.g., Dworkin, pp.

p.

222.

1000-02; and Hughes, p.

681.
9

Richard Wollheim, "Crime, Sin, and Mr. Justice
See also Norman
Devlin," Encounter 28 (November 1959): 39
World
(Cleveland:
Law
the
and
Death
St. John-Stevas, Life,
•

60

Id) Democracy and l egal moralism

.

Moral populism

raises another issue which has met with some undeserved
criticism from those who oppose legal moralism. Devlin
argues
that democratic principles imply a legal as well
as a moral
right of the majority to enlist the support of the
criminal

law for its moral preferences.

For instance, although

Devlin warns that "the law-maker's task, even in a democracy
is not the drab one of counting heads or of synthesizing

answers to moral questions given in a Gallup poll," he never
theless asserts that "there can be no objection to morality

being a matter for the popular vote."^

Devlin explains:

It is a commonplace that in our sort of society matters
of great moment are settled in accordance with the
opinion of the ordinary citizen who acts no more and no
less rationally in matters of policy than in matters of
morals. Such is the consequence of democracy and
universal suffrage. 9^
^

Hence in a democracy, "in the end the will of the people

must prevail. " 7J
Some of Devlin's critics object to this view.

For

example, Ten writes:

Devlin's theory of democracy implies that it is
undemocratic for legislators to enact unpopular laws.
Later Devlin ("PrePublishing Company, I96I), pp. ^2-^3
(i.e., discon"irrational
beliefs"
face," p. viii) excluded
but he
of
moral
populism,
firmed ones) from his formulation
allowed the criteria of "intolerance, indignation, and disgust" to stand unaltered.
•

^Devlin, pp

^Ibid.,

p.

.

93-9^.

91.

95 Ibid., p. 92.

o
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But f t le crit erion of whether a government
is "demoJ- „ l
cratic
is the extent to which it satisfies the will
of
the majority of the people, then dictatorships
with
mass support, but no free elections, would be quite
democratic. 9
^

Clearly, Ten has Devlin's "theory of democracy" backwards.

Devlin does not attempt to establish a "criterion" for democracy, and hence is not guilty of implying that popularly

supported autocracies are "democratic."

Rather, he means

that when there is a government which meets democratic cri-

teria (such as free elections and universal suffrage) it
follows that the opportunities for popular influence on its

policies and legislation will be expanded and enhanced.
Thus, the principles of democratic government imply that

more often than not legislation is likely to conform to popular wishes—not that it is undemocratic for a legislature
to enact unpopular laws, but that it is less likely to.

To take another example, Glanville Williams says

that in holding that "the moral standards to be enforced by
the law must be the opinions of the mass of ordinary people"

Devlin is inviting us "to deduce moral intolerance from
democracy."

But, according to Williams, this "mistakes the

meaning of democracy as that term is understood in this
country.

...

We do not, in ordinary legal matters, resolve

questions in the way we think the uninstructed populace

would resolve them."
96 Ten,

Although Williams concedes that "the

"Enforcing a Shared Morality," p. 329.
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wrong-headed herd may be able to force its will
by the use
of the vote," he thinks that this is no reason

for conclud-

ing that democratic principles imply moral
populism. 97
ever, the "ordinary" understanding of •democracy

1

How-

is that of

an indirect, representative, and limited form of
government,

whereas the populistic democracy of Devlin's theory is
(contrary to fact— fortunately!
unlimited.

)

direct, plebiscitary, and

While no particular governmental policy can be

deduced from either kind of democratic principles, Devlin's

notion of democracy would certainly encourage a policy of
moral populism.
As we shall see (Ch. Ill, D,

2,

d),

Hart, too, holds

that Devlin's treatment of moral populism and democracy

rests on a "confusion" and a "misunderstanding" of democratic principles.

But Devlin is guilty of no inconsistency in

advocating both democracy and the legal enforcement of positive morality.

If no exceptions to democratic principles

are made, the legal prohibition of, say, homosexuality has
to be tested in the same manner as any other statute

— Is

this a law which the majority (of citizens? voters? legis-

lators?) pref ers?--and there is no basis on democratic principles for treating it any differently.

98

Opponents of

legal moralism must therefore also oppose populistic demo97 Williams,

p.

137.

98 See Ison,
p. 271.
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cracy to the extent that it permits

;he

majesty to impose

its moral views on minorities.
k. O bl ecti vg validit y of positive
,

r.—alitv

tive theories imply a further reason
each society's positive morality is

Klin's

.

for legs! m0 ralism:

^bjectiT=ly m0 rally

right, hence worthy of legal enforcement.

justifica-

tion of legal moralism rests, theref ore, on
the consensual and shared moral cod-

munity is the "true" morality.

norma-

-

e

.

c i a im

that

of a given social com-

The question Aether certain

basic moral principles are objectively valid

metaothics; therefore discussion of Devlin

1

-

.

9 i on gs

to

views on this

subject will be deferred until Chapter V.

li

Summary.

We have seen that Devlin's original theory

advocating legal moralism for the sa£e of prei 9rv i n society
g
must be abandoned on account of serious conceptual and evidential deficiencies.

Once this is done, it

ent that Devlin's advocacy of legal -oralism

servative .arguments

:

"r,o

CC me s appar.

r es t s

0n

con-

the legal enforcement of positive moral-

ity is desirable because it is necessary to pr eserve exist-

ing institutions (e.g., monogamous marriage

the govern-

ment) and positive morality itself, and becauso

in a

cracy the majority is entitled to tho enactment

0 f i aws

forming to its moral beliefs.

democon-

But oven this view must

assume that legal enforcement can in fact pres^ rV e existing
moral convictions from change

—a

highly tenuou-^ assumption,

•

6k
as we shall see in Chapter IV.

Devlin arrives at these normative conclusions by

making a chain of assumptions: legal moralism implies
the
preservation of positive morality, which in turn implies

the

preservation from change of society's "essential" institutions and society itself.

Hence society's "continued exis-

tence" means the presence of a shared positive morality;

society's "preservation" means the prevention of change to
its positive morality; and the maintenance of an unaltered

positive morality means the criminal punishment of "immoral-

ity as such."

Thus, Hart contends that Devlin's theory

appears to move from the acceptable proposition
that some shared morality is essential to the existence
of any society to the unacceptable proposition that a
society is identical with its morality ... so that a
change in its morality is tantamount to the destruction
of a society.
|_I ]t is only on this absurd criterion of what it is for the same society to continue
to exist that it could be asserted without evidence
that any deviation from a society's shared morality
threatens its existence. 99
.

.

.

.

.

.

Accordingly, Devlin's theory means that preservation from
change of positive morality, whatever its content might be,
is an intrinsic value.

This justifies its legal enforcement

and removes it beyond the purview of moral scrutiny.

In the face of these criticisms, Devlin backslides

from this view and denies that it is a faithful interpreta-

tion of his theory:

^Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
also Samek, p. 215

,

pp. 51-52.

See
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not assert that any deviation from a society's
shared morality threatens its existence any more than
I assert that any subversive activity threatens its
existence. I assert that they are both activities
which are capable in their nature of threatening the
existence of society so that neither can be put beyond
the law. 100
I do

Yet two paragraphs later he writes: "The proposition

in the text is that if

.

.

.

I

make

you cannot have a society

without morality, the law can be used to enforce morality as

something that is essential to society."

But this amounts

to precisely the same thing as the conservative arguments,

for Devlin adds nothing by way of conceptual clarification
and factual evidence to establish the credibility of his

original theory.
Similarly, Mitchell holds that, while Devlin "is not

entirely clear" about justifying legal moralism as a means
to maintaining the integrity of society,

"part of his mean-

ing, at least, is that society has a right to protect the

institutions that are judged essential to it and the morality associated with these institutions

.

101
"

Rostow, too,

says that the "essence" of Devlin's theory is that "the cri-

minal law should express, and must express, some of the
strong positions of a society's common public morality.

It

can appropriately change only when the community's lawi

makers are persuaded that the common morality has changed."
100
10l

Devlin, p. 13, in a footnote added in 19^5

•

Mitchell, p. 72 (emphasis added).

102

Rostow, p. 188.

For the view that the law should
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However, Devlin does not openly acknowledge his conservatism.
It is plain, though, that he thinks traditional institutions

and popular moral beliefs ought to be preserved from alteration, and that criminal legislation—despite the fact that
it entails grave harms and deprivation of liberty

appropriate means to securing these goals.

— is

the

In his words:

"Only the criminal law can be used to enforce moral standards."

103J

Apparently Devlin's personal moral standard is:

Compliance with positive morality is morally right

— because

positive morality is itself morally right.
shape and alter (as well as reflect) society's "moral sense"
see Morris Ginsberg, "The Enforcement of Morals," British
Journal of Sociology 12 (March I96I): 66-68; and Idem, On
Justice in Society (Baltimore, Md. Penguin Books, 196577
:

103

Devlin, p. 52.
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CHAPTER

III

NORMATIVE THEORIES--II
Pi Hart's Normative Theories

Like Devlin, Hart addresses himself to the question

whether legal moralism is justifiable: "Is the fact that
certain conduct is by common standards immoral sufficient to
justify making that conduct punishable by law?

ly permissible to enforce morality as such?
ity as such to be a crime?" x

Is it moral-

Ought immoral-

Hart's replies show that he is

unqualifiedly opposed to the legal punishment of "immorality
as such."

He argues in general that conduct should never be

made criminal merely because it is generally considered
"immoral."

Rather, penal legislation may justifiably be

enacted only for the sake of consequences other than "preserving" positive morality, e.g., preventing harm to others.

More particularly, Hart opposes the advocacy of
legal moralism for the sake of goals which he considers

vaguely defined and unrealizable.

For Hart, Devlin's theory

advocating legal moralism in order to prevent society's
disintegration is "confused and confusing" because its

plausibility depends on an interpretation which equates the
existence or preservation of a given society with the pre-

H.

L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty,

Oxford University Press, 1963)1

P»

4-

and Morality (London:
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vention of changes in its positive morality.

Moreover, Hart

doubts whether a given society's continued
existence is
realizable through the legal enforcement of its
positive

morality.

But even if it were true that without such

enforcement the society would "disintegrate" and "cease
to
exist," Hart would still oppose legal moralism because,
he
says,

such a society may not deserve to exist.

Hart rests his normative view on John Stuart Mill's

"famous sentence" from Chapter

I

of On Liberty

:

"That the

only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised
over any member of a civilised community against his will is
to prevent harm to others."

Some of the purposes of power

which Mill intended to exclude from this principle are the

promotion of the individual's own welfare and the protection
of his morals: The individual's "own good, either physical
or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.

He cannot rightfully

be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for
him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in
the opinion of others, to do so would be wise or even

right."

2

While Hart himself thinks that "there may be grounds

justifying the legal coercion of the individual other than
the prevention of harm to others," he nevertheless asserts

that Mill's single principle is adequate to support argu-

Quoted by Hart, p.
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merits opposing legal moralism.

On the "narrower issue" con-

cerning legal restrictions of sexual
conduct, Hart says,
"Mill seems to me to be right." Hence
Hart suggests that
the controversy over legal moralism is
best conceived in
relation to practices which deviate from
conventional sexual
morality: "I shall consider this dispute mainly
in relation
to the special topic of sexual morality
where it seems prima
facie plausible that there are actions immoral by
accepted

standards and yet not harmful to others. "^
Apparently, then, Hart thinks that there are grounds

for presuming the private sexual conduct of consenting

adults to be harmless to others and therefore beyond the

rightful control of the criminal law.

He is therefore in

fundamental disagreement with Devlin over the harmfulness of
sexual acts which contravene a given society's positive morality.

Hart grants to the legal moralist the factual

assumption that certain kinds of sexual activity (e.g.,
homosexuality) are considered "immoral" in Western societies
hence he does not dispute Devlin's claim that homosexuality

violates England's positive morality.

But, unlike Devlin,

Hart holds that the private sexual practices of consenting

adults constitute matters of "private morality" in which

society has no interest and over which the law should have
no control—precisely because he presumes such conduct to be
3

-'Hart,

p.

5;

see also his "Preface," p. v.
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incapable of producing appreciable injury to others.
Hart avers that he is concerned with showing

... what precisely is wrong in mid- twentieth century
with, e.g., the idea of legally enforced chastity
and
generally with the use of the criminal law to stop
freely consenting adults engaging privately in sexual
practices, which are commonly spoken of and (more
doubtfully) thought of as "immoral".^
This thesis draws heavily upon Mill's single principle

regarding harm to others.

Yet there are several instances

where Hart appeals to other principles in answering the
arguments of Devlin and his supporters.

On these occasions,

according to Hart, the application of Mill's principle alone
is not adequate.

Thus, even with respect to the "special

topic of sexual morality" Hart applies more than one criter-

ion and therefore poses several theories in opposition to

Devlin's legal moralism.

The following analysis will consi-

der each theory in turn, beginning with that which is

strictly utilitarian.
1.

Utilitarian theory

.

Foremost among the reasons why Hart

opposes the legal enforcement of positive morality is his
intrinsic valuation of promoting human happiness--the major

principle in the classical utilitarian tradition of Jeremy

Bentham and John Stuart Mill

J

Put another way, Hart argues

that it is morally right, if not obligatory, for governments
to enact laws,

first, to alleviate rather than to exacerbate

"The Use and Abuse of the Criminal
Law," The Lawyer 8, no. 2 (I965): ^7H. L. A. Hart,

.

•
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human misery and suffering, and second, to
assure economical
and efficient law enforcement against those
forms
of undesi-

rable conduct which the law can practically
and effectively

control

ja.)

Prevention of misery and suffering;

.

Among the

most important and desirable functions of the positive law
in any society, according to Hart, are the reduction of

misery and the prevention of avoidable suffering.

Like

Bentham, Hart holds that criminal legislation produces con-

sequences (coercion and punishment) which are painful, hence

prima facie objectionable, to be tolerated only for the sake
of some countervailing greater good.

Punishment of the

offender involves deprivation of liberty of movement or of

property or of association with family and friends, or the
infliction of physical pain or even death.

Coercion of

others involves further restrictions on freedom wherein

human desires are frustrated by the fear of punishment which
the law threatens to apply to offenders.

These consequences

of the penal code can lead to extensive unhappiness which
must be justified
It follows, then, that a governmental policy of

legal moralism is both unnecessarily and unjustifiably

^Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality pp. 20-22, 57-60.
See also Robert S. Summers, review of Law, Liberty, and
Morality by H. L. A. Hart, in New York University Law
Review 38 (December I963): 1202-03.
,

,
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repressive and cruel.

For Hart, the legal proscription of

conduct for no reason other than its alleged "immorality"

results in law-created evils without compensating benefits. 6
Specifically, the criminal statutes against deviant sexual
conduct recommended by Devlin "create misery in quite
special ways and in a special degree," for they repress and

frustrate strong impulses which are "recurrent and insistent."

Legal suppression of sexual drives "affects the

development or balance of the individual's emotional life,
o

happiness, and personality."

It is necessary, then, to

justify such legal unfreedoms by showing that they are

instrumental in bringing about goods greater than the evils
they cause.
What good consequences are there to set off against

the suffering created by morals legislation as a justifica-

tion for enacting it?

Contrary to Devlin, Hart thinks that

there is none, for no one has ever "attempted to show that
the misery caused is balanced by the avoidance of greater
o

"
misery or the production of greater happiness. y

Hart

"The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," p.

^Hart,

See also H. L. A. Hart, "Immorality
^Ibid.
p. ^-8.
and Treason," in The Law as Literatu re, ed. Louis BlomCooper (London: The Bodley Head, 196TJ", p. 226.
,

8

Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality

^Hart,
^9-

,

p.

22.

"The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," p.

•

.
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doubts that any consequence theory can justify
legal moralism.

For one thing, he thinks that laws proscribing
"immor-

ality as such" are incapable of utilitarian justification:
It is surely not possible to regard the
disappointment
or indignation of those who wish for a legally enforced
morality if not gratified, as misery, comparable to
that which the laws inflict. Indeed, it .is very doubtful whether they suffer anything which could be called
misery at all. Nor, where such laws do exist, can the
satisfaction of those who want them be ranked as happiness which could outweigh the misery caused. 10
^

For another thing, he thinks Devlin's teleological theory

derived from society's preservation to be just as vulnerable
to criticism:

Why
should we assume that it is a good thing that
every society should continue to exist? Why should a
society whose principal occupation is torturing a
racial [or a sexual] minority continue to exist? Unless
we think that it should exist however great the misery
.

.

.

it causes,

surely the argument that certain laws are
required to preserve the society is not per se sufficient to justify the misery they cause. li

Concerning any society whose survival is in fact dependent
on a policy of legal moralism, Hart says that "it is arguable that what Lord Devlin terms the 'disintegration' of
such a society would be morally better than its continued
ii

existence, and steps ought not to be taken to preserve it."

Contrary to Devlin, then, Hart holds that "preserv-

ing society" is not sufficiently valuable to offset the

Ibid.
11

12

Ibid., p. 51
Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality

,

p.

19

12

7^

negative utility of legal punishments for deviant sexual
conduct.

In so far as no greater happiness is produced and no

greater misery is avoided by a policy of legal moralism,
but

rather just the opposite, Hart concludes that morals legis-

lation should be opposed for utilitarian reasons, among
others.

Indeed, because attempts by the penal law to con-

trol private sexual behavior always have evil effects, Hart

suggests that moral guidelines for such conduct ought to be

supplied through nonlegal agencies, e.g., by educators,
moralists, religious teachers, and social workers. 1 ^
Hence Hart's view is that all adult persons have a

prima facie moral right to satisfy their sexual desires and
impulses as a means to the goal of happiness, and that they
should also have the correlative legal right to sexual

expression and gratification
consensual and private.

— so

long as such conduct is

Conversely, no one (not even the

majority in a democracy, as we shall see) has a moral right
to realize by means of the criminal law the fulfillment of

ideals regarding how others should conduct their lives
unless justified by the promotion of greater happiness or
the avoidance of greater misery.

For Hart, then, the legal

prohibition and punishment of conduct merely because it
3 Ibid.,

75-81; and H. L. A. Hart, The Morality
of the Criminal Law (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1964), PSee also Vincent C. Punzo, "Morality and the Law: The
32.
Search for Privacy in Community," Saint Louis University
Law Journal 18 (Winter 1973): 19^.
pp.

,
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contravenes positive morality is always undesirable
and unjustifiable.

(

b) Efficiency and practicality of enforcement

.

Hart's utilitarian theory also questions the desirability
of
legal moralism from the standpoints of practicality and
efficiency.

For Hart, it is desirable that law enforcement

agencies be used economically because of their limited
supply and abilities, and only in those situations where

they can be effective in either deterring or punishing undesirable conduct.

But,

says Hart, Devlin's legal moralism

would lead to uneconomical and impractical allocations of
society's limited criminal law enforcement resources.
First, because any society's law enforcement and

judicial resources are scarce, the attempt to detect and to

punish sexual deviants "will be a bad use of existing
resources, so long as thieves and murderers remain uncaught."

Since certain "universal values" (e.g., life,

liberty, property, and safety from deliberately inflicted

injury) must be secured by the law for any society to exist,

Devlin's recommendation that the government outlaw "the.

grosser forms of vice" would divert limited enforcement
resources from their chief purposes of detecting and of
either preventing or punishing conduct which directly
threatens the persistence of orderly social relations--viz
Hart,
48.

.

"The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," p.

'
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murder, assault, theft, and fraud. 1 5
-

This objection to legal moralism calls into question

Devlin's sense of priorities: Is it more important to
punish
"immorality" than to devote enforcement efforts exclusively

and fully to the control of violent crimes?

Devlin implies

that it is equally important for the law to attempt to do
both, for he holds that sexual "immorality" is just as

potentially harmful to society as sedition and treason.

But

Hart assumes that we cannot have everything we want, crime

prevention included.

Herbert Packer implicitly corroborates

Hart's view:

Every hour of police, prosecutorial, judicial, and
correctional time that is spent on marginal uses of the
criminal sanction is an hour lost to the prevention of
serious crime. Conversely, every trivial, imaginary,
or otherwise dubious crime that is removed from the
list of criminal offenses represents the freeing of
substantial resources to deal more effectively with the
high-priority needs of the criminal justice system. 1°
In a time of rising levels in the rate of violent
crimes, when only one in five of such crimes is solved, it

would appear foolhardy for anyone to expect legal agencies

%art, Law, Liberty, and Morality

,

pp.

70-71.

See

also H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1961), pp. 189-951 f\

Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal
Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp.
259-60. The same point is made by Nigel Walker, "Morality
and the Criminal Law," The Howard Journal 11, no. 3 (196*0:
217-18; Sanford H. Kadish, "The Crisis of Overcriminalization," The Annals 37^ (November I967): 159-62; and Louis B.
Schwartz, "Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code,"
Columbia Law Review 63 (April I963): 669.
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to place homosexuality and prostitution with
assault and

armed robbery in the same category of enforcement priority.

Informed opinion contradicts Devlin's supposition that
"immorality as such" is either harmful at all or sufficient-

ly harmful to justify use of the criminal law to suppress it.
Hence

I

agree with Joel Feinberg's judgment that "the essen-

tially utilitarian argument based on the need for prudent
allocation of our social energies in fighting crime may, by
itself, be a conclusive argument against the use of the cri-

minal sanction to prevent private (and therefore inoffensive)
conduct whose harmfulness is indirect and speculative at

most." 17
Second, Hart thinks that legal control of sexual

conduct is impractical because of the private nature of its
usual manifestations.

It follows that

.
concealment is relatively so easy that only a
negligible proportion of offenders against laws proscribing such behaviour are ever likely to be detected
or deterred by the law's threats, or by actual punishment. This situation could only be changed if the
punishment were made immensely more severe than would
in fact be tolerated, and even that might have very
little effect. 18
.

.

'Joel Feinberg, '"Harmless Immoralities' and Offensive Nuisances," in Issues in Law and Morality ed. Norman
S. Care and Thomas K. Trelogan (Cleveland: The Press of Case
Western Reserve University, 1973), P» 89.
,

18

Hart, "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," p.
Summers (p. 1204). seems to be of two minds about this
point: first he says that "this argument alone cannot be
very weighty" (citing the example of secret incest), and
then he holds, in agreement with Hart, that if "the criminal
then the effort
law simply cannot be effectively used
48.

.

.

.
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This objection to legal moralism claims that laws proscribing certain sexual acts cannot effectively be enforced, just
as those against taking illicit drugs usually cannot.

The

truth of this is in itself sufficient to convince Lon Fuller
(Hart's opponent on other issues in the philosophy of law)
that Devlin's legal moralism is undesirable.
to agree with Fuller that,

am inclined

I

"without having to reach agree-

ment on the substantive moral issues involved" in the
enforcement of morals controversy, this objection to Devlin's
views is fatal to his whole position.

Rather than consti-

tuting only one among many arguments against making private
consensual sexual practices by adults criminal because
"immoral," Hart should have used it as the primary reason

for opposing legal moralism.
The arguments outlined here are,

I

think, more than

sufficient to refute Devlin's normative views.
to crimes against persons or property,

With respect

even though the cost

of enforcement is high, the gravity of the offenses justifies
the criminal sanction.

But concerning so-called "crimes

against morality," where enforcement is both extremely costly
ought to be abandoned" for the sake of preventing cynicism
of the public toward law enforcement and the legal process.
1

^Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 196^), pp. 132-33- See also Yves
Caron, "The Legal Enforcement of Morals and the So-Called
Hart-Devlin Controversy," McGill Law Journal 15 no. 1
(I969): 3^-35; and Richard Taylor, "Law and Morality," New
York University Law Review ^3 (October I968): 637-^0.
»
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and ineffective, and where the putative harmf ulness is questionable, there appears to be no justification for the law's

concern with curbing them and punishing their perpetrators.

When the costs are high and the yield negligible, the penal
law should not be used.

If it is, more evil than good will

result: the welfare of many individuals and of the social

collectivity will be lessened.
Devlin has not attacked Hart's utilitarian theory,
nor has he submitted a rejoinder which meets and refutes its

objections to legal moralism.

Indeed, at one point Devlin

grants that the misery and suffering created by legal coer-

cion and criminal punishment must be taken into account when
20
deciding whether to outlaw "immoral" practices.

But

regarding the exorbitant cost and impracticality of enforcing such statutes, Devlin has nothing to say.

To other

legal moralists Hart's utilitarian theory would appear to be
just as impervious to attack, for none of them has raised

any objection to it.

In my view, then, the legal moralists

have lost the debate by default.

2.

Nonutilitarian principles

.

Legal moralism is also unde-

sirable, according to Hart, for reasons other than its nega-

tive utility: it would lead to unequal legal treatment of
sexual offenders, decrease the consistency and predictabil-

ity of the law itself, unjustifiably restrict the intrinsic
20

Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965). p. H7«
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value of individual freedom, and permit democratic majori-

ties to dictate how all shall live their private lives.
(a) Equality of legal treatment

.

For Hart, it is

desirable that administration of the criminal law result in
equal treatment of similar offenders: those who commit

similar offenses ought to be similarly punished.
is a consideration of justice, not of utility.

Hence this
But, Hart

says, legal attempts to enforce positive morality with

respect to sexual conduct are unjustifiable because, besides
the misery and suffering they create, they also tend to

result in "gross inequalities."
First, Hart claims that the difficulty and impracti-

cality of successful law enforcement with respect to sexual

offenses are so great that "it must be a mere matter of
chance that enables evidence to be obtained in some cases
and not in others equally 'bad'."

21

Since only "a negligi-

ble proportion of offenders" are likely to be either detected or deterred in their private sexual practices, applica-

tions of the law will be capricious and therefore unequal.

Like drug users, sexual deviants who are detected would be

unjustly treated by the processes of criminal justice.
Second, because of widespread disagreement over the

moral gravity of sexual deviance and the punishment it
deserves, "there will be wide variations in the actual pun2l

48.

Hart,

"The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," p.
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ishments meted out in similar cases." 22

Since Hart claims

that contemporary sexual morals
are determined by "variable
tastes and conventions,"^ he thinks
it highly unlikely that
penalties for similar sexual offenses
will themselves be
similar. Thus, another objection
against legal moralism is
that it is likely to result in unequal
treatment of similar
2i|
cases by the law.
This objection seems to me a good deal
weaker than
the utilitarian theory. Its deficiency lies,
not in
its

.factual assumptions (which are no doubt accurate),
but in
its implication that unequal legal treatment of
offenders is

peculiarly characteristic of sexual offenses of this kind,
but not of criminal offenses in general.

Is it, however,

not safe to assume that a rather large proportion of scoff-

laws are neither deterred nor detected and punished?

Park-

ing and speeding auto violations abound; but more important,
according to the FBI only 20 per cent of "serious crimes"
which are reported are also brought to adjudication.

It

could be, in Hart's words, "a mere matter of chance that
enables evidence to be obtained" in these cases as well.
22
*
23
2*4-

Is

Ibid.
Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality

,

p.

73.

Hart's view that the law should treat like cases
alike has recently been criticized as "trivial" because the
law does not usually operate that way. See Kenneth I.
Winston, "On Treating Like Cases Alike," California Law
Review 62 (January 197*0: 1-39; and Idem, "Justice and Rules
A Criticism," Logique et Analyse 1*4- (March-June 1971): I7782.

"
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it not also true that legal penalties
for similar nonsexual

offenses may vary?

Sentencing behavior of trial judges

shows that judicial discretion is exercised not only
in

determining which laws apply to a given offense but
also in
punishing defendants found guilty of the same crime.
In any
event, it is surely less than obvious that legal
moralism

differs significantly from the administration of criminal
justice generally in its propensity to result in "gross

inequalities

.

Hart also offers a corollary to this view:

"[Prin-

ciples of justice or fairness between different offenders

require morally distinguishable offences to be treated dif-

ferently and morally similar offences to be treated alike.

2^

This means that "the law should reflect the principle of
justice that morally disparate cases should not be punished

with the same severity unless there is some overriding moral

reason for departing from this principle."

Thus, Hart

holds that the moral gradation of legal punishments is

justified on grounds of fairness: the severity of punishment

should fit the "immorality" of the crime.
Hart explains that the question 'How severely should
we punish different offenses?' is distinct from and indepen-

dent of the question 'What kind of conduct may justifiably
2

%art, Law, Liberty, and Morality

,

p.

37.

Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law

,

p.

51.
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be punished?*

Answers to the former should conform
to the
principle of justice by weighting criminal
punishments

'

according to the comparative moral gravity
of the offense.
Clearly, this is a moral criterion. On
the other hand,
replies to the latter should adhere to the
principle of
utility by criminalizing only those activities
which are
shown to be sufficiently harmful. Contrary to
the legal

moralist, Hart says that "we cannot infer from
principles

applied in deciding the severity of punishment what the
aims
of the system of punishment are or what sorts of conduct
may

justifiably be punished."

Thus, Hart holds that, while only

injurious activities should be punished, it is morally right
"to mark moral differences between different offenders" by

adjusting "the severity of punishment to the moral gravity
of offences."

But, he says, this does not imply either that

it is morally right to punish activities which are not harm-

ful or that "punishment merely for immorality is justified." 2

Devlin thinks that Hart's two questions are not
independent:

They are a division, made for the sake of convenience,
of the single question which is: 'What justifies the
sentence of punishment?' The justification must be
found in the law and there cannot be a law which is not
concerned with a man's morals and yet which permits him
to be punished for his immorality .28
2

^Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality pp. 36-38.
See
Criminal
of
the
Law
also Idem, The Morality
pp. 53-5^,

,

28

Devlin, p. 130.

7
'

8^

Of course, Devlin has no quarrel with the
reasons Hart gives
"for allowing moral considerations to enter
into
the assess-

ment of punishment," for he, too, favors this
view.
But he
thinks that these considerations force Hart to
withdraw
"from the firm line that the law is not concerned
with morality as such." Thus, to Devlin "it seems
to
.

'

.

.

be an

emasculation of Mill's doctrine to say that it is to apply
only to the making of the law and not to the administration
of it." 29
Devlin's criticism is justified if Hart intends that
the moral gradation of punishments be determined by the

positive morality of a given society rather than by an

utilitarian assessment (like that given by Bentham) of the
various punishments necessary to deter different crimes.

There are some indications that Hart means the latter.
C. L.

Thus,

Ten argues, in support of Hart, that legal punishments

should both fit the relative seriousness of the crime and
take into account the extenuating and aggravating conditions

which reduce or increase criminal guilt (mens rea); on this
view, moral considerations influence the punishments meted

out both by

permitting mitigating conditions, like the presence of provocation, to reduce the punishment for a
particular offence, and in seeing that offences like
murder and armed robbery, which are generally regarded
as morally graver, receive a more severe punishment
.

.

.

Ibid., p. 131.

See also Caron, p. 32.
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n
S
tty theft and
are ies°s graie:3r

fences, which

On the other hand, if Hart's principle
means that "morally
graver" crimes ought to be more severely

punished than those

which are "less grave," how are we to
account for his claim
that "there are many reasons why we might
wish
the legal

gradation of the seriousness of crimes, expressed
in its
scale of punishments, not to conflict with
common

estimates

of their comparative wickedness"?

"One reason," besides

that of justice or fairness, Hart holds, "is that
such a

conflict is undesirable on simple utilitarian grounds:
it

might either confuse moral judgments or bring the law into
disrepute, or both." 31

But this is not the utilitarian

justification offered by Bentham; nor, as Devlin points out,
is it applicable merely to legal punishments alone: one of

the arguments against repeal of the statute proscribing

homosexuality is that "moral judgements might be confused
and the law brought into disrepute because people would see

moral wickedness going unpunished." 32

Since Hart denies

that "immorality as such" should be criminally punished, he
is inconsistent in allowing "common estimates of their com-

parative wickedness" to determine the degree of punishment
30
^
C. L. Ten,

"Crime and Immorality," The Modern Law

Review 32 (November I969): 659.
31

Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality

32 Devlin,

p.

131.

,

pp. 36-37-

:
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inflicted on criminal offenders.

Surely this view contra-

dicts both his utilitarian theory
and his view that justice
requires equal legal treatment
of offenders convicted of
the
same crime.

Devlin holds that it also constitutes
"an abuse of
power"
It is a doctrine firmly embedded
in English law that
1S .Sjven ^r one purpose,
whether"
SSKtl^SS JU ge
St n0t be used for another
purlose
fh«? f. h 36
P ° Wer: and its Prevention is
6
essenti^
S e
?h
? lal t ? + t ^ e existence of a free society. Under
+h
the
law
as it is now administered it would
be an abuse
PUniSh f ° r immorali *y that is outsiSe
the
'

L

^
f

^33^

But this charge is ambiguous.

If it means that Hart wishes

to punish activities which are not
legally prohibited, then

Devlin is plainly wrong.

However, if it means that Hart

wants to inflict degrees of punishment which are
not specified by law, then there is no clear-cut answer,
for Hart
does not explicitly advocate that estimates of a
crime's

moral gravity be incorporated within the scale of punishments provided by statute.
Hart would therefore agree with Devlin's view that a

criminal offender may justifiably be punished according to
the wickedness of his crime:
It sometimes happens that an act which is a breach of
the criminal law is also a breach of that part of the
moral law that is not included in the criminal. Thus
a course of deception might include an adultery.
A
judge may proportion his sentence according to the

Ibid., p. 129.
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degree of immorality involved in the, act
itself but not
according to extraneous immorality. 3^
In the example given, Hart would not increase the
punishment
on account of the adultery but would proportion it
according
to the moral gravity of the deception.

This is not what

Devlin calls "an abuse of power" (i.e., punishment for
"extraneous immorality" or "immorality that is outside the
law"); rather, both Devlin and Hart agree that it is a

justifiable use of power to grade punishments according to
the "immorality" of the crime itself.

This view is different from the utilitarian justification of grading legal punishments.

For instance, Hart

could have argued that crimes causing greater harm ought to
be more severely punished, assuming that the harsher the

penalty the more likely that fear of punishment will succeed
in deterring the potential criminal.

Today, however, crimi-

nologists contend that it is not so much the severity as the

likelihood of punishment that has deterrent value.

This is

supportive of Hart's utilitarian theory regarding efficiency
of law enforcement: as the probability of detection and punishment-increases, would-be offenders will be deterred.
(b) Le^al consistency and predictability

to Hart,

.

According

"certainty" in the criminal law is, like equality

of treatment, another of its desirable qualities.

Ibid., pp. 129-30.

That is,
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both the content and the administration of the
law ought to
be consistent and predictable in order to insure
equal

(hence just) treatment.

Since, as we have seen, Hart

believes conventional sexual morality to be subject to the
influence of "variable tastes," he thinks that such moral
views change too frequently for the law faithfully to incor-

porate and consistently to enforce them.

Therefore the

legal enforcement of positive morality--especially with

respect to sexual practices

lead to inconsistent

and.

— is

undesirable because it would

unpredictable applications of the

law.

This objection to legal moralism emerges from Hart's

discussion of common law determinations of "moral crimes" as
ex post facto laws.

decision in Shaw's

In particular, Hart attacks the
ca.se JJ

for attempting to enforce conven-

tional moral views regarding sex-related conduct.

In Shaw's

case, as we have seen (Ch. II, C, 3» c), the House of Lords

resurrected the ancient common law doctrine of conspiracy to
corrupt public morals.

While Devlin approves of this

because it supports his view of moral populism, Hart objects

because it would lead both to legal uncertainty and to the

lessening of public respect for the law.
Hart's opposition to the Shaw decision is based on
his claim that the principle of "legality" is necessary to

-^Shaw

v.

Director of Public Prosecution,

446 (1961), A.C. 220 (1962).

2

A.E.R.
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insure uniform and reasonably certain
applications of the
law to particular offenses:

The particular value which they [Lords]
the principle of legality which requires sacrificed is
criminal
offences to be as precisely defined as
possible, so
xnat it can be known with reasonable
certainty beforehand what acts are criminal and what are
not.
As a
result of Shaw's case, virtually any
cooperative conduct is criminal if a jury consider it ex
post facto
Ve
een immoral
So while Mill^olIlTTive
...
2
^?
^
shuddered at the law laid down in Shaw's case
as authorising gross invasions of individual liberty,
Bentham
would have been horrified at its disregard of the
legal values of certainty and its extension of
what he
called "ex post facto law. "36
-

For Hart, then, but not for Devlin, the principle
of legality is a value with which the criminal law should

be imbued.

On this point

Fuller

)

I

agree fully with Hart (and with Lon

that the criminal law ought to be clear and

precise in its content and regular in its application.

Should this require translation of common law offenses into
statutory ones, so much the better.

At least the element of

uncertainty (or surprise) would thereby be removed from the
law.

It would avoid as well the unseemly and irregular

occurrence of criminal convictions being upheld on appeals
for reasons other than those for which defendants were orig-

Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality p. 12.
See also
J. E. Hall Williams, "The Ladies Directory and Criminal Conspiracy," The Modern Law Review 2k (November I96I): 631 and
Glanville Williams, "Conspiring to Corrupt," Listener 2k
August I96I, p. 275. For a pro-Devlin commentary, see A. L.
Goodhart, "The Shaw Case: The Law and Public Morals," Law
.Quarterly Review 77 (October I96I): 560.
,

;

,

37

^'Fuller, passim.
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inally accused and found guilty, as was done
by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the case of Ralph Ginzburg. 38
(c) Int rinsic valuation of freedom

that Hart values freedom extrinsically

,

.

We have seen

i.e., as a means to

the utilitarian goals of welfare and happiness.

He finds

legal moralism undesirable because legal unfreedom (coercion
and punishment) creates rather than alleviates human misery

and suffering.

At least with respect to private sexual con-

duct, then, Hart values individual liberty as the means

necessary to the satisfaction and gratification of human
desires, to the development of emotionally stable personalities, and to the achievement of happiness.

Hart values freedom intrinsically as well, i.e., as

desirable for its own sake.

For instance, he speaks of

"human misery and the restriction of freedom," "human

suffering and the loss of freedom" as intrinsic evils. 3 ^
He asserts that "free choice may be held a value in itself

with which it is prima facie wrong to interfere."

llQ

It

seems, then, that for Hart both liberty and welfare are
38

Ginzburg v. U.S., 354 U.S. 413 (1966). Ginzburg
was convicted of offending against federal postal-obscenity
laws, but on appeal his conviction was upheld by the Supreme
Court because (inter alia) he had offended against the
common law prohibition of "pandering," a crime of which he
was not accused at trial.
3 %art,

Law, Liberty, and Morality

,

(emphasis added).
^°Ibid., p. 21; see also pp. 46-4?.

pp. 82-83
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intrinsic values.

Hence, whereas Devlin values liberty only

as a means to doing what is morally right, Hart,
like Mill,

values freedom both extrinsically and intrinsically.

Not

only is liberty good because it is conducive to
happiness,
but it is also a good in itself. Thus, Hart opposes
legal

moralism for its unjustifiable interference with the intrinsic value of individual freedom as well as for its negative

utility, inequality, and uncertainty.

Hence this is a non-

utilitarian consideration.
(d) Limited democracy and libertarianism

.

Hart's

intrinsic commitment to liberty becomes apparent in his

criticism of Devlin's moral populism:
[l]t is fatally easy to confuse the democratic principle
that power should be in the hands of the majority with
the utterly different claim that the majority, with
power in their hands, need respect no limits. Certainly
there is a special risk in a democracy that the majority
may dictate how all shall live.
But loyalty to
democratic principles does not require us to maximize
this risk: yet this is what we shall do if we mount the
man in the street on the top of the Clapham omnibus and
tell him that if only he feels sick enough about what
other people do in private to demand its suppression by
law no theoretical criticism can be made of his demand. ^1
.

.

.

Hart claims that "this is a misunderstanding of democracy

which still menaces individual liberty," and which rests on
a "confusion":

The central mistake is a failure to distinguish the
acceptable principle that political power is best entrusted to the majority from the unacceptable claim that
what the majority do with that power is beyond criticism
Hart,

"Immorality and Treason," pp. 226-27.
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and must never be resisted. No one can be
a democrat
who does not accept the first of these, but no
democrat
need accept the second. ^2
The conclusion follows that "though a democrat is
committed
to the belief that democracy is better than other
forms of

government, he is not committed to the belief that it is

perfect or infallible or never to be resisted."^

Thus,

Hart advocates democracy in the sense of the majority principle in general, but does not hold that the legislature is

bound to comply with the majority's views on restricting
freedom.

This implies that democracy requires limitations

on the majority principle by means of, say, a bill of rights.
I

do not agree fully for these reasons: Hart's cri-

tique of Devlin's views on democracy and moral populism is

perfectly acceptable to the libertarian but not to somebody
who (like Devlin) advocates democracy in the sense of un-

limited majority rule.

True,

"belief" in democracy entails

acceptance of certain legal protections for both minorities
and the majority: the rights of political freedom and poli-

tical equality, and the majority principle implied by the
latter.

But as a political concept 'democracy' does not

entail other social but nonpolitical rights (e.g., respect-

ing economic and sexual activity).

Yet, contrary to

Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality

^Ibid.,

p.

^See Felix

,

p.

79.

80.
E. Oppenheim,

"Democracy—Characteristics

Included and Excluded," The Monist 55 (January 1971): 29-50.
But 'democracy' is often defined as including a bill of rights

.

.
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Devlin, Hart says that even the majority should not be able
to limit freedom of private sexual activity.

Hence some-

thing more than democratic principles is necessary to
justify limiting the criminal law with respect to the non-

political conduct which Hart desires to protect.

A prin-

ciple of libertarianism which extends beyond the democratic

protections of political freedom is necessary when Hart
seeks to protect private sexual "immorality" from legal

prohibitions and punishments.

'Democracy

1

simply cannot do

the work of a normative theory of libertarianism in provid-

ing the rationale for protecting nonpolitical social
freedoms
In effect, then, Hart makes 'democracy

1

stand for a

general theory advocating minimal legal control over
citizens' lives, for he says:

Whatever other arguments there may be for the enforcement of morality, no one should think even when popular
morality is supported by an "overwhelming majority" or
marked by widespread "intolerance, indignation, and
disgust" that loyalty to democratic -principles requires
him to admit that its imposition on a minority is
justified ^5
'

.

But on "democratic principles" alone such an "imposition"
is justified.

Outside of legal immunities for basic politi-

cal liberties and equalities the majority "need respect no

limits."
live."

Indeed, the majority may "dictate how all shall
Thus, democracy is perfectly compatible with either

^Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
added)

,

p.

81 (emphasis

^
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legal moralism (and socialism) or sexual libertarianism (and

laissez-faire capitalism).

Those who agree with Hart that

a governmental policy of legal moralism is neither "beyond

criticism" nor "never to be resisted" should realize that
the critical moral principles which prohibit governmental

attempts to control nonpolitical conduct by means of the
criminal law cannot follow from democratic principles alone.
Hart is therefore a libertarian as well as a utili-

tarian.

That is, besides advocating welfare as the goal of

legislation, he also recommends minimal intrusions by the

democratic state into the lives of its citizens.

But

apparently he fails to see that his opposition to Devlin's
legal moralism also requires him to oppose democratic principles of a populistic kind to the extent that they permit
and even encourage the adoption of governmental policies to

which he objects

— viz.,

those demanded by moral populism.

But democracy is not compatible with anarchy,
Eugene V. Ro stow ( "The Enforcewhich is anti- government
ment of Morals," The Cambridge Law Journal [November i960],
PP« 175-76, 193) is therefore mistaken in equating opposition to legal moralism with "anarchy"— as if advocacy of
sexual freedom is tantamount to advocating the destruction
of government! Rostow's view is reminiscent of Devlin's
treason analogy.
.

Sin, and Mr. Justice
3^0) avoids Hart's
[November
28
1959]:
Encounter
Devlin,"
to legal moralism.
response
"liberal"
error and develops a
of democrats,
types
two
between
conflict
For an account of
other to a
the
and
principle
one committed to the majority
the Theory
in
Paradox
"A
critical morality, see Wollheim' s
Second
Society,
and
of Democracy," in Fhilosophy Politics
Basil
(Oxford:
Runciman
Series, ed. Peter Laslett and W. G
Blackwell, 1962), pp. 71-87.

^Richard Wollheim ("Crime,

,

r

.
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Rather than unqualified support for democracy,
the explicit
advocacy of a bill of rights for sexual minorities
(i.e.,

the imposition of strict limits on the majority
principle)

would be more consistent with Hart's libertarian views.
While Hart values freedom both extrinsically and
intrinsically, he recognizes that there are reasons which

justify legal limitations on individual liberty.

now from Hart's arguments against legal moralism

We turn
to his

views regarding the justification of legal unfreedoms.
3.

Principles .justifying legal intervention

.

Although Hart's

emphasis is on protecting individual freedom, he nonetheless

mentions three principles which justify legal limitations on
liberty: preventing harm to others, preserving public order

and decorum against indecency and nuisances, and protecting

individuals from themselves, i.e., paternalism.
(a) Prevention of harm to others

.

We have already

seen that Hart subscribes to Mill's principle that an indi-

vidual's liberty may rightfully be restricted by law in
order to prevent him from harming others, and that he

believes this principle to be incompatible with legal moralism respecting the private sexual practices of consenting
adults.

To qualify for Hart's exemption from legal control

sexual conduct must therefore fulfill three criteria: it

must (1) take place in private, (2) involve only adults, and
(3) be freely consented to by all participants.

Failure to
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meet every requirement could indicate that
harm is being
done sufficient to warrant legal intervention.

For example,

some nonsexual acts (e.g., mercy killing,
suicide pacts,

enslavement, drug taking), though done in private by
con-

senting adults, might not qualify.

On the other hand, sex-

ual sado-masochism and orgies, if they take place in
private

between consenting adults, are presumably protected from
legal interference by Hart's adaptation of Mill's principle.
Thus, either sexual or nonsexual conduct in public may just-

ifiably be interdicted by law if offensive to others or
otherwise productive of harm; and either lack of consent or

participation by one or more minors may disqualify conduct
from protection, even if the remaining criteria are fulfilled.

Hart suggests that whenever conduct fails to meet
one or more of these criteria Mill's principle might not
apply, and recourse might have to be made to some other

principle(s) in order to determine whether the penal law is

warranted in intervening.

Contrary to Mill, then, Hart

asserts that, besides harm to ethers, there are other principles which may justify legal unfreedoms:

The grounds for interfering with human liberty are more
various than the single criterion of 'harm to others'
suggests: cruelty to animals or organizing prostitution
fall easily under the description
for gain do not
of harm to others. Conversely, even where there is
harm to others in the most literal sense, there may
well be other principles limiting the extent to which
harmful activities should be repressed by law. So
there are multiple criteria, not a single criterion,
.

.

.
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determining when human liberty may be restricted.^ 8

We have seen that Hart is certain that these "multiple criteria" do not include Devlin's sense of "preserving society"

— viz.,

preventing changes in social institutions and posi-

tive morality.

He seems just as certain that they do

include principles justifying laws against cruelty to animals (to protect all sentient creatures from deliberately

inflicted pain and injury) and organized prostitution (to
prevent exploitation and corruption of minor youths or even
adults in a condition of dependence or mental incapacity).

Of these additional criteria Hart gives special attention to
two in particular: prevention of public offense, and legal

paternalism.
(b) Prevention of public offense

.

Although there

may be several kinds of public offense which are covered by
this principle, and may therefore be justifiably interdicted

by the criminal law, Hart's discussion of it is limited to
only two types: indecency and nuisance.
(1) Public indecency.

Since Hart bases so much of

his utilitarian argument on Mill, it is instructive to

inquire into Mill's own views concerning the use of the law
to prohibit and to punish publicly indecent conduct.

Whether or not Mill considered public indecency sufficiently
offensive to harm unwilling witnesses is controversial.

^Hart, "Immorality and Treason,"

p.

22^.
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Some think Mill held that it is justifiable
on utilitarian
grounds to outlaw such conduct, and they usually

cite a pas-

sage from On Liberty to substantiate their
position.

In a

single reference to public indecency Mill wrote:
Again, there are many acts which, being directly
injurious only to the agents themselves, -ought not to
be legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly,
are a violation of good manners and, coming thus within
the category of offenses against others, may rightly be
prohibited. Of this kind are offenses against decency;
on which it is unnecessary to dwell, the rather as they
are only connected indirectly with our subject, the
objection to publicity being equally strong in the case
of many actions not in themselves condemnable, nor
supposed to be so. ^9
i

<

Others hold that this passage is patently incompatible with

Mill's general normative views respecting individual liberty,
especially since he explicitly contrasted 'offense' with
'harm' in order to reject the view that giving offense to

others is a sufficient ground for prohibiting an action by

law.-^

Hence they consider this excerpt on "offenses

against decency" extraneous to Mill's theory of justifiable
legal unfreedoms.
While Mill's position on the subject of publicly

indecent actions is at least ambivalent if not ambiguous,

Hart's view is clearly in favor of legal prohibition and
punishment.

The maintenance of public order and decency

^John Stuart Mill, On Liberty ed. Currin V.
Shields, Library of Liberal Arts (New York: Liberal Arts
Press, 1956), p. 119.
,

5 °Ibid.,

pp.

77,

102.
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requires, according to Hart, legal proscriptions
against
offenses such as sexual intercourse in public and
the soli-

citations of prostitutes.

Yet Hart asserts that it is pos-

sible to distinguish "the punishment of immorality
from the

punishment of indecency":
Sexual intercourse between husband and wife is not
immoral, but if it takes place in public it is an
affront to public decency. Homosexual intercourse
between consenting adults in private is immoral according to conventional morality, but not an affront to
public decency, though it would be both if it took
place in public. But the fact that the same act, if
done in public, could be regarded both as immoral and
as an^ affront to public decency must not blind us to
the difference between these two aspects of conduct
and to the different principles on which the justification of their punishment must rest. The recent English
law relating to prostitution attends to this difference.
It has not made prostitution a crime but punishes its public manifestation [viz., soliciting and
pimping] in order to protect the ordinary citizen, who
is an unwilling witness of it in the streets, from
something of f ensive -51
.

Thus, Hart considers the prevention of "shock," "distress,"

or "offence to feelings" to be a justifiable reason for
.

.

the legal proscription of sexual activity

m
.

public places.

That is, legal intervention is justified, not because the
conduct is considered "immoral," but because it is shocking
to the innocent bystander.

It seems to me that this distinction is more ingen-

ious than convincing.

In the first place, Hart equates the

seemingly nonmoral effects of distress and shock with a
^ 1 Hart,

52 Ibid.,

Law, Liberty, and Morality
p.

47.

,

pp.

44-^5.

^2
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moral category— viz

.

,

cent is to be immoral:

indecency.

But,

surely, to be inde-

"[a] person's behaviour may be inde-

cent because immoral, because it causes what is
construed as
immorality by its beholders, because it offends against

religious sensibilities, and because it is in very bad
taste." 53

Hence

I

agree with R. A. Samek

1

s

criticism:

Professor Hart's example of intercourse between a
married couple shows that some acts which are not immoral in private, may be immoral in public. No one
would be offended by a married couple's intercourse in
public if it were not immoral. As regards Professor
Hart's example of homosexual intercourse, all that it
proves is that the immorality is heightened if the act
is done in public, not that we have two independent
elements, immorality and indecency ,5*
.

.

.

Yet Hart makes 'public offense' (conduct which shocks or

distresses witnesses) synonymous with 'public indecency'
(conduct which is considered "immoral" by onlookers).

In

this way a (dubious) utilitarian reason becomes confused

with a nonutilitarian one.
What makes publicly indecent conduct "offensive"
such that it causes shock?

As Samek and McCloskey suggest,

it is the conventional moral beliefs and feelings of the

witness which make his encounter with sexual activity distressing.

Consider, for instance, Hart's reference to the

"h. J. McCloskey, "Immorality, Indecency, and the
Law," Political Studies 13 (October I965): 367.
-^"R. A. Samek, "The Enforcement of Morals: A Basic
Re-Examination in Its Historical Setting," The Canadian Bar
Review 4-9 (May 1971): 219. But cf. Summers, p. 1208.
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public behavior of the prostitute and the
pimp.
there about their invitations to commercialized

What is
sexual in-

tercourse that causes distress and offends
feelings?
ally we are not offended by the importunings

Norm-

of street mer-

chants who go about, sometimes rather noisily,
hawking their
wares. We are not distressed but amused by a
child's

request of a quarter for the good humor man.

The panhand-

ler's plea for "coffee money" is, at worst, a mere annoyance.

If someone were to express shock at these things we would

probably think that something was "wrong" with him.

There-

fore whatever is offensive about soliciting must be associ-

ated with one's knowledge that it is being done for the purpose of engaging in an activity he considers "immoral."

As

Samek claims, "Soliciting would not be regarded as suffic-

iently offensive to require the protection of the criminal
law, if prostitution were not regarded as immoral.

Cer-

tainly someone would not object, or he would object much
less, to public soliciting if he considered prostitution

morally acceptable.

Indeed, the innocent who has no idea

what these people are doing would presumably not be offended
at all.

5°

"ibid. See also Gilbert Geis, Not the Law's BusiAn Examination of Homosexuality, Abortion, ProstituCrime
tion, Narcotics and Gambling in the United States
of
the
National
and Delinquency Issues, A Monograph Series
Institute of Mental Health (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 218.
ness?

,

-^Basil Mitchell, Law, Morality, and Religion in a
Secular Society (London: Oxford University Press, 19 67) p.
,

62.
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Second, Hart's implication that his view of public

indecency is an "extension of the utilitarian principle that
coercion may be used to protect men from harm" 57
defensible.

seems in-

While it is no doubt true that many are shocked,

distressed, or offended by public manifestations of sexual
conduct, a utilitarian justification of legal interference

requires that it result in more good than evil.

Granted,

then, that at least in principle the undesirable consequences

of public offenses could constitute good utilitarian reasons
for bringing in the criminal law either to prevent or to

punish them; that is to say, they would be good utilitarian
reasons if it could be shown that the harm done to one who
is shocked or distressed is greater than the "misery and

suffering" which Hart says legal coercion creates.

When it

comes to the issue of public offense, Hart simply ignores

the need to show that the harm done by the law to actual or

potential offenders is warranted.

Rather, he makes a pre-

sumption in favor of the witness of a public act and against
the offender: he assumes that sexual activity in public

causes injuries to others which do in fact outweigh the
"prima facie evils" of legal unfreedom.
But what harm to others is caused by acts of public

indecency?

Are the offense to feelings and the psychologi-

cal distress of bystanders in any way comparable to the

^Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality

,

p.

^7.

—
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"misery and suffering" of those arrested
or of those made
unfree by the threat of punishment?
Apparently Hart thinks
that they are, but then his normative
views are inconsistent.
We have seen Hart claim that, while most
persons pay lip
service to the idea that unorthodox sexual
practices are
"immoral," it is doubtful that they really hold
this belief.

Then is it not unreasonable for him to insist on
having the
criminal law make everyone unfree merely to protect
the
questionable moral sentiments of others from offense?

Else-

where Hart has asserted that the protection of "religious"
.

and "unenlightened" moral feelings constitutes only a "negligible benefit" secured for those who disapprove.-58

How,

then, can temporary feelings of shock and embarrassment on

the part of some people possibly be taken as a good reason

let alone a better reason than that the conduct in question
is generally considered "immoral"

— for

permanently limiting

the liberties of all and marring the lives of a few by

making them criminals?

If it is true, again as we have seen

Hart hold, that "sexual morals are so obviously determined

by variable tastes and conventions," then is it not inconsistent of him to allow legal protection of a public's

feelings about changing sexual morals while asserting the

desirability of legal consistency and predictability?

Surely he does not count any given society's conventional
58 Hart, The Concept of Law

,

p.

I78.

10^

beliefs concerning public sexual conduct among the
"universal values" which, he says, must be secured in every
society

for the sake of survival.

For what reason, then, should

feelings about them be protected by the penal code?

Indeed,

if moral feelings are so often based on "ignorance, superstition, and misunderstanding," as Hart claims they are,^ 9

then why should they be legally protected?
Hart's treatment of "public indecency" therefore

appears to contradict his views opposing legal moralism, and
his reason for legal intervention is based on the positive

morality (the beliefs and feelings about right and wrong
conduct) of a given public.
(2) Public nuisance.

Hart gives another example to

show "the need to distinguish between the immorality of a

practice and its aspect as a public offensive act or
nuisance"

— viz.,

the law prohibiting bigamy.^

0

Devlin holds

that in Western societies bigamous marriages are outlawed to

protect both the public's preference for monogamy and an
"essential" social institution.

^1

Rostow adds that "mono-

gamy is so fundamental a theme in the existing common morality of the United States, that the condemnation of polygamy
as a crime is justified, even though in the end the repug-

-5%art,
6

"Immorality and Treason," p. 226.

°Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality

6l

Devlin, pp. 9-10.

,

p.

43.
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nance to it rests on 'feeling'
and not on 'reason'." 62
replies that the law against bigamy

Hart

is warranted, not for

the reason that it enforces
positive morality, but "to protect religious feelings from offence
by a public act desecrating the [marriage] ceremony":
It is important to see that if
the law intervenes
Vr teC reli S io
sensibilities
from outrage
hv a public act,
l
by
the bigamist is punished neither as
irreligious nor as immoral but as a
law is then concerned with the of f nuisance. For the
ensiveness to others
ol his public conduct, not with the
immorality
private conduct, which, in most countries, it of his
leavess
altogether unpunished. ©3

J

^

.

.

.

_

Thus, like the "public indecency" of sexual
intercourse and

soliciting, the "public nuisance" of bigamy is for
Hart

sufficiently offensive to the moral and religious sensibilities of the public to justify its proscription by the criminal law.
Now,

Rostow's.

I

fail to see how Hart's statement differs from

Hart's attempt to set off "nuisance" from "irre-

ligion" and "immorality" is surely in this context to make a

distinction without a difference.

To make the distinction

work he has to show that legal protection of religious and

moral feelings (which to him is acceptable) is different
from the legal enforcement of those same feelings (which he
holds to be undesirable).

But is not the protection proffer-

ed by the positive law a form of enforcement?

It surely is

Rostow, p. 190.
-'Hart,

Law, Liberty, and Morality

,

p.

kl.
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whenever protection is secured through legal
coercion. And
is not the enforcement of moral feelings or
sensibilities
(be they religious or not) tantamount to the
enforcement

of

positive morality?

Since 'positive morality

1

means the

moral beliefs or sentiments of the majority, it seems
to me
that it is.
Furthermore, Hart avoids an interesting question

raised in Rostow's discussion of marriage, i.e., whether the
legal proscription of polygamy is justifiable.

Hart says

practically nothing about this and deals extensively with
the law of bigamy, perhaps because polygamy is not a live

issue in England as it was in the United States.

This is

unfortunate because bigamy, unlike polygamy, is not normally

advocated as an alternative to monogamy.

The typical bigam-

ist seeks to evade his obligations to one wife (and some-

times even to both) rather than to assume responsibility for
two; his second marriage usually takes place as the result

of fraud wherein he deceives both wives, neither of whom is
aware of his marriage to the other.

For this reason many,

like Packer, consider bigamy an "imaginary crime": its practice is just as well interdicted by the anti-fraud laws pro-

hibiting deceit in legal contracts.

Therefore

I

agree

with Samek's criticism: "If bigamy without deception were

punished only in order to protect religious sensibilities
But cf. Hughes (p. 6?k) whose
312-16.
views on bigamy appear to be as mistaken as Hart's.

^Packer,

pp.
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from outrage by a public act, there
would be no [nonmoral]
reason to protect these sensibilities." 65

On the other hand, the would-be
polygamist desires
to keep all of his wives with their
full knowledge

and con-

sent.

Does entrance without deception into
several simultaneous marital contracts "desecrate" the
ceremony of marriage
in the same way that Hart thinks a (typically
fraudulent)

bigamous marriage does?
thinks so.

Hart does not reveal whether he

In any event, it is less than obvious that his

treatment of bigamy as prohibited by English law is adequate
to account for the laws against polygamy in the United
66

States.

Moreover, as Devlin points out, bigamy is not

strictly speaking a public act; hence it "violates neither
good manners nor decency." 6 ?

Whatever sense of 'public

1

Hart intends in his discussion of bigamy, David Conway says
that "it surely cannot be one which involves 'foisting one's

conduct on the unwilling non- participant

'

,

since a quiet

marriage ceremony is certainly no more public in this sense
than is living out of wedlock with more than one 'wife'." 68
65
66

Samek, p. 219.

See the discussion in Mitchell, pp. 26-30.

Devlin adds: "When it [bigamy^] is
'Devlin, p. 138.
committed without deception it harms no one." Surely this
admission contradicts his own view that every "immoral" act
is capable of producing harmful consequences.
68

David A. Conway, "Law, Liberty and Indecency,"

Philosophy k9 (April 197*0: 1^1.
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If bigamy is therefore not a public act,
then it must be in
the private realm— concerning which Hart
strongly

denies the

justification of punishing people "simply because
others
69
object to what they do."
On his own principles,
then,

Hart is bound to advocate the decriminalization
of bigamy

rather than to defend the law against it, just as he
denies
the justifiability of criminalizing nonmarital
cohabitation

with more than one mate.
Ernest Nagel is therefore correct in thinking that
"Hart is begging the question" by assuming that to judge an

activity to be a public nuisance because it offends the moral
beliefs of others "is always independent of any judgment of
its morality."

For example,

"bigamous marriages and other

kinds of public conduct are crimes in the U.S. because they
are offensive to others in America"; however, "they are in

fact not offensive to members of other cultures in which

Puritanical conceptions of moral behavior are not widespread."
Like Samek and McCloskey, Nagel holds that some kinds of conduct are regarded as nuisances to others just because such

people believe them to be "immoral."

Hence,

"if bigamy is a

crime because it is a nuisance to others, it does not follow

without further argument that the bigamist is not punished

because he is judged by society to be immoral, but for some

other reason.
6

%art,

Law, Liberty, and Morality

,

p.

^7.

^°Ernest Nagel, "The Enforcement of Morals," Humanist
28 (May-June 1968): 26
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Hart does not supply this "further argument,"
and

without it he cannot present a clear alternative
to the view
that with respect to bigamy the criminal law is
being used
to enforce positive morality.
Devlin is therefore correct:
the laws against bigamy without deception are examples
of

legal moralism in practice.

Therefore Hart's utilitarian

principles require him to seek their repeal.

His surprising

defense of them must be regarded as an inconsistency.
Do these conclusions apply as well to Hart's general

category of 'public offense'?
suggest as much.

Nagel's comments certainly

So do my own earlier criticisms of Hart's

treatment of publicly indecent conduct.

Before making a

judgment, let us consider Hart's last published remarks on

the subject:

[T]he use of punishment to protect those made vulnerable
to the public display by their own beliefs leaves the
offender at liberty to do the same thing in private, if
he can.
It is not tantamount to punishing men simply
because others object to what they do. 71
First of all, it is not necessarily true that laws against

publicly offensive conduct leave "the offender at liberty to
do the same thing in private";

qualification--"if he can"

even Hart's own words of

— suggest

that some activities

which cause offense in public cannot be performed privately,
72

i.e., without witnesses.'

The obvious example, with which

? Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
Feinberg (p. 90) uses a similar argument.

? 2 See Conway,

pp.

139-^0.

,

pp.

^7-48.

110

Hart does not deal, is exhibitionism:
the exhibitionist's
achievement of sexual gratification depends
on the shocked
reaction of an unwilling witness to his act
of self-exposure.
Another example that Hart does not mention is
public nudity:
going naked in the privacy of one's home is
simply not the
same thing as doing so at the seashore or the
supermarket or
even in one's own backyard where intolerant neighbors
have
the legal right to make a complaint of indecent exposure.
Second, it seems to me that punishing public offense

in Hart's sense is "tantamount to punishing men simply

because others object to what they do."

What does it mean

to object to what others do if not that its public display

caused offense?

The law punishes in these cases because

others object, and they complain because their moral and
religious feelings have been hurt.

While we may grant that

they are entitled to object because offended by an unpleasant experience, we may nonetheless deny that for this reason

they should also be entitled to seek legal punishment of the
offender.

As Hart asserts in his utilitarian theory, we

should require more than offense to someone's sensibilities
to warrant legal intervention in the forms of prohibition

and punishment.

A consistently utilitarian ethic would

therefore require evidence of more substantial harm than
shock and distress (which arise, after all, from the witness'

own moral beliefs) to justify action on the part of the criminal law.

Accordingly, a given public's moral assessment

Ill

of offending acts should not be

the- sole

determinant of

whether the law is justified in interfering.

That is, legal

control of a public offense ought to
be independent of its
effects on the moral beliefs and feelings
of others.
Third, because of his treatment of public
offense,

Hart holds two incompatible views: legal
enforcement of

positive morality against offensive private conduct
is unjustifiable, while the same thing is warranted with respect
to offensive public behavior.

But,

it seems to me,

alternative amounts to legal moralism.

either

Is there a moral

principle which would justify legal proscriptions of public
offense while preventing the law from interfering with

private conduct to which others object on account of its
offensiveness?

If there is, Conway has shown that Hart does

not advance it in support of his view."^

If the law is war-

ranted in interfering with public conduct which offends
moral feelings, then why not with private conduct which does
so as well?

Hart's distinction between public and private

morality simply will not do the work demanded of it here.
The fault with Hart's treatment of public indecency

and nuisance lies, not with the public/private distinction,
but with his failure to stay true to his utilitarian principles.

Hart would do well to heed his own admonition

against advocating laws on the ground of enforcing the

73 Ibid.,

pp. 137-^3.

•
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public's moral feelings.

For instance, he criticizes tho!»se

who defend laws prohibiting abortion
for the reason that the
killing of an embryo or a fetus is morally
wrong: »[l]n many
current controversies, as in the case of
abortion, the
defenders of the law would not be content to
leave the matter
to be decided on an assessment of the
balance of harm without

bringing the immorality of the practice into the
scale. " 7k
Yet he himself justifies laws against public sexual
intercourse, soliciting for prostitution, and bigamous marriage

on the same grounds.

I

conclude, with Conway, that Hart's

advocacy of laws against public offense contradicts his

utilitarian views opposing legal moralism.
(c) Legal paternalism

.

As with public offense, so

with the issue of legal paternalism, it is useful to begin

with Mill's views on the subject.

Mill's central thesis in

On Liberty is that no one, and especially not the state, is
justified in interfering with the voluntary choice of a

mature and rational human being for the person's "own good"
or to protect him from self-inflicted harm.

On the other

hand, Mill would permit the state to protect an adult from

the harmful consequences of his own ignorance in circum-

stances which create a presumption that his choice would be

different if he had better information.

Moreover, legal

^Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law
"^Conway, pp. 1^6-^7.

,

p.

^9
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interference may be justified to protect
a person, not only
from his own ignorance, but also from
some other condition
which renders his informed choice substantially
less than
voluntary, for instance, he may be "a child,
or delirious,

or in some state of excitement or absorption
incompatible
with the full use of the reflecting faculty." 76
Thus, Mill
accepts legal paternalism to the extent that he thinks
the

state justified in preventing nonvoluntary conduct which

results in self-harm.

That is, both children and adults

without "the full use of the reflecting faculty" may rightly
be deterred for their "own good."

But no sane and sober

(i.e., rational) adult may justifiably be prevented from

injuring himself once it has been determined that his choice
is voluntary.

In neither case, Mill insists, ought the law

to punish the actor. 77

Hart's treatment of legal paternalism occurs in a

brief and incomplete response to Devlin's claim that by disallowing the consent of the victim as a defense in criminal
proceedings the law does enforce "morality as such."

Hart

agrees with Devlin that consent of the victim "is not a

defence to a charge of murder or a deliberate assault, and
this is why euthanasia or mercy killing terminating a man's
7 Slill,

Here Mill gives the well-known
p. 117.
preventing a person from crossofficer
public
of
example
a
ing an unsafe bridge.
77 Joel Feinberg,

nal of Philosophy

1

"Legal Paternalism," Canadian Jour(September 1971): 111-13-

•

114

life at his own request is still murder."

But, contrary to

Devlin, Hart holds that this is not an
example of the criminal law enforcing positive morality (i.e., the
common belief

in "the sanctity of human life"); rather, he
considers it
"a piece of paternalism,

against themselves."

designed to protect individuals

The same is true, he says, of penal

legislation proscribing "the supply of drugs or narcotics,
even to adults, except under medical prescription." 78

Hart

concludes that the paternalism he advocates is theoretically
distinct from legal moralism:

•

Certainly a modification of Mill's principles is
required, if they are to accommodate the rule of criminal law under discussion [viz., disallowance of consent
of the victim as a defense in cases of murder and
assault] or other instances of paternalism. But the
modified principles would not abandon the objection to
the use of the criminal law merely to enforce positive
morality. They would only have to provide that harming
others is something we may seek to prevent by use of
the criminal law, even when the victims consent to or
assist in the acts which are harmful to them. 79
This view seems to me to be greatly misconceived and

confused.
ism.

First, Hart misconceives the notion of paternal-

Or, rather, he uses two different concepts of pater-

nalism, one correct and the other not.

Paternalistic legis-

lation is "designed to protect individuals against themselves," but not to prevent one from nor to punish one for
Thus, Hart fails to distinguish Mill's

"harming others."

Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
Ibid.

,

p„

33

,

pp. 30-32.
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harm to others principle from the self-harm principle of

paternalism— even though he explicitly asserts that

"a modi-

fication of Mill's principles is required" in order to
accommodate paternalistic legislation.

Like the prevention

of public offense, then, Hart apparently considers legal

paternalism another "extension of the utilitarian principle"

warranting legal coercion in order to prevent harm to others.
Second, this misconception leads to a confusing use

of examples—a fault, surprisingly enough, which Hart finds
in Devlin's theory.

Are the laws against euthanasia and the

sale of narcotics without prescription correctly interpreted
as instances of paternalism?

Laws prohibiting suicide and

the taking of illicit drugs certainly are; but concerning

those in question, it seems to me that here we have illustra-

tions of the law seeking to protect a person, not from himself, but from the harmful acts of another.

With mercy kill-

ing there is the case of A terminating the life of B (not B

taking his own life) even though B consents; hence A may be

punished under the harm to others principle.

If A sells

drugs to B without the required medical prescription, the

law intervenes both to prevent the transaction (i.e., to
restrain A from dealing to B a potentially harmful substance)
and to punish A for making it possible for B to harm his own

health (i„e., for contributing to B's injury).

In neither

of Hart's examples is there a clear case of the law being
used to prevent the individual actor from voluntarily doing
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harm to himself.

Hence an appeal to the principle of
pater-

nalism is not necessary for Hart to justify
these laws.
is he required to "modify" Mill's
principle. 80

Nor

One cannot, therefore, blame Devlin for
feeling
"left in genuine doubt about what the modification
81
is."

Even so, the views of both Devlin and Hart are mistaken.
Unlike laws which prohibit attempted suicide and possession
of heroin or LSD, laws against mercy killing and drug deal-

ing are (like those which punish murder and deliberate
assault) justifiable neither as an "enforcement of morals"

nor as "a piece of paternalism" but as a protection from

harm done by another.

Op

This leaves a further question: Is Hart right to
think legal paternalism (correctly conceived) distinct from

legal moralism, or is Devlin right in holding that laws pro-

tecting a person from himself are an enforcement of society's
positive morality?

Several of Hart's critics think that

80

Hart's error was recently repeated by otherattempts to justify laws of this kind by an appeal to paternalism.
See Gerald Dworkin, "Paternalism," in Morality and
the Law ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1971 ) pp. 107-26; and C. L. Ten, "Paternalism and Morality," Ratio 13 (June 1971): 56-66. For the
view that both Hart and Dworkin are mistaken in thinking
paternalism relevant to the problem of consent as a defense,
see Michael D. Bayles, "Criminal Paternalism," in The Limits
of Law; Nomos XV ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman
(New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1974), P- 185,

.

,

81

Devlin, p. 133-

82 A recent analysis (Christine Pierce, "Hart on Paternalism," Analysis 35 LJune 1975]: 205-07) shows that considering laws against euthanasia as paternalistic can have
"peculiar consequences."

U7
Devlin is right.

But their judgment is based,
not on any

explicit statement by Hart about
what paternalism does and
does not entail, but on Devlin's
attribution of paternalistic views to Hart. Consider Devlin's
allegations: Hart
quotes, apparently with approval, the
Wolfenden Report's
recommendation that the criminal law "provide
sufficient
safeguards against exploitation or corruption
of others,

particularly those who are especially vulnerable
because
they are young, weak in body or mind or
inexperienced." 83

Devlin holds that, if Hart truly is committed to
the principle of preventing exploitation and corruption by
means

of

penal legislation, it must then be justified as a paternalistic policy.

But,

says Devlin, laws against exploitation

and corruption are laws against "immorality"; hence Hart's

view is one of moral paternalism which is indistinguishable
Oh

from legal moralism.
Now, Hart says absolutely nothing (outside of quot-

ing the Report) in defense of laws against exploitation and
corruption.

Since they are obviously not public offenses,

one would expect that, had Hart dealt with them, they would
fall under his category of 'legal paternalism' since even
Oo

^Quoted by Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality p. 14;
see also Idem, The Morality of the Criminal Law p. 2>k.
Actually, Hart misquotes the Report: he substitutes an "or"
for the original "and" separating the words "exploitation"
and "corruption."
,

,

8

\>evlin, pp. 105, 133-37. Mitchell (pp. 5^-60)
appropriates Devlin's criticism and develops it further.
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euthanasia and the sale of narcotics appear there.

But,

because Hart is silent on these topics, we cannot know
how
he would treat them.

Indeed, it is not readily apparent

what even the Committee itself meant by preventing "exploita-

tion and corruption."
In any case, Devlin's claim that laws punishing
exploitation are paternalistic seems mistaken.

The adult

who exploits a special vulnerability in another can justi-

fiably be punished under Mill's harm to others principle; in
no sense does the youth. (or the weaker party) exploit himself.

This view is perfectly compatible with Hart's (see

section 3, a above).

Corruption is a more difficult case,

however, since it probably means 'corrupting another's

morals' or 'leading another morally astray'

.

Legislation

proscribing corruption of, say, the morals of minors, if
based on the conventional moral code of a given community,
would indeed constitute an enforcement of positive morality;
but,

again, it would not be an instance of paternalism, for

the corrupted youth does not corrupt himself but is corrupted by an adult.

Nor would such a statute necessarily con-

flict with Mill's (and Hart's) harm to others principle

since minors, who cannot give consent, are excluded from it.

Hart would presumably justify the law of statutory rape for
this, and not for a paternalistic, reason.

We are left, then, with Hart's explicit espousal of
a form of legal paternalism which Mill would reject, i.e.,
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protection against voluntary self-harm of
an adult.
respect Hart goes further than Mill but

In this

not so far as Devlin.

But Hart fails to supply even one convincing
example of the
law fulfilling this paternalistic function.
Laws requiring
the wearing of seat belts in automobiles
and of crash helmets
while operating motorcycles, or prohibiting
jay-walking,

cigarette smoking, and drug taking might be good
examples.

These show that Hart could have attempted to make a case
for

paternalism (contrary to Mill) on utilitarian grounds, i.e.,
to protect or to promote the actor's welfare. 8

5

-

Even here,

though, Hart's decision to deal only with examples drawn from

the realm of sexual behavior leaves him, it seems to me, with

only one relevant activity— viz

.

,

solitary masturbation.

Would anyone claim today that laws forbidding autoeroticism
are meant to prevent self-harm?

Like the Emperor Justinian's

belief that homosexuality causes earthquakes, erstwhile
claims that the (practically universal) practice of "selfabuse" causes maladies from acne to insanity are no longer

seriously entertained.
I

conclude, therefore, that Hart's appeal to legal

paternalism does nothing to help his argument; rather, it

both hinders and confuses it.

He could have dealt much more

clearly with the subjects and examples he chose for discussion without it.

Moreover, his defense of paternalistic

85 Cf. Bayles, p. 18^.
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legislation seems to contradict his
own view that laws which
cannot be effectively enforced are
undesirable. In my view,
•legal paternalism* is a useless category
when debating the
desirability of enforcing conventional sexual
morality.

Hence, with respect to the Devlin-Hart
controversy, there is
no need to determine whether legal
paternalism is distinct
from legal moralism.

Summary

.

We have seen that Hart argues that government

enforcement of "morality as such" is always undesirable
and
unjustifiable.

The case for this position is made most

effectively by using utilitarian arguments based on Mill's

harm to others principle.

Hart concentrates on examples of

"immoral" sexual activity because he thinks that "deviations

from conventional sexual morality such as homosexuality

afford the clearest examples of offences which do not harm
others."

Thus, Hart's utilitarian theory holds that with

respect to the private and consensual sexual practices of
adults legal moralism is an unjustifiable governmental
policy.

Hart also uses nonutilitarian arguments against

enforcing positive morality by means of the criminal law.

Of these principles only the argument from justice

— that

86

Bayles (pp. 178-79) shows that legal paternalism
is "logically distinct" from legal moralism. We shall
return to this question in Chapter VI.

^Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality

,

"Preface," p.

v,
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reasonable legal certainty is necessary to achieve equal
treatment of criminal offenders—is clearly and cogently set
forth.

His other arguments from justice— that sexual offen-

ders are more likely to receive unequal legal treatment than

others, and that legal punishments are graded to reflect

common estimates of a crime's moral wickedness
vincing, as we have seen.

— are

not con-

The arguments based on the prin-

ciple of liberty fare little better: Hart's intrinsic valua-

tion of freedom establishes only a prima facie right which

may justifiably be infringed for the sake of preventing both
public offense and voluntary self -harm, as well as harm to
others; and the advocated governmental policy of libertar-

ianism is erroneously thought to be implied by the principles

of democratic government.

In sum, it is chiefly the argu-

ments derived from the principle of utility that provide an
effective and persuasive alternative to Devlin's views.

When Hart's discussion turns to justifiable reasons
for imposing legal limitations on liberty, serious difficul-

ties arise whenever he either contradicts or abandons Mill's

harm to others principle.

His justification of using the

criminal law to prevent and to punish public offense is con-

fusing because it contradicts both Mill's and his own view
that punishing conduct for its mere "immorality" is unjustifiable.

Even more confusing is his treatment of legal pat-

ernalism, wherein he first rejects Mill's principle and then

applies it nevertheless in certain cases which are not
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examples of voluntary self-harm of an adult.

Evidently Hart is not sufficiently clear
about his
own grounds warranting legal limitations of
liberty.

Rather,

his uses of these "multiple criteria" are merely
piecemeal

efforts to answer the arguments of Devlin and his
supporters
that certain criminal enactments and legal
practices can be

justified only as instances of government enforcement of

"morality as such."

In all cases, Hart counters by holding

that they can be justified in other ways, but not always by

an appeal simply to Mill's single principle.

Although Hart claims that his appeal to "multiple
criteria" necessitates a "modification of Mill's single

principle," he proceeds to deal with public offense and legal

paternalism as if no "modification" were needed after all.
Hart actually remains committed to the harm to others principle, but then

— apparently

without realizing it

— advocates

penal legislation which cannot be subsumed under that principle

.

This inconsistency has made Hart's whole normative

position vulnerable to attack.

The legal moralists (and

other critics) have scored heavily against Hart without even
so

much as mentioning, let alone criticizing, his rather

formidable utilitarian theory.

They have done so by focus-

ing on Hart's parting of ways with Mill, and by interpreting
his justifications of legal unfreedom in such a way that

they appear indistinct from legal moralism.

While I, too,

—

—
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think that Hart's use of the public
offense principle implie
an enforcement of positive morality, his
discussion of legal
paternalism does not; hence it is unfair to
use the latter
against his general views opposing legal
moralism,
I

conclude that Hart espouses simultaneously two

quite different views regarding the desirability of
using
the criminal law to enforce positive morality.

Both views

appear again in his last lecture on the subject.
says first that "the use of the criminal law

.

There he
.

.

is not

justified by the mere fact that the conduct which [it] is
used to punish is an offence against the accepted moral code

of the community." 88

Yet on the very next page he endorses

the view that public indecency and offenses which hurt moral

feelings can justifiably be prevented and punished by the
criminal law.

But surely such conduct constitutes "an

offence against the accepted moral code of the community,"
and legal protection of that code amounts to an enforcement
of it.

Paradoxically, Hart is prepared to use penal legis-

lation to ban indecent public behavior because it offends
but not because it is generally considered "immoral"

although it is its "immorality" in the eyes of witnesses
which makes it offensive.

I *am

far from convinced that this

view is consistent with the utilitarian argument against the
legal enforcement of positive morality.
88

Rather, it is the

Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law

,

pp.

31-32.
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basis for a separate normative theory
which favors government enforcement of a public's moral
beliefs for reasons
that Hart fails to establish on
utilitarian grounds.
E.

Compar ison of Devlin and Hart

The Devlin-Hart controversy concerns one
normative
issue: whether a given society's positive
morality ought to
be enforced by the criminal law. Devlin's
affirmative

response is based on two reasons: each society's
positive

morality is objectively morally right, and democratic governments have a moral duty to enforce majoritarian convictions and beliefs regarding how everyone should conduct his
(public and private) life.

Devlin also thinks that legal

moralism can be justified for further ends: it is a necessary means to preserving both "essential" social institutions and society itself.

But it turns out that this view

is moral populism in disguise, for Devlin makes 'preserving

society' synonymous with 'preserving positive morality* by

means of legal enforcement.

Thus, moral populism is the

main principle on which Devlin's advocacy of legal moralism
is founded.

Hart deals more particularly with the question:

Should certain kinds of sexual conduct be prohibited and
punished by the penal code simply because they are widely

believed to be morally wrong?

Hart's negative answer is

chiefly utilitarian: a governmental policy of legal moralism
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would have consequences for both particular individuals and
society generally which are more harmful than beneficial.
However, Hart considers legal proscriptions of public sexual

activity justifiable for the sake of protecting the moral
and religious sensibilities of others: the disvaluable consequences of prohibition (unfreedom for all) and punishment

(unfreedom for the offender) do not offset the valuable consequences of preserving public order and decency.

Yet this

view appears to be indistinct from legal moralism, and it is
incompatible with Hart's utilitarian theory.

Hart's incon-

sistency consists in saying first that legal moralism is
always unjustified, and then in holding that it is justified
to prevent public offense

— without

saying that this is an

exception.

Devlin and Hart also disagree over the valuation of
freedom.

Devlin does not value freedom as good in itself,

while for Hart liberty (together with welfare) is an intrinsic value as well as a means to other ends.

Devlin values

liberty extrinsically, i.e., as a means to doing only what
is objectively morally right as defined by the positive mor-

ality of one's society.

But Hart values freedom as a means

to individual self-realization, want-satisfaction, and moral

diversity—the last being closely similar

to Mill's "experi-

ments in living" wherein all might benefit from innovations
in ideas and in social conduct.

Lastly, Devlin regards

limitations of freedom as valuable for the sake of "preserv-
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ing society," i.e., preventing changes in social institutions and in society's positive morality itself; but Hart
considers restrictions of liberty necessary to promote
public order and decency and to protect persons from doing

harm to themselves.
One critic has held that there is a paradox in the

normative theories of the controversy

— viz.,

Devlin's

"moralistic" view is based on "non-moralistic utilitarian

grounds," and Hart's "utilitarian" theory is supported by
"moralistic" arguments

y
.

I

have shown that there is no

paradox; rather, both Devlin and Hart deploy nonutilitarian

principles in support of their opposing moral views, and

only Hart appeals to utilitarian grounds as well.
F. Conclusion

Although there are several important differences

between the normative theories of the protagonists in this
controversy, they seem not to lead to any radical differences in practice.

For example, Devlin complains that

Hart's view leads to recommendations for legal change which
differ hardly at all from his own:
It is a curious thing that a century after the statement of [Mill's] doctrine it is still not possible to
say what amendments to the criminal law would flow
from it; and that there is only one crime, that of
homosexuality, that is known with certainty to lie
89 A. R. Blackshield,

"The Hart-Devlin Controversy in
19^7) ^50.
(October
I965," Sydney Law Review 5
:

within the private realm. y
However, this is not accurate: Hart holds that, besides

homosexual acts, incest should also be decriminalized, and
more recently he implied that abortion should be legalized
91
in certain cases. 7

Yet it is true that Hart's main pre-

occupation seems to be with reforming the law respecting
And Devlin himself recently held that the

homosexuality.

"limits of tolerance" had shifted sufficiently in England
to permit that reform even on his own principles; indeed,

he even went so far as to recommend decriminalization in an

open letter to the House of Commons. 92
It appears, then, that practical applications of

Devlin's and of Hart's normative theories would have rather
Devlin would retain all legislation pro-

similar results.

hibiting "immorality as such" while Hart goes no further

than recommending that the offense of incest be removed from
the criminal calendar.

To this extent both Devlin and Hart

are reluctant to reform the criminal law and are in this

sense conservative.

How could it be otherwise when Hart

defines 'offensive conduct' in terms of what is indecent,
9 °Devlin,
^ 1 Hart,

p.

128;

see also p. 139.

The Morality of the Criminal Law

,

pp. ^6-49.

92 See Henry David Aiken, "There Oughta Be a Law,"
New York Review 11 November 1965, p. 17; Ronald Dworkin,
"Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals," The Yale Law
Journal 75 (May I966): 987, n. 4; and Jerome H. Skolnick,
"Coercion to Virtue: The Enforcement of Morals, Southern
California Law Review kl (Spring 1968): 616.
,
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while Devlin defines •immorality' in terms of what
is disgusting?
One critic observes that Devlin starts "from a

license issued to the legislature" while Hart commences
"from a prohibition on the law's intervention."

That is,

Hart takes the "conservative" (or nineteenth- century liberal)

view that government ought not to interfere; but, while

Devlin appears the conservative because he defends both the
enforcement of morals and resistance to social change, his

advocacy of government intervention is consistent with the
view of modern liberals that the scope of governmental power
should be expanded.

"Both parties then proceed to qualify

the license or prohibition until there is little more than

an architectural difference between them."^

Even so, there

is an important theoretical difference as well, as we have
seen.

Furthermore,

agree with Hart that, contrary to

I

Devlin, the private sexual practices of consenting adults
are harmless and therefore ought not to be liable to inter-

ference by the criminal law.

Generally speaking, that is,

I

think Hart's views are more satisfactory than Devlin's, for

surely some limiting principle on government enforcement of
positive morality is better than none.

However, with

respect to both private and public sexual conduct, relying

only on utilitarian arguments would be more consistent than
either Devlin's or Hart's views.
"The Legal Enforcement of NonOtago Law Review 1 (July 1967): 211-

9 ^F. W. M. McElrea,

Utilitarian Morality
12.

"
,

129

CHAPTER

IV

FACTUAL ASSUMPTIONS

An important part of the Devlin-Hart controversy is
concerned with certain factual theories which are used
either to support or to attack the normative views of the
protagonists.

These theories have to do mainly with assump-

tions about the nature of society and about the relationship

between society's positive morality and its positive law.
Some of them also have to do with Devlin's and Hart's views

of human nature.

The analysis of these theories will follow

a brief discussion of so-called extrinsic value judgments,

which will serve to relate the present subject of factual
assumptions to the preceding one of normative theories.
We have seen that something may be valued both in-

trinsically and extrinsically

.

Intrinsic value judgments

are exemplified by Devlin's contention that government

enforcement of positive morality is valuable regardless of

whatever other desirable ends it might achieve, or by Hart's
view that sexual freedom, privately manifested, is desirable
in itself.

On the other hand, extrinsic value judgments

assert that something is good, not for itself, but as being

conducive to some other state of affairs which is held to be

intrinsically desirable.

Thus, for Devlin legal moralism is

good, not only intrinsically, but also because it is instru-
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mental in preserving society and its existing
institutions.
For Hart sexual freedom is good, not only in itself,
but

also because it promotes personal happiness and
emotional

balance and encourages the development of moral diversity;
but he advocates its restriction (i.e., sexual unfreedom)

for the sake of protecting religious and moral sensibilities
from public affront.

This shows that some state of affairs

(either morals legislation or sexual freedom) may be valued

both intrinsically and extrinsically, and that something
(e.g.,

sexual unfreedom) may be considered intrinsically

disvaluable but extrinsically valuable.

So-called extrinsic value judgments are actually
descriptive statements, hence a part of science rather than

of ethics.

For instance, Devlin's claim that restricting

sexual freedom is desirable for the sake of protecting

society from disintegration means the same as: If society is
to be preserved, then freedom to be "immoral" must be

limited by the criminal law.

Similarly, Hart's contention

that certain sexual unfreedoms are desirable in order to

prevent public indecency and nuisance means the same as:
Some limitations of sexual freedom are a necessary means to
the end of preserving public order and decency.

Extrinsic

value judgments "can be translated without loss of meaning
into 'if-then' or 'means-end' statements which contain no

value words like 'good' or moral terms like 'ought'."
1

1

Felix E. Oppenheim, Moral Principles in Political
Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 10.

Since 'means-end' and 'if-then'
statements are descriptive
and ethically neutral, thoce which
are found in the DevlinHart controversy belong to empirical
science.
Hence they
are capable, at least in principle,
of being tested in the
same manner as any other proposition of
empirical
science.

Here

will examine the factual assumptions
underlying the
extrinsic value judgments of the controversy.
I

A. Devlin's Factual Assumptions

We have already seen (Ch. II,

c,

1) that the so-

called factual claim of Devlin's disintegration thesis
may
be interpreted in a number of different ways, some of which

may be empirical and, thus, testable in principle.

Here

I

will inquire, first, whether empirical hypotheses can be

established to test the assertion that without government
enforcement of positive morality a society will "disintegrate" or be "destroyed," and what kinds of evidence there

might be either to confirm or to disconfirm them.

In this

connection the factual assumptions underlying Devlin's

theory of moral populism will also be examined.

Finally,

I

will draw out the implications of these assumptions for

Devlin's view of human nature.
lv The nature of political nociety

.

According to Devlin,

the survival of any society is dependent on it individual

members' conformity to its conventional moral code.

From

time to time the criminal law may have to be used to insure
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conformity in both actions and
beliefs.

Indeed, if society

is to survive, then the law
must enforce positive morality.
For Devlin, conduct which
is generally regarded as
morally wrong is harmful to society
in two ways: it causes
"tangible harm" by weakening those
members of society who
practice it and thus, when the
practice is widely indulged,

by weakening society; and it
produces "intangible harm" by
undermining the majority's beliefs in
its received moral
code, thus causing injury to society's
moral
bonds.

(a) Tangible hnrm.

On this view, Devlin holds that

It is obvious that an individual may by
unrestricted
indulgence
vice so weaken himself that he ceases to
be a useful^ member of society.
It is obvious also that
ii a sufficient number of individuals so
weaken themselves, society will thereby be weakened. That
is what
I mean by tangible harm to society.
If the proportion
grows sufficiently large, society will succumb either
to its own disease or to external pressure.
A nation
of debauchees would not in l$bO have responded satisfactorily to Winston Churchill's call to blood and toil
and sweat and tears. 2

m

Although it is probably true that most of those who responded to Winston Churchill's call were not "debauchees," there

can be no doubt that many of them were not wholly chaste.

Many of them also gambled and drank.
that a "nation of debauchees"

— like

But Devlin insists
a nation of drunkards

and gamblers, but unlike a nation of celibates--would be so
"weak" as to collapse under "its own disease."-^
2

Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 111.
3 Ibid.,

pp.

106,

Hl-13.
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What kinds of conduct lead to
"tangible harm"? On
the one hand there is "unnatural
vice," i.e., homosexuality
and the other so-called "crimes
against nature"
such as

sodomy and bestiality.

On the other hand, "excessive immor-

ality" refers to "natural" acts, both
sexual (e.g., fornication and adultery) and nonsexual (e.g.,
gambling and drinking), which are not kept "within limits."
Devlin does not

specify the "limits" beyond which "immoral" (yet
"natural")
conduct becomes "excessive," and precisely in what

ways acts

of sexual "immorality"— be they "natural" or "unnatural"--

tend to "weaken" those who practice them.

He also offers no

evidence to support the claim that, say, homosexuals are not
"useful members of society," or that their "weakness" will

spread to "infect" the rest of the population.
The habitual practice of certain sexual acts might
well lead to physical or psychological debilitation in much
the same way as does drug addiction or chronic alcoholism.

Conceivably, this or a similar hypothesis could be confirmed

or disconfirmed
other.

— if

we had factual evidence one way or the

But, according to Glanville Williams,

"£t]here is no

evidence that sexual immorality is physically debilitating,

or even that so-called sexual 'excess* is debilitating--and,
in any case, we have no legal or illegal institution more
.A
conducive to sexual activity than matrimony."

This view is

Glanville Williams, "Authoritarian Morals and the
Criminal Law," Criminal Law Review (March I966), p. 138.
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corroborated by others.^
Devlin's claims regarding
"tangible harm" have been
contradicted:
61 1
«^°ns of
deLre^Sifa^Lr?^
PP a
lead ^
the vast majority

sexual
of gen°n into the depressingly normal
ISfiJ2 £ m Sr aSe
family reari
the
?he results
resu?t, of Hdepartures from this ^' For ano?^r
normal pattern
e n ao
do
not show unequivocal injury. o
^
!?

prStfnn III

J?
eneratl

S
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If "excessive" indulgence in sex
"weakens" a man, it presumably does so whether he indulges himself
with his wife or
with his mistress, or with another man,
or with several
'

persons— or only by himself.

Like drug taking, drinking,

suicide, and abortion, certain sexual
practices (e.g., for-

nication, adultery, and homosexuality) could create
serious

social problems if they were widely and frequently
indulged.

But so, too, could the practice of having either very
large

families or none at all: both overpopulation and universal

contraception (or celibacy) can threaten society's survival.

Contrary to Devlin, activities which can have this effect are
not necessarily those which contravene a given society's
^See, e.g., Ronald Atkinson, Sexual Morality (London:
Hutchinson, I965J, PR. 1 4-0-^5; Gilbert Geis, Not the Law's
Business? An Examination of Homosexuality, Abortion, Prostitution, Narcotics and Gambling in the United States Crime
and Delinquency Issues, A Monograph Series of the National
Institute of Mental Health (Washington, D.C.r U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1972), p. 25; and Charles Lister, "The Right
to Control the Use of One's Body," in The Rights of Americans: What They Are--What They Should Be ed. Norman Dorsen
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), p. 352.
,

,

Ai R. Louch,

(January 1968): 47.

"Sins and Crimes," Philosophy ^3

9

positive morality/

Devlin fails to show that conduct which

is generally considered "immoral" is for this reason likely
to result in injury to the individual or to society.
(b) Intangible harm

.

Devlin's disintegration thesis

relies most heavily on the argument that society's survival
depends on the maintenance of common beliefs in its shared

moral code:

When considering intangible injury to society it is
moral belief that matters; immoral activity is relevant
only in so far as it promotes disbelief.
What is
important is not the quality of the creed but the
strength of the belief in it. The enemy of society is
not error but indifference.
Why then is the lav/
used to guard existing moral beliefs? It is because an
old morality cannot be changed for a new morality as an
old coat for a new one. The old belief must be driven
out by disbelief ,°
.

.

.

.

.

.

Basil Mitchell, too, adopts this argument:
We do not know just how much cohesion is necessary for
a society to exist.
Some degree of shared morality is
essential to this minimum of cohesion, and any weakening of moral belief may reduce it below this minimum;
hence we cannot bind ourselves not to use the law to
safeguard existing moral beliefs, no matter how peripheral they may appear to be.

Accordingly, both Devlin and Mitchell must show that there
is a public interest in maintaining a like-thinking, as well
as a like-acting, community with respect to what is regarded

L. Ten,

"Enforcing a Shared Morality," Ethics 82

(July 1972): 323.
8

Devlin, p. 114.

9 Basil Mitchell,

Law, Morality, and Religion \r. a
Oxford University Press, 196?),
(London:
Society
Secular
p. 22 (emphasis added).
_
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as morally right and wrong.

Does conduct which is generally
considered "immoral"
oppose the interests, not of individuals,
but of the social
collectivity? Devlin appears to hold that
there is such a
public interest: "The vast majority of people
in this country
still believe that certain practices [viz.,
abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality] are morally wrong and
are content

that they should be forbidden by the law as such." 10

We have

seen (Ch. Ill, F) that Devlin no longer thinks that the

English public morally condemns homosexuality to the degree
necessary to justify its legal proscription.

He is not so

certain about abortion, either:
believe that a great many people nowadays do not
understand why abortion is wrong.
Many people
regard abortion as the next step when by accident
birth-control has failed; and many more people are
deterred from abortion not because they think it sinful
or illegal but because of the difficulty which illegality puts in the way of obtaining it.il
I

.

.

.

Then the English public does not consider abortion morally
wrong to the extent that Devlin requires to justify interference by the criminal law.

This is reflected in the

recent liberalization of England's law of abortion.

Regarding sexual conduct in particular, it is difficult to believe that a "vast majority of people" in England

consider certain practices both "immoral" and contrary to
the collective welfare.
10

Devlin, p. 125.

If they no longer so believe with
11

Ibid., pp. 23-2^.
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respect to homosexuality (as Devlin now
holds), one wonders
what private sexual practices by consenting
adults are

popularly disapproved for these reasons.

Since revocation

of the homosexuality statute in I967 virtually
no private
sexual activity of consenting adults has been liable
to

criminal punishment.

In the United States, however, numerous sexual practices continue to be legally proscribed.
true of homosexuality.

This is especially

It appears that here there exists a

deep core of popular feeling against homosexuality and the

abolition of state laws punishing its practice.

In I969 the

Harris poll reported that 63 per cent of the American public

considered homosexuality harmful to society, and in the same

year a CBS-TV survey showed that "two out of three Americans
look on homosexuals with disgust, discomfort or fear, and
one out of ten regards them with outright hatred.

A major-

ity considers homosexuality more dangerous to society than
abortion, adultery, or prostitution."

12

Presumably, Ameri-

cans regard other so-called "crimes against nature" with

considerably less distaste.
Is it in the public interest of America to legislate

in accordance with popular feelings of moral disapprobation

respecting homosexual practices?

Devlin's views suggest that

it is, and that therefore the state legislatures are justi12

Geis, p. 38.
and CBS-TV surveys.

Geis gives data for both the Harris
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fied in criminalizing homosexuality.

His views also imply

that the legislatures of Illinois, Connecticut,
and New York
were unjustified in their recent reforms
of homosexuality
statutes.

But a given public's feelings, particularly
in

such a disputed area as sexual practices, are
often based on
their beliefs as to matters of fact about which they
are

either ignorant or misinformed.

Is the belief of most Amer-

icans that homosexuality is harmful to their collective

welfare a rational one?

According to Lister, "the prevail-

ing psychiatric evidence surely precludes any argument that

homosexual acts committed in private by consenting adults

threaten the rights, safety, or interests of others.

In

!969 Modern Medicine reported that 67 per cent of nearly

twenty- eight thousand physicians sampled favor decriminali-

zation of homosexuality in light of evidence that the acti-

vity does not threaten either the health of the persons
directly concerned or the welfare interests of others.

1/1

Informed opinion therefore appears to contradict both popular
beliefs about the harmfulness of homosexuality and Devlin's
idea that what a public believes to be harmful actually is

productive of harm.
It is for this reason that Ronald Dworkin criticizes

Devlin for holding that any majoritarian belief, substantiated or not, can constitute an expression of public interest:

"^Lister, p. 352.

1

^See Geis, p. 39.
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A conscientious legislator who is told a moral
consensus exists must test the credentials of that
consensus.
The claim that a moral consensus exists
is based on an appeal to the legislator's
sense of how
his community reacts to some disfavored
practice. But
this same sense includes an awareness of the
grounds on
vmich that reaction is generally supported
What
is shocking and wrong is not |_Devlin's| idea that
the
community's morality counts, but his idea of what
counts as the community's morality. 1-5
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

.

Dworkin thinks that community reactions against homosexuality
are generally supported, not by moral principles, but by

mere prejudice, arbitrary rationalization, and personal
aversion.

agree with him that such grounds should not be

I

the basis of criminal legislation because they do not pro-

vide a rational assessment of public interest.

More important, in the United States the law does not

recognize (or is not supposed to recognize) unsubstantiated
fears and irrational hatreds as legitimate grounds for gov-

ernmental intervention.

Thus, Lister holds that as a "well

established" principle of American constitutional law the

government is prohibited from extending its approval, protection, or sanction "to any such superstition or prejudice,

however widely held":

Whatever the force or propriety of Lord Devlin's proposition elsewhere, it should be plain here that government may not attach blame or deny benefits upon the
basis of arbitrary or irrational classifications. There
are no doubt homosexuals whose conduct warrants punishbut nothing in the characteristics or conment,
sequences of homosexuality itself renders punishable all
those who engage, or who have previously engaged, in
.

.

.

"^Ronald Dworkin, "Lord Devlin and the Enforcement
of Morals," The Yale Law Journal 75 (May I966): 1001 (emphasis added).
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homosexual acts. 1 ^

Apparently Lister thinks that criminal
laws against homosexuality are based on "arbitrary and
irrational classifica-

tions," and that as such their constitutionality
can be
challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of
equal protection of the laws. His authorities
for this view
are, however, outside of the criminal law. 17

Because these

cases dealt with indiscriminate and arbitrary actions
by

public officials in civil matters, it is by no means
clear
that their prohibition of such actions can also be
applied
to legislative determinations of what kinds of conduct
are

criminal.

If they could be, the laws against polygamy would

have been struck down as unconstitutional long ago.
Can the constitutionality of criminal statutes out-

lawing homosexuality be questioned in the judicial arena by
appeal to the principle that governmental officers (in this
case, legislators) are prohibited from depriving a citizen

or a class of citizens of equal protection of the laws by

means of an arbitrary and indiscriminate classification of
criminal conduct?

I

suppose that they can be, although to

my knowledge they have not been.

Recent decisions of the

U.S. Supreme Court have applied the principle to state cri-

minal statutes prohibiting inter-racial marriage and distri1

^Lister, p. 353*

l7

v. Updegraff, 3^ U.S. 183 (1952); Baxtrom
383 U.S. 107 (I966); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 u.s. 563 (1968).

v. Herold,

Wieman
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bution of contraceptives to unmarried
persons: both Virginia's
18
miscegenation law
and Massachusetts 's restriction on
trade
in birth control devices 19 were found
to
violate equal pro-

tection of the laws for their use of
"invidious discrimination" and "arbitrary classification."
Such decisions

point

to the dubious constitutional status of
criminal laws pro-

hibiting homosexuality.
However, let us put these difficulties aside and

consider Devlin's claim that legal moralism is necessary
to
preserve conventional moral beliefs.

The question whether

failure of the criminal law to proscribe conduct which is

considered morally wrong will lead to the disintegration of
positive morality (and, hence, of society) can be treated as
two propositions which are capable, at least in principle,

of empirical testing.
The first may be rendered as follows: If any parti-

cular precept of a given society's positive morality loses
the support of popular convictions, then the whole of that

moral code will lose popular support or at least will not
be believed in so strongly.

This is the view that all con-

ventional moral beliefs are equally important to the integ-

rity of the whole moral code "(and, hence, to the integrity
and cohesion of society), and that therefore a given society's
18

l9

Loving

v.

Eisenstadt

Virginia, 388 U.S.
v.

1

(I967).

Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

Ik2

positive morality is homogeneous, i.e., an
indivisible whole
which stands or falls together. For instance,
Stephen
Wexler subscribes to this view:
It should be almost self-evident that Devlin
is vindicated
his contention that no one can predict which
tolerated immorality will finally break the back of
the
old code. Moral codes are not destroyed in great
strokes; they are, rather, "littled away." 20

m

The truth of this proposition is surely not "self-evident."
Nor is it likely that moral codes are "destroyed" rather than

altered or perhaps replaced by some other.

We cannot con-

clude with Wexler and Devlin that every "immoral" act is

equally responsible for "breaking the back" of society's

positive morality.
Devlin's and Wexler' s conclusion is predicated on
two assumptions.

The first posits the existence of a single

code of public morality in a given society.

It ignores the

possibility of the presence of a plurality of moral codes.
As Robert Summers indicates, here Devlin appeals to the

"entering wedge" argument: repeal of one law proscribing
"immoral" conduct implies the repeal of all.

21

Thus, Devlin

claims that if laws against homosexuality were repealed,

then laws proscribing euthanasia, suicide, duelling, abortion, and incest between brother and sister would also have
?0

Stephen Wexler, review of Law, Morality, and Religion in a Secular Society by Basil Mitchell, in New York
University Law Review ^3 (December 1968): 1290.
,

2l

Robert S. Summers, review of Law, Liberty, and
Morality by H. L. A. Hart, in New York University Law Review 38 (December I963): 1206.
,

U3
to be repealed, and the
combined impact of these repeals on
the moral code would be
more than it could bear. 22 Here
also Devlin assumes, according
to Hart, that "all moralitysexual morality together with
the morality that forbids acts
injurious to others such as killing,
stealing, and dishon-

esty-forms

a single seamless web,

so that those who deviate

from any part are likely or
perhaps bound to deviate from
the whole." 23 Devlin takes up
this criticism:

Most men take their morality as a whole and
in fact
aenve it, though this is irrelevant, from some
religious doctrine. To destroy the belief in one
part of it
will probably result in weakening the belief
in the
whole.
Professor Hart says that to argue in this way
is to treat morality as if it 'forms a single
seamless
web which he finds unconvincing. Seamlessness
presses
the simile rather hard but, apart from that, I should
say that for most people morality is a web. of beliefs
rather than a number of unconnected ones. 2 ^

Beliefs "connected" how and by what Devlin does not say, but
connected as in a "web" nevertheless— without even so much
as an attempt to give reasons why this view is not "uncon-

vincing."

Devlin certainly gives the impression that, as

Mitchell puts it, "all moral beliefs contribute equally to
the stability of society." 2 -^

The second assumption is that, granted the presence

of a single conventional moral code, the precepts of that

^Devlin,
23

-^H.

pp.

7,

139.

L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty,
p. 51.

Oxford University Press, 1963),
"^Devlin, p. 115.
2

^Mitchell, p. 25.

and Morality (London:
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code can be known to reflect
a "consensus of opinion on moral
issues .
without any type of social enqiry." 26
Devlin
seems to think that we can know
precisely what moral precepts
are supported by popular beliefs
without expending any
special effort to determine which they
might be. But today,
it would appear, an attempt to learn
by means of social
science research methods the contents of a
society's positive
.

.

morality would reveal that the first assumption
regarding
webs of connected beliefs is unfounded. 27
As Hart puts it, "it would be sociologically naive
to assume that these conditions [of moral consensus]
obtain

in contemporary England at least as far as sexual morality
is concerned."

Even Mitchell acknowledges this:

In fact most individuals are not wholly consistent in
their^ morality, which they have derived from diverse and
sometimes incompatible sources. Certainly those critics
of Lord Devlin are right who accuse him of exaggerating
the homogeneity of modern British society. 2 9
One serious problem with Devlin's view is its assumption of
a moral consensus "in a differentiated society composed of
p/

T. G. Ison, "The Enforcement of Morals," University
of British Columbia Law Review 3 (March 1967):268.

27

See Julius Cohen, et al., "Ascertaining the Moral
Sense of the Community," Journal of Legal Education 8, no. 2
(1955)5 137-^9; Idem, Parental Authority: The Community and
the Law (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958)
and Edwin M. Schur, Law and Society: A Sociological View
(New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 177-82.
28

Hart, p. 63.
See also Ison, p„ 265; and C. L. Ten,
"Crime and Immorality," The Modern Law Review 32 (November
1969):

662.
29

Mitchell,

p.

108.

1^5

groups having primary identification along
ethnic, religious,
racial, educational, occupational, and status
lines." 30

These are divisive factors which in modern societies
"often
produce widely opposing definitions of goodness, truth,
and

moral

virtue." 31

Besides, it can be argued that government

efforts to criminalize deviant conduct in general and "immoral" practices in particular are least likely to occur when
a

moral consensus exists.

If social practice reflects positive

morality, legal enforcement is unnecessary; if it does not,

enforcement might be impractical because people no longer

live by and perhaps no longer believe in the old morality.

Contrary to Devlin, a policy of legal moralism is most probable, yet just as unnecessary to social cohesion, when posi-

tive morality is indeterminate or when a moral consensus is
unattainable.
A testable hypothesis consistent with the tenor of

Devlin's disintegration thesis is still possible.

Consider

this version: If any precept of a given society's positive

morality undergoes change such that most people no longer
believe in it or no longer believe so strongly, then other

moral standards (both sexual and nonsexual) will undergo
J

Jerome H. Skolnick, "Coercion to Virtue: The
Enforcement of Morals," Southern California Law Review kl
(Spring 1968): 606.
3l

Joseph R. Gusfield, "On Legislating Morals: The
Symbolic Process of Designating Deviance," California Law
Review 56 (January 1968): 56.
32 See Ibid., p. 73; and Louch, p. kk.
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change as well.

That is, moral permissiveness
with respect
to sexual practices is supposed
to lead to general lapses in
all kinds of moral restraints and to
the eventual abandonment and replacement of fundamental
social institutions.
Thus, Mitchell holds that "in a society
which gave

its blessing equally to every variety of
sexual relationship,

marriage as we know it could not survive.
would be no longer available." 33

As an option it

He gives no evidence in

support of this claim, and it is defective in at
least two
ways. First, "marriage as we know it" is and always
has

been an institution in which the rules are either openly or
secretly broken by a substantial number of those who are
supposed to be living by them.

Divorce and remarriage rates

suggest that for many today the normal pattern is one of

successive marriages

— perhaps

a new form of "polygamy."

Second, in modern pluralistic societies there exist sub-

cultures in which a great variety of sexual relationships,

including monogamous marriage for those who want it, are

both available and generally acceptable; yet these societies
and the institution of marriage survive.

In my view, evidence in support of this kind of

hypothesis must show that changes in popular beliefs about
sexual morality lead to measurable increases in anti-social

conduct such as serious crime.

The breakdown of a common

sexual morality may result either in increased general per33Mitchell, p. 101.

Ik7

missiveness or in moral diversity,
both of which are supposed
to affect moral beliefs about
nonsexual
conduct such as

violence, theft, and
qbnnpq+v 34
aau di
aisnonesty.
i

„
n
Do
increases
.

m
.

physical

assault, fraud, and disrespect for
property result from
"moral laxity"? Does moral diversity
lead to the destruction
of those minimal forms of restraint
which are essential for
social cohesion? Since neither alternative
is obviously
true factual data are required either to
substantiate or to

falsify them.

However, social scientists have not supplied

the evidence necessary to affirm the hypothesis
that the

minimum requisites of social interaction would be lost in
a
community which "gave its blessing equally to every variety
of sexual relationship."

In any event, we know so little

about the supposed deterrent effects of the threat of legal

punishment that there are no factual grounds to support

Devlin's and Mitchell's expectation that a governmental policy of legal moralism will prevent either those activities

which are disapproved or a breakdown of the moral consensus
itself. 35

There is a second hypothesis underlying Devlin's

disintegration thesis: If the precepts of a given society's
positive morality are not enforced by the criminal law, then
34
J
See H. L. A.

Hart, "Social Solidarity and the
Enforcement of Morality," The University of Chicago Law Review 35 (Autumn I967) 12-13.
:

-^Johannes Andenaes, "The General Preventive Effects
of Punishment," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 114
(May 1966): 953, 964-66.

"

148

they will lose the support of popular
convictions.

In

Devlin's words, "relaxation [of the law] is thought
to imply
6
3
approval."
Hart calls this assumption the "condemn or
condone" theory: what the law does not explicitly
condemn

by prohibition it implicitly condones by giving the
appearance of official approval. 37

It is also called the "declar-

atory" theory because it attributes to the criminal law "the

function of telling members of a society what is regarded as
undesirable conduct, and so of influencing their moral attitudes to certain types of behaviour." 38

On this view, irre-

spective of whether a legal prohibition operates as a deterrent to disapproved conduct, "to repeal it would give the

impression that the conduct in question is no longer regarded by society as morally wrong.

3^

Evidence in support of this hypothesis must show
that precepts of positive morality which are no longer en-

forced by the criminal law are also no longer believed in

by the general public.
bear on this claim.

But Devlin brings no factual data to

To Hart it "seems fantastic" that an

3

Devlin, p.. 99.
See also Robert F. Drinan, Democracy, Dissent, and Disorder: The Issues and the Law (New
York: Seabury Press, 1969), p. 14.
37 H. L. A. Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law
(Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1964), p. 39.
38

Nigel Walker, "Morality and the Criminal Law,"
The Howard Journal 11, no. 3 (1964): 213.
3 ^Nigel

Walker and Michael Argyle, "Does the Law
Affect Moral Judgments?" British Journal of Criminology 4
(October 1964): 570.

.
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"overwhelming moral majority would
or even could change
heart morally and shed these deep
instinctive feelings" if
the penal law did not reflect
their moral views. 210 Hart is
surely right in thinking that most
people cannot be made to
want a homosexual experience. The
absence of laws against
heterosexuality does not induce homosexuals
to desire that

condition; so, too, the repeal of laws
against homosexuality
is unlikely to result in a flight into
the practice-unless
one believes that homosexuality is objectively
preferable
but generally avoided only out of fear of
legal punishment.^ 1

Without any evidence it is difficult to accept Devlin's
argument 42
In the early 1960s efforts were made by criminolo-

gists at the University of Oxford to test the declaratory

theory of the criminal law.

The Suicide Act of 1961 repeal-

ed the offense of attempted suicide, and a sample survey of

public attitudes toward the morality of attempted suicide

revealed no relationship between moral beliefs and knowledge

of change in the law.

Among those who knew the law had been

changed there was just as large a majority who thought sui40

Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality

,

pp.

67-68.

41

Geis, pp. 49-50.
See also Herbert L. Packer, The
Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, I968), p. 302.

42

One study shows that predictions of doom have
always accompanied social reforms, but that the predictions
do not materialize after reform takes place.
See E. S.
Turner, Roads to Ruin (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, I966).

•

^
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cide to be morally wrong as there
was among those who did
not know about the legal reform. The
report's summary concludes: "These results cast considerable
doubt on the 'de-

claratory* argument that alterations of the
criminal law are
likely to weaken moral attitudes."^ 3 In other
words, the

little evidence we do have (concerning a nonsexual
act at
that) goes against Devlin's assumption that reforming

the

criminal law will make a difference to the moral convictions

of the public.

If removal of the criminal sanction with

respect to suicide does- not affect either popular moral
judgments or the number of those who want to kill themselves,

decriminalization of homosexuality is scarcely more likely
to make that sexual disposition more attractive and to con-

vert heterosexuals into homosexuals.

Further research by the Oxford group concludes that
it is not the defining of conduct as legal or illegal but

the consensual moral opinion of one's peer group which is

primarily determinative of a person's own moral views.
Once again, mere repeal of a criminal statute is unlikely to

alter the views of many as to the morality of the activity
in question.

It is said that it does not pay much of a com-

^Walker and Argyle,

p.

579

^See Rupert Cross, "Unmaking Criminal Laws," Melbourne University Law Review 3 (November I962): 422.
^Leonard Berkowitz and Nigel Walker, "Laws and
Moral Judgments," Sociometry 30 (December I967) 421. See
also Walker, pp. 213-14.
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pliment to a statute to hold that it is
not unconstitutional;
likewise, it does not express much approval
of an activity
to say that it is not criminal.^ 6

The question still remains whether enforcing a
positive morality will do much to preserve it.

Devlin apparently

thinks that traditional moral beliefs can he preserved
and

strengthened by means of penal legislation and enforcement.

As we shall see, Hart argues convincingly against this view.

Devlin himself seems to be of two minds about this assumption, for much of what he says suggests that "even in his

view the law is carried by the 'public morality
matters rather than the 'public morality

by the law."

1

1

in these

being buttressed

But the relationship cannot be reciprocal:

the criminal law punishes deeds rather than thoughts,
beliefs, and convictions.

In this sense the legal enforce-

ment of positive morality is impossible.
(c) The delegate role of legislators

.

A third

factual assumption concerns how the legislator determines a

society's positive morality.

Answering the question 'How

does the law-maker ascertain the moral principles that are

accepted by the society to which he belongs?' Devlin says:
He is concerned only with the fundament that is surely
accepted, for legal sanctions are inappropriate for the
enforcement of moral standards that are in dispute. He

^Packer,

p.

30k.

^Brian Barry, Political Argument (New
ties Press, 1965). P. 310.

York: Humani-
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does not therefore need the assistance of moral
philosophers nor does he have to study the arguments upon
peripheral questions. He is concerned with what is
acceptable to the ordinary man, the man in the jury
box, who might also be called the reasonable man
or the
rightmmded man. 48

Accordingly, moral populism assumes that in their decision

making legislators will act as delegates of the majority
which will make its moral beliefs unequivocally known, and
that judges will defer to the moral convictions of "the man

in the jury box."
This raises grave difficulties: How does the legis-

lator know what moral beliefs are "surely accepted," i.e.,
not in dispute?

With respect to sexual morality, is there

any undisputed belief?

Suppose that a popular majority no

longer believes in accordance with certain criminal laws:
Is it realistic to suppose that the legislature will perforce

follow the new convictions of the public?
First, it is apparent that there is no item of sex-

ual morality which is not in dispute.

Even if those in gov-

ernment were to consider it desirable to enforce such precepts, they would probably find none which is "surely

accepted" as Devlin requires.

Second, there is ample evi-

dence to conclude that in their decision making legislators
do not necessarily act as delegates of their constituencies.

Empirical studies by political scientists who have inquired
48

Devlin, p. 90; see also pp. 15-16.

^Summers,

p.

1212.

49
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into legislative behavior
contradict the view that representatives always possess an accurate
knowledge of their con-

stituents' preferences regarding
salient political issues
(let alone their moral beliefs about
sexual practices), and
affirm that their policy decisions are for
the most part
taken independently of their perceptions of
what the constituents prefer. 50 Third, juries decide the
"facts," whereas
judges decide the "law." The moral beliefs of
"the man in
the jury box" might affect the outcomes of trials,
e.g., by

determining whether defendants are innocent or guilty, but

they have nothing to do with either the framing of criminal
statutes or the determination of which laws apply to a par-

ticular criminal case.

It is more likely, however, that

Devlin's "right-minded" and "reasonable" man is, like "the

man in the jury box," merely

a projection of the judge's own

morality or that of the social class from which he belongs. 51
Finally, despite recent reforms of England's law of suicide,

homosexuality, and abortion, the repeal or even the modifi-

cation of criminal statutes is most difficult. 52

In any

5 °The literature
is too extensive to cite here;

see

Heinz Eulau, "Changing Views of Representation," in Contemporary Political Science; Toward Empirical Theory ed.
Ithiel de Sola Pool (New York: McGraw-Hill, 19 6?) pp. 5385» especially the footnoted works of Eulau et al., and
Miller and Stokes.
,

,

J^1 Barbara Wootton,

Crime and the Criminal Law (LonCf. Gerald Abrahams,
don: Stevens and Sons, 1963)1 P- ^2.
Morality and the Law (London: Calder & Boyars, 1971) p. 83.
1

52 Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law

,

pp. 4-2-^9.
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case, it is far from obvious that whatever
success reformers

have enjoyed has been due either exclusively
or primarily to
the pressures of public opinion.^
At one point Devlin recognizes the possibility
that

there may exist "many other factors" besides moral
populism
which "give the legislator a wide discretion in determining

how far he will go in the direction of the law as he thinks
it ought to be.

Now this is most probably the case, but

it is surely inconsistent with Devlin's claim that the leg-

islator's "mandate" is to enact statutes in accordance with
the majority's moral beliefs and "not to reconstruct them

according to his own ideas.

If the law-maker is "right-

minded" and "reasonable" (as he presumably is), then are not
"his own ideas" already in conformity to his society's posi-

tive morality?

So it would seem if for even "ordinary men"

a moral consensus is commonplace.

But then there is no need

to insist that legislators act as delegates.

^

Not only does Devlin acknowledge that legislators

exercise discretion, but he also admits

— that

— quite

realistically

democratic methods favor the influence of educated

^Cross,

pp.

^15-16.

-^Devlin, p. 95 (emphasis added).

^Ibid.,

p.

90.

"The Legal Enforcement of NonUtilitarian Morality," Otago Law Review 1 (July I967): 203,
206-07; and Peter Winch, review of The Enforcement of Morals
by Patrick Devlin, in The Sociological Review n.s., 13
(July 1965): 21^.
-^F. W. M. McElrea,

,

,
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persons (as opposed to "ordinary men") on
public policies.
Prospects for success in influencing both
public opinion and
government officials are greater for those who
are better
educated, hence "the educated man is at an
advantage in a

democratic society."

Thus, Devlin concedes that in a

representative (as opposed to a direct) democracy
well-informed and articulate men can play a part
shaping the law quite disproportionate to their
numbers. Under a system in which no single question is
submitted to the electorate for direct decision, an
ardent minority for or against a particular measure may
often count for more than an apathetic majority. 57

m

.

.

Normally, then, educated opinions will prevail.

In my view,

this implies that the realization of a system of criminal

law determined by moral populism is an impracticable goal.

If it is unrealistic and recognized as such, why does Devlin
advocate that penal legislation follow the moral beliefs of
the majority?

There appears to be no reason other than a

personal value commitment, ultimately, to the principle of

moral populism.
2.

The nature of man

.

Devlin's theory of moral populism

also assumes that men have equal ability to judge the moral

rightness and wrongness of conduct:
As men of reason are all men equal? If they are, if
every man has equivalent power of reasoning and strength

-^Devlin, pp. 95-96. For a summary of political
science findings which correlate degree of education with
extent of political activity, see Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in
Politics? (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).
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subdue the b aser faculties of
feeling and
CMl e
to
mo
raliiy
being
?
s a
matter for
ma?^er
tor ?r
the popular
vote. 58

lL+\

n

™

^H^n

Notice Devlin's ambivalence with
respect to "feeling",
earlier he treated the feelings of

"intolerance, indignation,

and disgust" as synonymous with the
moral beliefs of "reasonable" men, but here "feeling," like
"emotion," is contrasted
with the "reasoning" power and termed a
"baser faculty." 59

Devlin dismisses the objections of those
(the "intel-

lectual oligarchy") who teach the superiority
of critical
morality reached by "trained" (i.e. educated) minds.
He

thinks there can be no defensible objection to public
moral-

ity being determined by "the popular vote," and he holds
that

men are indeed equal in their ability to "reason": "Not that
all men are born with equal brains— we cannot believe that;

but that they have at their command—and that in this they
are all born in the same degree— the faculty of telling

right from wrong." 60

Apparently Devlin thinks that because

men sometimes hold similar views on some moral questions
they are therefore equally endowed with "moral reason."

We

shall see (in Ch. V, A, 2) that it is questionable whether

there is such a thing as moral reason.
58

Ibid., p. 93.

59 His 1965 "Preface" (Ibid.,
pp. viii-ix) fails to
resolve this discrepancy; rather, he reiterates his view
that "intensity of feeling" justifies the legal enforcement

of collective moral judgments.
60

Ibid., p. 100.
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The mere existence of a positive
morality appears to
indicate to Devlin that all men are
equal as to their
"reasoned" contributions to it. But the
presence of a moral
consensus is no indicator of the equality of
each individual's reasonings or feelings about what is
right or wrong.
For most men, "reason" as it is usually
understood may not
be employed at all. The process of socialization
is one of

"education"— a learning experience involving the inculcation
and (mostly uncritical) acceptance of a shared moral
code.

Devlin himself recognizes this: "The pressure of opinion
that in the end makes and unmakes laws is

...

in the

hearts of those who continue without much reflection to

believe most of what they learnt from their fathers and to

teach their children likewise."

Then men are equally

endowed, not with reason in the ordinary sense, but with a

capacity to learn from family, church, and peers those moral
convictions which one is expected to uphold.

But if the

positive morality which Devlin entitles to legal enforcement
is comprised only of strongly held feelings, it is most dif-

ficult to see what role reason plays in their formation.

Devlin assumes that men are equal in yet another
respect: despite their equal ability to distinguish right

from wrong, men are also equally prone to temptation.
6l

Ibid., p. 126.

Devlin himself once held (Ibid., p. 15) that his
reasonable man "is not expected to reason about anything and
his judgment may be largely a matter of feeling."
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Contrary to Socrates, virtue is

not-

knowledge: to know what

is morally right and wrong is not
necessarily to act accordingly.
Thus, Devlin remarks that "All sexual
immorality

involves the exploitation of human weaknesses.

The prosti-

tute exploits the lust of her customers and
the customer the
moral weakness of the prostitute." 63 Like St.
Augustine's

dictum that all men are sinful or concupiscent, Devlin

implies that all men are lustful, i.e., are at times
incapable of controlling their sexual appetites.

He also implies

that sexual passion clouds judgment to the extent that a

person cannot, or is unwilling to, foresee the harm he can
cause and the guilt to be endured after succumbing to tempxaxion.

In my view, Devlin is here describing no more

than the obvious: all men are capable of engaging in sexual
practices which are contrary to society's or to someone's
(even their own) moral standards.

But this is in itself

insufficient to make a case for the criminal law having to
protect both the individual and society.

Moreover, to speak

in terms of "weakness," "lust," and "exploitation" is surely
to express the argument pejoratively from the standpoint of

one's own value system.

Devlin evidently believes that men are "reasonable"
and "right-minded" enough, and sufficiently conscious of
6

^Ibid., p. 12.
See also J. N. D. Anderson, Morality, Law and Grace (London: Tyndale Press, 1972), p. 72.
6/|

See Louch, pp. kZ-kJ,

.
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their sexual "weaknesses," to prefer
that conventional sexual morality be enacted into criminal
law, their motive presumably being protection from self-harm.
Like the alcoholic
who has the bottle locked away,
Devlin's "ordinary
man" is

presumed to desire morals legislation to
protect himself
from his own "weakness." The cynic might
reply that such
laws are generally unenforced because people
want to continue
their sexual practices, but are unrepealed
because they want
to preserve their morals.

But, in the United States at

least, most morals legislation goes unenforced
precisely

because it lacks popular support. 6

-^

B. Hart's Factual Assumptions

Hart, too, offers theories about the nature of

society and mankind.
1.

The nature of political society

Hart rejects Devlin's

.

claim that "a society is identical with its morality as it
is in any given moment of its history, so that a change in

its morality is tantamount to the destruction of society,"

but he accepts the proposition that

"

some shared morality

is essential to the existence of any society."

66

Hart main-

tains that it is important to discriminate between those
^Ralph Slovenko, "Sex Mores and the Enforcement of
the Law on Sex Crimes: A Study of the Status Quo," University of Kansas Law Review 15 (March 1967): 2?0-71. See
also Schur, p. 132.
66

Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality

,

p.

51
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parts of a society's positive
morality (if there
moral code) which are essential
to its existence
6
which are not. ? Hence he holds
that there is a
of consensual moral rules which
is necessary for
ity of men to exist and to survive.

is only one

and those

minimum set
any commun-

The minimal moral rules of every
society are characterized by Hart in terms of "such
universal values as
individual freedom, safety of life, and
protection from
deliberately inflicted harm." 68 But on a narrow
interpretation of this claim it is surely false: life,
liberty, and
security from harm are not universally valued;
if they were,

there would be no capital punishment, slavery,
or wars of
national liberation. Broadly construed, however, it
is true
that everyone wants government to restrict violent
acts
against some, but not necessarily all, people.

This inter-

pretation is probably closer to Hart's intent, for he claims
that these universal values are provided only "in some
degree" (and presumably only for some persons) by all social

moralities. 69

But this view also can be criticized, as we

shall see.
Not only are Hart's "universal values" required for

the survival of any society, but also "some measure of these
6

?Hart,

Morality," p. 8.
68

69

"Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of
See also Dworkin, pp. 990-92.

Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
ibid.

,

p.

70.
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universal values" can be secured for some individual
citizens
only if a social community survives. 70 Political
society
is

therefore likened to a voluntary association formed to
achieve certain benefits for at least some of its members—

in this case, security of life, liberty, and property.

With-

out rules restricting to some degree "the use of violence in

killing or inflicting bodily harm," without some "system of
mutual forbearance and compromise," and without rules requiring respect for "some minimal form of the institution of

property," Hart says that "laws and morals could not forward
the minimum purpose of survival which men have in associat-

ing with each other." 7

Thus, Hart apparently thinks that

those values which are to some degree common to all societies
are also noncontroversial

.

That is, they are undisputed and

indisputably universal values.
However, as Mitchell points out, "reliance on non-

controversial 'universal values' is not enough" for two
reasons.

First,

"whereas such principles as the sanctity of

life are, abstractly considered, not controversial, their

application is often controversial."

72

For example, abortion

and euthanasia are disputed issues even among persons who
7 °Ibid.

71

H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, I96I), pp. 189-92. Ernest Nagel ("The Enforcement of Morals," Humanist 28 [May-June I968]: 2*0
presents an argument similar to Hart's.

72Mitchell,

pp. 119-20.
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are committed to the protection
of human life; moreover, if
the preservation of life were
thought to be of overriding
importance, wars to defend national
independence would be

abandoned altogether.

In these cases people differ over the

extent to which they are prepared to
subordinate other goals
(e.g., relief from pain, personal
convenience, national
autonomy) to the preservation of life, and the
same is true
of liberty and property. Second, "although
'universal
values' are necessary for the existence of any
society, they
are not sufficient for the regulation of any particular

society." 73
i

For example, the precise form of social insti-

tutions (which are to some extent necessary to every society)
is variable from one community to another.

Even in those

societies in which, say, monogamy is securely established,
there are many controversial issues about it and the sexual

morality connected with it.

The same is true of economic

institutions built on the notion of private property.

Thus,

while we might agree with Hart that certain values must be

secured to some degree and for some people in order that a
social community may exist, Mitchell is correct in holding
that controversy attends their implementation and the parti-

cular ways in which they are practiced.

Hart's "viable society" is therefore a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition for insuring the protection of
73 Ibid.,

p.

120.
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life, liberty, and property for
some persons, let alone fo r
all. Hart himself acknowledges
that "though a society to b e
viable must offer some of its members
a system of mutual
forbearances, it need not, unfortunately,
offer them to
7^
all."
Again, he says:
rt

The diminution of human misery at least
for
making of some human lives less nasty, less some, the
brutish and
less short, is a common concern of all
legal systems
ana ail moral codes however much they differ
in other
respects and however barbarous, unequal and
repressive
those other respects they may be. 75

m

As Oppenheim observes, "there have been stable
and enduring
social systems which considered the lives of slaves
expend-

able or the survival of the economically weak of no
public

concern."

76

Hart's "universal values" therefore require

that any society, in order to survive, have rules which protect the life, liberty, and property of only some of its

members.

I

agree with Oppenheim* s comment: "This is indeed

a minimum requirement,

minimal that every social system

so

satisfies it, from the most egalitarian to the most hierarchical.

Only anarchy would violate this condition, and anarchy

by definition, does not constitute a social system.

"^

This shows that the "universal values" required for
the survival of any social order per se do not tell us any7Z1

Hart, The Concept of Law

;

7^
r

-^H.

L. A. Hart,

Law," The Lawyer 8, nos.
'

p.

107.

p.

I96.

"The Use and Abuse of the Criminal
& 3 (19&5)'- ^9.

2

Oppenheim, p. 106.

77,Ibid.,

,
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thing about its particular excellences
or deficiencies (e.g.
the peculiarities of its public morality);
nor do they provide information with respect to the
policies of its governmental regime (e.g., egalitarian! sm vs.
elitism) or

its per-

vasive pattern of institutionalized behavior
(e.g., monogamy
vs. polygamy,

cracy).

capitalism vs. socialism, demo'cracy vs

0

auto-

So long as the "universal values" are secured
to

insure the maintenance of social order, Hart says that
the

community can tolerate controversies over the desirability
of alternative social institutions, governmental policies,

and—of course— sexual practices: "[T]hough these essential
universal values must be secured, society can not only
survive individual divergencies in other fields from its

prevalent morality, but benefit from them."'78

Disputes over

such issues are therefore not only normal and to be expected

but they also bring about social benefits rather than evils.

Contrary to Devlin, Hart holds that "there is again
no evidence to support, and much to refute, the theory that

those who deviate from conventional sexual morality are in
other ways hostile to society."'797

He claims that "we have

ample evidence for believing that people will not abandon

morality, will not think any better of murder, cruelty, and
dishonesty, merely because some private sexual practice

Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality

Ibid., p. 51-

,

p.

71

•
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which they abominate is not
punished by the law." 80 Again,
he thinks there is "much
evidence from contemporary societies
of Europe and from the past" to
falsify the belief that "a
failure to enforce by law a society's
accepted sexual morality is likely to lead to the destruction
of all morality
and

so

jeopardise the existence of society." 81

Unfortunately,

Hart merely asserts that there is
evidence which contradicts
Devlin's factual assumptions; nowhere does
he cite his references on this important point. Presumably
he thinks
that

the stability and survival of those European
countries where
homosexuality is not punishable by law is ample evidence.
As we have seen, however, although Hart himself
does not

document it, there is evidence to support his assertions.
Thus, in Nagel's estimation,

"neither logic nor history

appears to support the supposition that the violation of any
specific moral standards prescribed by public morality may

threaten the life of a social order." 82
Contrary to Devlin, Hart holds that the breakdown of
a conventional sexual morality could have two consequences:

either permissiveness and widespread tolerance, or moral

diversity in place of a single positive morality.
80

Rather

H. L. A. Hart, "Immorality and Treason," in The
ed. Louis Blom-Cooper (London: The Bodley

Law as Literature,

Head, 1961), p. 225.
81

Hart,

"The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," p.

51.

82

Nagel, p. 2k.
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than conclude that either consequence
would lead to lapses
of other moral and legal restraints, Hart
thinks it just as

plausible that permissiveness in sexual matters
would make
it easier for everyone to submit to
legal restraints
on

violence and other anti-social conduct, and that
a multiplicity of different sexual moralities would coexist
in harmony
and mutual tolerance:

"[o]ver wide areas of modern life,

sometimes hiding behind lip service to an older common morality, there actually are divergent moralities living in
peace.'* 83

Like Mill, H a rt is convinced that it is not the un-

hindered practice of sexual "perversions" but the free dis-

cussion of sexual morals, informed by the discoveries of

anthropology and psychology, which divides public opinion,
challenges the certainty of popular convictions, and fosters

moral heterogeneity: "The real solvent of social morality

...

is not the failure of the law to endorse its restric-

tions with legal punishment, but free critical discussion."

In fact, moral beliefs cannot be enforced by law, for the

law punishes deeds rather than thoughts.

The law can proffer

little protection against the ideas which attack orthodox
beliefs.

This is why Hart's charge that a governmental pol-

icy of legal moralism would "freeze into immobility the mor3 Hart,

"Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of
See also Idem, The Morality of the CrimiMorality," p. 13
nal Law, pp. 40-41.
.

84Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality

,

p.

68.
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ality dominant at a particular

time,

in a society's existence-

is itself an unpersuasive argument. 85

If 'morality' means

popular moral beliefs about right and wrong, the law
itself
cannot effect either a "freeze" or a "thaw."

However homogeneous and generally accepted sexual
moral codes might once have been, Hart suggests that scientific discoveries about sexual conduct and increased candor

in public discussions of sexual morals have in contemporary
times made it possible for diverse moral views to be both

advocated and practiced.

tion of 'society

1

Contrary to Devlin, whose concep-

more adequately describes voluntary groups

rather than involuntary political communities, tolerance of
moral diversity is itself a necessary rule for the harmonious

functioning of society.

86

Indeed, with the advent of a

plurality of sexual moralities, toleration of them becomes
universally valued as a condition of society's survival;
hence some degree of mutual tolerance and peaceful accommoda-

tion of differences is essential to the existence of a

modern pluralistic society.
Devlin's supporters resist this contention: e.g

0

,

Mitchell believes that "the Christian attitude to sex has a
good deal more coherence than is suggested by Professor
8

%bid.,

p.

72.

86

Case Hoogendoorn, "On the Legal Enforcement of
Morals," The Christian Lawyer k (Winter 1972): 17; and
Glenn Negley, Political Authority and Moral Judgment (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 1965) p. 64.
»
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Hart's expression 'variable
tastes and conventions'." He
concludes that "in the present
confused situation
there
is no single alternative which
commands anything like th e
same degree of support [as the
8
Christian
.

view]."

?

.

.

But sev-

eral Christian organizations,
both in England and in th e
United States, have called for the
decriminalization of homosexuality and prostitution. Catholics
and

Protestants-and

the various sects of Protestantism
itself—are notorious for
their differences over sexual morality,
e.g., respecting

artificial insemination, sterilization, contraception,
permissible coital acts within marriage, and divorce
and remarriage.

Therefore

agree with Hart, against Mitchell, that

I

an attitude of tolerance toward these conflicting views,
even among Christians, is necessary to the maintenance of

orderly social relations in pluralistic societies.
against both Mitchell and Devlin,

I

And

agree with Hart's basic

point: the cohesion of society does not require morals

legislation.

2.

The nature of man

.

Hart, too, thinks that mankind is

characterized by a basic equality, but not in Devlin's sense

of equal "reason."

Rather, Hart holds that, while men differ

in several respects (e.g., physical strength, agility, and

intellectual capacity), these differences are insignificant.

Hart's view of human nature is reminiscent of Thomas Hobbes's:
87Mitchell,
p. 114.
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Nature hath made men so eauali
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For both Hobbes and Hart, the
significant characteristics of
mankind are that all men are equally
vulnerable (to disease
and to bodily assault) and that
all usually seek to
go on

living, i.e., their goal is survival.

Therefore Hart thinks

that "this fact of approximate equality,
more than any other,
makes obvious the necessity for a system
of mutual forbearance and compromise." 89 This view of human
nature is, of
course, the basis for Hart's contention
that some minimal
rules or "universal values" are necessary for
any community

of men to exist.

Men are also approximately equal, according to Hart,
in their capacity to feel pleasure and pain; they generally
seek the former (in pursuit of happiness and survival) and

avoid the latter (misery, suffering, and death).

But depri-

vation of freedom can cause pain to the individuals whose
desires are thereby thwarted.

This is why Hart holds that

criminal laws which prohibit and punish sexual practices

merely because they are generally considered morally wrong
88

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan Everyman's Edition (New
York: E. P. Dutton, 1950), p. 101 (Ch. XIII).
,

89
'Hart, The Concept of Law

,

p.

191.
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cause "widespread misery
and suffering." The individual's
sexual disposition (toward
hetero-, homo-, or bisexuality)
is largely beyond his
control, and continual frustration
of
his "recurrent and
insistent" sexual impulses can lead
to a
life of unhappiness. In
the absence of any evidence that
his sexual practices
produce injury either to himself or to
others, there is no nonmoral
reason for the criminal law to
interfere with them. 90

Mitchell disagrees with Hart's view that
deprivation
of liberty causes pain:
It may be possible so to indoctrinate
or condition
people that they do not find deprivation of
liberty
painful ^ but rather find it painful to be required
to exercise choice. ...
The horror of Brave New
world is that the people enjoy their degradation.
91

The burden of free choice has, no doubt,
been felt by everyone; and it is true that many may desire to
forego responsi-

bility for a personal decision by leaving the choice
to
another.

But it is difficult to see how this constitutes a

meaningful objection to Hart's argument: a person's sexual

proclivity is hardly determined by personal choice.

The

success rate for "cures" (through indoctrination or condi-

tioning?) of homosexuality, even for those who wish to be
heterosexual, is strikingly low. 92

One does not typically

90

Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality pp. 20-22, 57and Idem, "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," pp.
,

60;

91

Mitchell, p. 93.
92
Bernard C. Glueck, Jr., "An Evaluation of the

.
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decide to be homosexual (or heteroor bisexual); but it can
be a matter of choice whether a person
indulges his sexual

inclinations

Mitchell's criticism is also unconvincing with
respect to the practice of (as opposed to the
proclivity to)
sexual aberrance. Deciding whether or not to

engage in "im-

moral" sexual conduct may be affected by the existence
of
a law prohibiting it.
A person may calculate that the

risk

of detection and punishment is too great, and thus
be deterred.

But if the act is private and consensual, the risk will

be low

and— given

ual impulse

— the

the recurrence and insistence of the sexact will probably be undeterred.

However,

few sexual practices are likely to be embarked upon, or
deterred, through such simple rational choice processes.

^

Hence the irrelevance of the threat of punishment:

Homosexuality involves not so much a choice to act
wickedly as the seeking of normal sexual fulfillment
in abnormal ways (though not abnormal to the individual) preferred by the individual for reasons deeply
rooted in his development as a personality. 94

Although a person may be legally unfree to engage in homosexual relations, if he is disposed to do so and has the

Homosexual Offender," Minnesota Law Review kl (January 1957):
C. A. Tripp's new book
209; and Slovenko, p. 278.
The
Homosexual Matrix [New York: MacGraw-Hill 1975], p. 251)
states categorically: "There are no known 'cures' for homosexuality, nor are any likely, since the phenomena which
comprise it are not illnesses in the first place."
(

,

93 Schur,

p.

131.

^Sanford H. Kadish, "The Crisis of OvercriminalizaAnnals 37^ (November I967): 160-61.
The
tion,"
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opportunity, he probably will
indulge himself despite the
risk. Morals legislation seems
peculiarly incapable of inhibiting the proscribed behavior
while making everyone
officially unfree to practice it.
Hart's point

is that the

many who go undetected and unpunished
are placed in fear of
the law for no justifiable purpose,
and that-like the homosexual who is deterred by fear-those
who are not deterred
are nonetheless undergoing "misery and
suffering" as a result

of their being officially unfree.
Again,

I

am in agreement with Hart's basic argument:

human survival and happiness, like the existence
of a social
community, do not require a governmental policy
of
legal

moralism.

C.

Conclusion

Contrasting Devlin's and Hart's factual assumptions,

Mitchell says that Hart thinks "there are certain moral
principles (which could, in principle, be listed) such that
any society, in order to survive, must recognize them,"

whereas Devlin holds "that any society, in order to exist,
i.e. in order to be a society at all, must have some shared

moral principles (though not any particular ones).
is, I think,

"9-5

This

correct with respect to Hart but only partly so

with respect to Devlin.

The "particular" moral principles

which a society must share "in order to be a society at all"
chell, p. 22.
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are, according to Devlin, specifiable (not
indeterminate, as

Mitchell seems to imply): they are the strongly held
moral
convictions of the majority. This view makes 'society
1

synonymous with its positive morality, or at least with that
part of its moral consensus which is deeply felt.

By defi-

nition, then, if these moral beliefs change, society "disin-

tegrates."

But this necessary truth is not a factual claim.

On any reasonable interpretation of Devlin's disin-

tegration thesis as an empirical hypothesis,

I

have argued

that there is no reason to believe, and there are some

reasons not to believe, that a society's existence is threatened by the failure of the penal law to enforce all of its

strong feelings of moral disapprobation.

If and until

social science can provide evidence which substantiates

Devlin's factual assumptions, "supporters of the enforcement

of morality would do better to rest their case candidly on
the conservative rather than on the disintegration thesis.

That is, rather than relying on faulty factual assumptions,

Devlin could have made a more plausible argument for legal

moralism as a means to preserving traditional social institutions and the morality which accompanies them.
Yet even this view must face the question whether

the criminal law is both the effective and the appropriate

instrumentality by which to forestall change in social organ-

^Hart, "Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of
Morality," p

0

13-

1?4

ization and morality.

In my view, it is

same reasons as those given by Hart:

not— and

for the

(1) free critical dis-

cussion, not disuse of the criminal law,
leads to change in
both beliefs and actions; (2) legal protection
of social

institutions and positive morality for their own
sakes can
create unwarranted deprivations of personal freedom
and

welfare; and (3) mutual tolerance of differing points
of

view and of change in the pattern of communal organization
is essential to the survival of pluralistic societies.

While penal legislation is a means to preserving a
social order, it does not follow that criminalization of

certain sexual (or gambling and drinking) practices is

necessary to insure society's survival.

Moreover, it is

far from plain that a policy of legal moralism would success-

fully achieve the conservative goal of protecting existing
institutions and moral beliefs from alteration.

,
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CHAPTER

V

METAETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The controversy between Devlin and Hart is
concerned
primarily with normative issues and, secondarily,
with factual assumptions, as we have seen. In contrast,
metaethical

issues do not occupy a prominent place in the debate.
Rather, these philosophical issues are raised explicitly

only be Devlin, while Hart's views regarding them are merely
implicit.

In order to determine the metaethical position of

each protagonist it is necessary to apply the categories

developed in recent analytic philosophy.
Analytic philosophy generally is concerned with the
critical analysis of descriptive and normative discourse.
Thus, philosophy of science has the goal of determining the

most fruitful means to reliable factual knowledge.

This it

does, in part, not by making new factual discoveries, but

through explication of the central concepts and analysis of
the paradigms and theories used in science.

Philosophy of

ethics is related to ethics as philosophy of science is to
science.
(e.go,

It is concerned with the meaning of value words

'good 1

)

and moral terms (e.g.,

logic of normative discourse.

'right

1

)

and with the

This part of analytic philos-

ophy, which is also called metaethics to distinguish it from

normative ethics, does not propound moral principles but
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rather, develops theories about them—
about their meaning,
function, and logical status.

Political metaethics consists of analytic theories
about the normative theories of politics.
One important
issue of political metaethics, and of ethical
philosophy in
general, concerns the possibility of justifying
ultimate

principles of political ethics.

These involve intrinsic

moral judgments (to the effect that some specified state of
affairs is desirable for its own sake), as distinguished
from extrinsic moral judgments (to the effect that some
course of action should be taken as a means to some given
end).

The philosophical questions of whether and how intrin-

sic moral principles can be shown objectively to be true or

false, independently of anyone*

s

subjective preferences or

personal value commitments, make up the issue which will be
i

dealt with here.

Whether or not basic moral principles are objectively
valid depends on one's metaethical view.

Is it possible to

demonstrate that certain fundamental principles of political
ethics are objectively true or false, valid or invalid?

Profound disagreements in metaethics are based on the answer.

An affirmative answer is supplied by the metaethical theory
of value-cognitivism; the negative answer, by value-noncognitivi sm.
i

m

this chapter are
The analytic categories used
drawn from Felix E. Oppenheim, Moral Principles in Political
Philosophy (New York: Random House, I968).

3
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Value-noncognitivism is the metaethical theory which
holds that
Basic ethical principles have no cognitive status;
they
cannot be known to be true or false because they are
not true or false; and they are neither true nor
false
because they do not affirm or deny that something is
the case.^

Truth or falsity can be attributed only to statements which
are either analytic or empirically verifiable.

Ethical

judgments are neither, and hence are not cognitive statements; rather, they perform a different ("expressive,"

"directive," "prescriptive") function.

Against this view, value-cognitivism affirms the

cognitive status of basic ethical principles and holds that

their objective truth or falsity can be demonstrated:
The philosophy of value-cognitivism in politics
holds that certain political institutions and policies
have the objective quality of being either good or bad,
right or wrong; that there are objective criteria by
which to determine whether a given political system is
or is not good or right; that such normative principles
of political ethics can be known, just as one can know
descriptive laws of political behavior.
However, value- cognitivists differ in their replies to the

question: How does one go about the demonstration?

On the

one hand, metaethical naturalism claims either that true
ethical principles can be derived (by inference) from true

descriptive generalizations, or that key ethical terms can
be defined by nonmoral descriptive expressions.
^Ibid., p. 2k.

^Ibid., pp. 21-22.

On the
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other hand, metaethical intuition! sm holds
that key ethical
terms (e.g., "good 1 ) refer to objective
characteristics,
that such properties are "primitive,"
"simple," and "non-

natural" and cannot be defined any further,
and that intrinsic moral judgments are true a priori, i.e.,
independently
of sense experience.
A. Devlin's Metaethical Views

We have seen that Devlin holds that a given society's

positive morality is objectively morally right, and that for
this reason (among others) it ought to be enforced by the

criminal law.

For instance, Devlin says that "Real crimes

are sins with legal definitions.

The criminal law is at its

best when it sticks closely to the content of the sin."^
That is,

'activity x is sinful' does not refer to Devlin's

subjective preferences; rather, there is an objective way of

determining that x is sinful, i.e., morally wrong.

Thus,

the criminal law ought to punish conduct which is objectively

morally wrong.

Similarly, Devlin asserts that "the law is

concerned with immorality as such.

"-5

That is, penal legis-

lation proscribes conduct not merely because it is generally
thought to be immoral but also because it is objectively
wrong.

As Basil Mitchell avers, both he and Devlin believe
k

,

Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 27.
^Ibid., p. 11.
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that, with respect to sexual morality
at least, "there is an
objective right and wrong." 6 In Devlin's
lectures this argu-

ment makes use of value-cognitivist theories
belonging to
both naturalism and intuitionism.
la Naturalism.

According to Hart's report, some critical

responses to Devlin's first lecture held that he was guilty

of "fallacious reasoning" by appearing to argue from an
'is*
to an 'ought'.'

Devlin had listed a number of crimes whose

"function," he claimed, "is simply to enforce a moral principle and nothing else."

Some critics think that Devlin

meant to suggest not only that some criminal laws prohibit
and punish conduct merely because it is generally regarded
as "immoral" but also that they ought to because they do so.

For instance, A. R. Blackshield holds that Devlin's view
"steers close to the dangerous argument that what the law is

can somehow be taken as a guide to what it should be.^

For

some, then, Devlin appeared to derive the desirability of a

governmental policy of legal moralism from the fact that
there is, to a limited extent, such a policy in effect.
6

Basil Mitchell, Law, Morality, and Religion in a
Secular Society (London: Oxford University Press, 1967)1 p.
99.
'H. L. A.

Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (London:

Oxford University Press, 1963),
g

p.

28.

Devlin, p. 7«

^A. R. Blackshield, "The Hart-Devlin Controversy in
I965," Sydney Law Review 5 (October I967): W*.
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In my view, Devlin is not
guilty of this form of the
naturalistic fallacy, because he
clearly states his intent
of comparing Mill's harm to
others principle (as advanced by
the Wolfenden Committee's
recommendations) with the practice
of contemporary English law in
order "to see how the
argu-

ment fares under the existing law." 10

As Hart suggests,

Devlin here merely expresses the
conservative view that longstanding policies and legal practices
are likely to have a
worth not readily apparent to the
11
rationalist
social critic.

Rather, Devlin subscribes to a more
sophisticated

type of metaethical naturalism which derives
the truth of
ethical principles, not from descriptive
generalizations
alone, but from descriptive generalizations
together with

descriptive definitions of moral terms.

This definist theory

typically follows a schematic pattern:
That x is good means that x has the property P.
x has the property P.
(3) Hence, x is good.
Here,
is a definition of 'good in descriptive terms;
is an empirical statement; (3) is a valuational
principle. 1 ^
(1)
(2)
(1;
(2)

1

Naturalism based on descriptive definitions makes moral terms
synonymous with descriptive terms, and then translates moral

principles into descriptive generalizations; by verifying
the latter, the truth of the 'former is allegedly established.
10

Devlin, pp. 5-6.

^art,
12

p.

29.

Oppenheim, p. 126.
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While Devlin sometimes defines moral terms normatively (e.g.,

»x is immoral

1

means x is "unnatural" or

"excessive"), he gives descriptive definitions of moral

Tightness and wrongness in his central argument.

In the

Maccabaean Lecture his definition of objectively true morality is the morality taught by the dominant religion of a

given society.

In so far as a society's positive morality

corresponds to the morality of its dominant religion, it too
is the objectively valid morality.

Moreover, the positive

morality is itself objectively valid if, and only if, it is
derived from some religion:

—

Morals and religion are inextricably joined the
moral standards generally accepted in Western civilization being those belonging to Christianity. Outside
Christendom other standards derive from other religions.
None of these moral codes can claim any validity except
by virtue of the religion on which it is based. 13

In Western societies 'x is immoral

1

means that x is forbid-

den by the Christian religion; in Moslem societies 'x is

immoral 1 means that x is contrary to the Islamic religion;
and so on.

In such societies the standards of positive mor-

ality which conform to the moral teachings of the dominant

religion are objectively true even if specific doctrines of,
say, Christianity and Islam are incompatible.

What is good

and right may vary from one society to another according to
the varying moral doctrines of the dominant religion.

In

any given society, however, objective goodness and rightness
"^Devlin, p. 4.
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correspond to the prevailing religious dogmas: the
moral
code taught by the religion espoused by most is
in each
society the true morality.
Whether because this view implies that the positive

morality of an atheistic (e.g., a Communist) society is not
"valid" (and hence that legal moralism should not be adopted

in all societies), or because of a need to secularize the
objective desirability of legal moralism, Devlin

1

s

later

lectures redefined moral terms according to the feelings of
the "ordinary man" rather than the teachings of an organized
religion.

On this view,

'x is immoral' means that x is dis-

approved by most members of a given society.

This is what

Devlin means by holding that "morality is a question of fact"
JjVQorality in England means what twelve men and women
think it means in other words, it is to be ascertained
as a question of fact.
I am not repelled by that
phrase nor do I resent in such a matter submission to
the mentality of the common man.l^

—

At any given point in time, therefore, affirmations about
the prevailing preferences and moral convictions of a given
social community are empirical statements which can be tested by such devices as sample surveys- -although Devlin denies

that it is necessary to "count heads" in answers to moral
15
questions given in public opinion polls.
.

.

According to Oppenheim, modern democratic theory and
practice are associated not only with the normative view
l2|

Ibid., p. 100.

15

Ibid., p. 9^.
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that governmental policies should implement
the preferences
of the majority but sometimes also with the
metaethical

theory of naturalism that "this normative principle
is true
because 'x is intrinsically desirable* is synonymous
with
•x is preferred by the majority 9

."

16

This is precisely

Devlin's metaethical view: that some activity is disapproved
strongly by the majority means that such conduct is objec-

tively wrong (e.g., homosexuality is condemned by most;
hence it is morally wrong).

Saying that he has "found no

satisfactory alternative" to this thesis, Devlin remarks
that his opponents "would think it surprising" if "absolute

truth" concerning morality were to be found "at the bottom

of the popular vote.

I

do not think it is as far from this

as some learned people suppose and

I

have known them to

search for it in what seem to me to be odder places." 1 ^
Evidently, here Devlin's naturalistic view is meta-

ethical relativism.

According to Oppenheim

1

s

analysis,

Metaethical relativism holds that ethical truth is
"relative" relative to social conditions and cultural
features. Under this assumption, there are at least
some conflicting basic moral principles which are
"equally true," that is, one of them is true in one
society but not in another, and vice versa. 18

—

l6

Oppenheim, p. I38.

18

17
'Devlin, pp. 93~9^»
His next sentence reads: "But
that is a subject outside the scope of this lecture which is
What the law-maker
not concerned with absolute truth.
has to ascertain is not the true belief but the common
belief." In context, however, it is apparent that Devlin i_s
concerned with "absolute truth" and that, in his view, the
"common belief" is the "true belief."
.

'

Oppenheim, p. 176.

.

.

s

18^

Just

bo— whether

as in his early view that moral truth
is

relative to the prevailing religion of
a given society, or
as in his later view that it is relative
to majority prefer-

ences—Devlin subscribes to the relativistic variant
of
metaethical naturalism. 19

It would then follow that, if

homosexuality is condoned in society A and condemned
by
society B, not only is practicing homosexuality morally
right or at least permissible in A and wrong in B, but
also
the statements 'practicing homosexuality is right in A

1

and

•practicing homosexuality is wrong in B' are both true.
There are some indications that Devlin is uneasy

with these implications of his metaethical position.

We

have seen that he tends to regard certain practices (e.g.,

homosexuality and abortion) as objectively morally wrong
regardless of whether they are condoned or condemned by
either a dominant religion or a popular majority.

Even in

the lecture in which he most clearly establishes his rela-

tivistic views, he sometimes appears to deny them.

For

instance, although he says "No one need be shocked by the

idea that the law-maker is concerned with morality as it is"
19

'Metaethical relativism is not to be confused with
value-noncognitivism. "Oppenheim (p. 177) explains:
"Noncognitivism claims that neither of any two conflicting
basic moral or political principles is either true or false.
The relativist thesis that there are conflicting principles
both of which are true presupposes, on the contrary, a cognitivist metaethics, namely, the definist theory that the
expression: 'it is morally right for A to do x means the
society'."
same as: 'doing x is generally approved in A
1

'
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(i.e., the moral preferences of
the majority), he claims
next that these public moralities
(or majoritarian preferences) are not necessarily good:

There are, have been, and will be bad
laws, bad morals
and bad societies. Probably no law-maker
believes till
make it true. Unfortunately bad societies
bad morals just as well as good societies can live on 20
on good ones.
There are, then, objectively good morals
and societies, and
there are objectively bad ones. But this
is a contradiction,
for it would imply that laws which correspond
to a society's
positive morality may nevertheless be bad— viz., if
these

moral principles are bad.

What, then, makes a morality

objectively true? Probably its conformity to Devlin's personal religious beliefs, in which case he returns to the

view that an activity is immoral if it is contrary to the

Christian religion.

This is, however, clearly irrelevant to

Devlin's argument, for he explicitly states that in today's
secular societies, characterized as they are by separation

of church and state, it is necessary to justify public moral
standards independently of religious doctrines. 21
We are left, then, with the conclusion that Devlin's

metaethical position is relativism

—a

type of naturalism

based on descriptive definitions of moral terms.

Now, it is

true that, given the definition 'x is desirable = x is gen-

erally preferred', and given the fact that the majority

Devlin, p. 9^.

Ibid., pp. 61-62, 86-87.
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approves of
be realized.

x,

it follows that x is desirable and
ought to

Thus, if 'legal moralism is desirable 1
means

that legal moralism is approved by the
majority, and if the

majority does in fact prefer this policy, then
it is true
that legal moralism should be adopted. Similarly,
given the
definition 'x is immoral = x is disapproved by most', and

given evidence that the majority views x with "intolerance,
indignation, and disgust," it follows that x is immoral and

ought to be prevented or punished.
But is it adequate to define moral terms by descrip-

tive terms such as 'generally preferred* or 'disapproved by
a majority'?

If such definitions were adequate, it would be

self-contradictory to hold that something which is not
approved by the majority is good, or that something which
has the majority's approval is bad.

Someone who claims,

like Hart, that legal moralism is morally wrong is surely
not merely giving a factual report about someone's valuations, whether his own or someone else's or the majority's.

If he maintains that legal moralism is wrong even though the

majority of his society considers it right, he surely does
not contradict himself as he would if moral wrongness meant

popular disapproval.

As Oppenheim points out, "Whenever the

concept of goodness or rightness is defined in terms of some
property, it is possible, without self-contradiction, to

affirm that something does have that property, and to deny

18?

that it is good or right." 22

Thus, in a society which

prefers a governmental polioy
of legal mo ralism it is not
self-contradictory for someone to
maintain that morals legis
lation is morally wrong or
unjust. So, too, it is not
incon
sistent for someone to assert
both that in the United States
homosexuality is generally abominated
and that homosexuality
is not morally wrong, and- even
if wrong-should
not be out-

lawed.
2,

Intuitionism

.

Together with this type of metaethical

naturalism, Devlin's value- cognitivism
also takes the form
of metaethical intuitionism. It might
at first appear odd
that the s^rne political theory contains
both kinds of cognitive arguments, but this phenomenon is not
unusual. 23 In
this instance, Devlin appeals first to intuitionism
based on

religious insight, and later to intuitionism based on
nonreligious moral insight.

In the Maccabaean Lecture, Devlin not only defined
true morality in terms of the moral teachings of a society's

dominant religion but also held that true morality can be

intuited from divine revelation:

"I

suppose that moral stan-

dards do not shift; so far as they come from divine revela-

tion they do not, and

I

am willing to assume that the moral

judgements made by a society always remain good for that
22
23

Oppenheim, p. 130; see also p. 139.
See Ibid., pp. 63, 71-78, 108, 120-21.
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society." 2k

Thus, a moral judgment is valid if it is a
pro-

duct of divine revelation, and in so far as
a society's positive morality comes from divine revelation it
is itself un-

alterably valid.

Accordingly, the moral principles emanat-

ing from God are objectively true and, for this reason,
should be followed by both the citizenry and the criminal
law.

But even if this were so, knowledge of what is per-

mitted and prohibited by the will of God would be limited to
those who are endowed with religious insight; then atheists
and agnostics could not know which moral principles are

objectively valid.

Although Devlin thinks that "the free-

thinker and the non-Christian can accept, without offence to
his convictions, the fact that Christian morals are the basis
OK
of the criminal law," J the argument that a moral principle

is true because it was commanded by God is not acceptable to
to the disbeliever.

As Oppenheim says,

—

—

To consider a statement whether factual or moral true
on the basis of religious belief in a personal God is
to preclude the possibility of rational argument with
those who do not hold the same or any religious convicReligious faith, feeling, and insight are
tions.
a profoundly subjective experience and therefore cannot
provide an objective ground for moral principles of
politics. 26
.

.

.

Perhaps for this reason Devlin later turned to a nonreligious

^Devlin,
2

,p.

18.

^Ibid., p. 23

26

Oppenheim, p. 71

•
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form of moral insight, as we shall now see.
Devlin asserts, as we have seen (Ch. IV, A,
2) that

men have equal ability to tell right from wrong, and that
this capacity is attributable to a special "faculty" which
he calls "reason" or "common sense." 2

7
'

Contrary to St.

Augustine, Devlin holds that correct moral intuitions are
not based on religious insight, because the moral sense is

available to more than just the Christian faithful.

Contrary

to St. Thomas Aquinas, he denies that true morality is based

on rational insight, because rationality and intellectual

reasoning have little to do with ascertaining right moral
principles.

Rather, like Plato and Jean-Jacques Rousseau,

Devlin holds that moral right and wrong are ascertainable by
means of nonrational and nonreligious insights into objective

moral goodness.

But, contrary to Plato, this moral sense is

not limited to philosophers; indeed, it is quite the reverse.

Devlin says that the educated are more likely than "ordinary
men" to disagree about what is morally right; in other words,

education tends to blur the moral sense.

Rather, like

Rousseau, Devlin claims that all "ordinary men" (if they are

"reasonable" and "right-minded"

— as

he presumes most men to

be) can apprehend correct moral principles, and he agrees

with Rousseau's view that the average man's feelings are the
indicators of true morality.

Devlin, pp. 93. 100. !?•
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Both Rousseau and Devlin use the term 'reason
when
referring to the moral sense, but the emphasis in
both "is
on the heart, the seat of 'natural feeling ." 28
1

1

For Devlin,

as for Rousseau, the moral sense of "natural feeling"
is

found throughout the social community:
I have said that the morals which underly the
law
must be derived from the sense of right and wrong which
resides in the community as a whole; it does not matter
whence the community of thought comes, whether from one
body of doctrine or another or from the knowledge of
good and evil which no man is without. If the reasonable man believes that a practice is immoral and
believes also
that no right-minded member of his
society could think otherwise, then for the purpose of
the law it is immoral. 29
.

.

.

Devlin holds, as we have seen, that the ordinary man's
"deliberate judgement" that certain conduct is sufficiently
"immoral" to justify its criminalization is the product of

both "an equivalent power of reasoning" and "strong feelings
of reprobation."

He suggests that "moral reasoning" is

therefore synonymous with the common reactions of moral

disapprobation of a given public: "It is the power of common
sense and not the power of reason that is behind the judge30

ments of society."-^

If that is the case, then men are

indeed possessed of an equivalent power

— but

one which

belongs, Devlin acknowledges, to the "baser faculties of
31
feeling and emotion."
28
29

Moral "reasoning" is therefore the

Oppenheim, p. 59

»

characterizing Rousseau's view.

Devlin, pp. 22-23.

3 °Ibid.,

p.

17.

31 Ibid.,

p.

93-
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same as popular feelings about moral
beliefs, and by "reason"
or "common sense" Devlin can mean only
direct intuitive
insight of that which is objectively
good and right. Hence
I agree with Blackshield'
s view that Devlin's "insistence on
•equal moral faculties available to all
men would suggest
1

both that public morality is 'true* morality,
and that moral
judgments do not differ."^ 2
If Devlin's intuitionism is correct, there must
be
an objective method by which anyone could determine
whose

moral insight is true and valid.
terion?

But what is Devlin's cri-

Since 'ordinary man' means most men, the criterion

is agreement among the majority.

Here Devlin's approach is

not to argue that legal moralism is morally right because it
is held to be desirable by the majority; this is the natural-

istic position discussed earlier.

According to the intuition-

istic position of the present argument, Devlin does not claim
that legal moralism is good because the majority thinks that
it is but, on the contrary, that the majority intuits its

goodness because it

is:

good,

just as it intuits the evil of

homosexuality and abortion because they are evil.
But if the majority rejects legal moralism and tol-

erates homosexuality and abortion, then Devlin must conclude
that the "ordinary man" is not "reasonable" and "right-

minded" (hence, is not endowed with a moral sense) after all.

•Blackshield, p.

.
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He at least comes close to admitting
that a given public
does not necessarily correctly intuit
the true morality when
he complains that too many people
nowadays do not understand
why abortion is wrong (see Ch. IV, A,
1), or when he concedes
that the English public no longer considers
homosexuality

sufficiently evil to justify its continued criminalization
(see Ch. Ill, F)

How does the majority know what kind of governmental
policies and penal laws correspond to true moral principles?
Devlin, like Rousseau, has nothing to fall back on but
a

public's "strong feelings of reprobation" and the "intolerance, indignation, and disgust" elicited by the mere thought

that others behave in ways the majority abominates.

But

what if these criteria should lead a public in opposite

directions?

What objective criterion is there by which to

determine whose stong feelings of disgust and intolerance
are correct?

I

agree with Oppenheim's answer:

[T]ake a situation in which the majority and the minority in a given society disagree as to what is intrinsically valuable or morally good. There is no way of
deciding whether the former experienced the objective
value entity and the latter was deceived by its value
experience, or whether, on the contrary, the majority
happened to be value-blind and the "deviant" value
judgment based on true moral insight. 33

.

Intuitionism fails to provide an objective standard by which
to assess the validity of ultimate ethical principles in

general and political ethics in particular, be it the
33 Oppenheim, p. 64;

see also pp. 57-59i

62.
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desirability of legal moralism or the moral
wrongness of
homosexuality and abortion. Therefore, Devlin's
"moral

reason" and "common sense" do not demonstrate
the objective
validity of the moral principles to which he
happens to

subscribe

B. Hart's Metaethi cal Vi ews

Unlike Devlin, Hart does not deal explicitly with

metaethical issues.

He fails to criticize Devlin's advocacy

of legal moralism based on the claim that any society's
positive morality is objectively true and, hence, worthy of
legal enforcement.

Indeed, he seems unaware that a signi-

ficant part of Devlin's normative theory depends on the

truth of his cognitivistic metaethical views.

On his own

side of the controversy, Hart makes no claims for the cog-

nitive status of the basic moral principles (welfare,
justice, freedom, and libertarianism) which he espouses, and
he does not hold that legal moralism is objectively undesirable.

One could conclude that Hart's metaethical position

is value-noncognitivistic

,

but one consideration prevents

such a facile judgment.

In The Concept of Law Hart presents an argument con-

cerning the survival goals of human activity which, accordIn his 1965 "Preface," Devlin (p. x) demurs: "I
should not care, any more than my critics would, to have my
personal morality equated with that which gains the highest
measure of popular approval." Even so, I cannot see how his
metaethical intuitionism can lead to any other conclusion.
3
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ing to Oppenheim, is metaethical
naturalism based on empirical generalizations: "Man ought to
aim at survival (his own?
everyone's?) because man does aim at
survival." 35
Thus,

Hart appears to adopt the naturalistic
thesis that a norm
can be derived from a fact. Although
the work in which this

argument appears is not technically a part of
Hart's controversy with Devlin, to the extent that it is
relevant to

Hart's views concerning the nature of political
society as
elaborated in the controversy (see Ch. IV, B, 1) it

counts

against deciding that his metaethical position is that
of

value-noncognitivi sm.
.

In connection with the controversy itself, Hart does

not hold that his normative views are objectively valid or

that Devlin's are objectively wrong.

Interestingly, even

where there is agreement (albeit in only two limited areas)

between Devlin and Hart on normative questions, they appear
to differ on the metaethical status of their common response

Both are agreed, as we have seen, that certain activities
done in public should be prohibited and punished by the law

when they offend the moral feelings of others; they also
agree that popular estimates of a crime's moral wickedness
ought to determine the severity of punishment meted out to

convicted offenders.

However, while Hart merely advances a

-^Oppenheim, pp. 106-07. Cf. Alan Wertheimer, review
of Moral Principles in Political Philosophy by Felix E.
Oppenheim, in The American Political Science Review 65
(March 1971): 205.
,

.
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normative view, Devlin makes the
metaethical claim that the
same normative theory is
objectively
justified.

Furthermore,
it is significant that in the
controversy itself Hart does
not claim objective validity for
his argument from The Conc ept of Law about the
survival goals of men and society.

For these reasons

I

conclude that Hart's metaethical position

in the controversy with Devlin is
noncognitivistic
C.

Conclusion

Devlin's metaethical views are cognitivistic,
and
are of the naturalist and intuitionist types.

He both

defines moral terms by descriptive expressions (thereby

deriving an 'ought

1

from an 'is') and holds that true moral

principles can be perceived, through moral insight, by most
men.

I

have criticized both views, and believe with the

value-noncognitivists that intrinsic moral judgments express
personal preferences.
In contrast, Hart does not claim objective validity
for his normative views opposing legal moralism.

However,

his theory of the viability and survival of societies con-

tains a value- cognitivist argument in which normative conclusions are drawn from factual premises.

Nevertheless, this

naturalistic metaethical position is not evident, even
implicitly, in Hart's controversy with Devlin.

On the

contrary, Hart's metaethical views in the debate appear to

be noncognitivistic.
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CHAPTER

VI

PRESENT STATE OF THE CONTROVERSY

The Devlin-Hart controversy is not
extinct, for the
normative issues it generated remain subjects
of disputation.
I have sided with Hart's view,
against Devlin's, that the
use of the criminal law to interdict activity
merely because
it is generally considered "immoral" is
unjustifiable.
I

•

have also pointed out that Hart is opposed to
legal moralism
except in one area: he defends criminal laws against
public

offense ("indecency" and "nuisance") for the sake of protecting the public's moral and religious sensibilities.

He also

justifies the enactment of penal legislation meant to

achieve paternalistic results on broad utilitarian (if not

on strict Millian) grounds.
Here

I

will examine recent contributions to the

Devlin-Hart controversy regarding the justifiability of
criminalizing conduct for the sake of protecting both the
public from offenses to moral feelings and the individual

actor from voluntary self-harm.

I

will also criticize the

concept of 'victimless crimes' which some of Hart's supporters use to designate the kinds of conduct which, the hold,

should be decriminalized.

I

will conclude by outlining the

kinds of criteria which should be taken into account in
decisions whether to enact or repeal such criminal statutes.
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A. Public Offpn^o

Like Hart, Joel Feinberg
recently held that, while
it is not justifiable to
punish "private immoralities," the
criminal proscription of
"offensive nuisances" in public is
justifiable for the sake of protecting
moral, religious,
ethnic, and patriotic feelings. 1
Unlike
Hart, however,

Feinberg does not justify this view
as an "extension" of
Mill's harm to others principle;
rather, he appeals to an
offense principle which, he says,
"would not only justify
prohibition of public conduct and publicly
pictured conduct
that is in its inherent character repellent
(e.g., buggery,

bestiality, sexual sado-masochism), but
also conduct and
pictured conduct that is inoffensive in itself but
offensive
only when it occurs in inappropriate circumstances
[e.g.,

going naked in public]."

2

Some other examples of the latter

category, according to Feinberg, are public activities
such
as sexual intercourse, defecation, desecration of the flag

and of religious icons and relics, and public speech acts
such as derisive ethnic taunts, "obscene remarks over a loudspeaker,, homosexual billboards in Times Square,
1

[and] porno-

Joel Feinberg, "'Harmless Immoralities* and Offensive Nuisances," in Issues in Law and Morality ed. Norman
S. Care and Thomas K. Trelogan (Cleveland: The Press of Case
Western Reserve University, 1973). pp. 83-110. Feinberg
(p. 107, n. 12) approvingly quotes Hart's distinction between
immorality and indecency (see above Ch. Ill, D, 3, a). See
also Feinberg's Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), pp.
,

2

Ibid., pp. 100-01.
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graphic handbills thrust
into the hands of passing
pedestrians.

,,jJ

Apparently Feinberg thinks that
Mill's harm to others
principle is incapable of justifying
criminal laws against
some kinds of public conduct
which
he desires to see sup-

pressed, for he says that he is
"driven, however reluctantly,
to the offense principle" by
his "particular intuitions"
about the types of conduct which
should not be permitted in
public.
His notion of 'offense' is that of
"offended mental
states": "Offensive behavior is such
in virtue of its capacity to induce in others any of a large
miscellany of mental
states that have little in common except
that they are un-

pleasant, uncomfortable, or disliked."

Chief among the "un-

pleasant states cause by off ensiveness" are "irritating
sensations," "unaffected disgust and acute repugnance,"

"shocked moral, religious, or patriotic sensibilities,"

"unsettling anger or irritation," and "shameful embarrass-

ment or invaded privacy."^
Thus, while Hart justified criminal laws against

public offense by relying on intuitionistic judgments con-

cerning the greater harm done by publicly indecent acts
("shock and distress" to the unwilling witness) as opposed
to the harm done by the law in prohibiting and punishing

3 Ibid.,

p.

103.

^Ibid., p. 100.

5 Ibid.,

pp. 85-86.
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them, Feinberg relies on intuition to
decide which activities

should be outlawed for their of f ensiveness
rather than for
their harmfulness. Feinberg thinks, contrary to

Hart, that

an offense to someone's "mental state" is not
harmful; hence
his need to appeal to a justificatory standard different

from the harm to others principle for the sake of interdict-

ing public conduct which his intuition tells him should not

be permitted.

The offense principle therefore justifies the

legal proscription of activities which, Feinberg concedes,

harm no one.
Since the use of the offense principle can "open the
door to wholesale and intuitively unwarranted repression,"

Feinberg suggests that its justifiable implementation meet
certain criteria.

The first is a "standard of universality"

requiring that an offense elicit reactions "that could

reasonably be expected from almost any person chosen at
random," rather than those of persons belonging to "some
faction, clique, or party."

But, while no special respect

is owed to "abnormal susceptibilities," he permits an excep-

tion in the case of "abusive, mocking, insulting behavior"
(including derisive speech) against members of some minority
group, e.g., Jews and Negroes.

According to Feinberg

1

second norm, the "standard of reasonable avoidability,

s
"

the

offense principle should not be used to justify legal

restrictions on activity which can without difficulty be

avoided by those whom it might offend.

The third condition
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is that persons whose liberty
is restricted by application
of the offense principle "be granted
an allowable alternative outlet or mode of expression." 6

Michael Bayles has made some valid criticisms
of
Feinberg »s offense principle. 7 First,
since Feinberg permit:
shocked moral sensibilities to constitute
a form of "offen-

sive nuisance," his offense principle (like
Hart's treatment
of public indecency) "gives a reason for limited
enforcement

of positive morality

.

.

.

[by] prohibiting public conduct

contrary to positive morality."

Thus, various legal prohi-

bitions are possible because Feinberg "only requires that
conduct, shock the sensibilities of accepted morality, reli-

gion, or politics":

In a Mormon society, drinking tea or coffee in a public
restaurant might be prohibited as shocking religious or
moral sensibilities. In an excessively war- oriented
society, a peace symbol or picture of a dove might be
prohibited. Indeed, a hundred years ago a racially
mixed couple could have been prohibited from strolling
along streets in the United States. Further, it certainly justifies the laws against blasphemy in earlier
days .o
Here Bayles notes that, although Feinberg eschews legal moralism, his defense of the offense principle places him

closer to the Devlin camp than he may think.
6
7

Bayles might

Ibid., pp. 102-06.
.

'Michael D. Bayles, "Comments: Offensive Conduct and
the Law," in Issues in Law and Morality ed. Norman S. Care
and Thomas K. Trelogan (Cleveland: The Press of Case Western
Reserve University, 1973), pp. 111-26.
,

8

Ibid., pp. 11^-15.

s
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also have added that Feinberg
goes further than Hart in
justifying laws against public
offense, for Hart never allowed ethnic and political
feelings legal protection, nor did
he hold that this principle
justifies legal restrictions on
offensive public speech.
Second,- Bayles holds, correctly, that
Feinberg "does

not provide any general argument to
show that protection
from offense justifies overriding the presumption
against

criminal legislation

.

.

.

[such] that the evil of offensive

conduct outweighs that involved in punishment." 9

As we have

seen, Hart supplies such an argument but fails to
give evi-

dence that "shock and distress" to witnesses are sufficiently

harmful to offset the evil of criminal penalties.

Feinberg'

failure even to pay lip service to this argument is attributable to his abandonment of the harm to others principle in

favor of the separate offense principle.

If an "offensive

nuisance" does not cause appreciable injury to anyone, then
there simply is no harmful effect of a public activity to

override the presumption against enacting a criminal statute
to proscribe it.

Like Bayles,

I

wonder whether the evil of

being offended, no matter what its cause (and considering
that it is not construed as harm), is greater than even a

light punishment such as a few weeks in jail.

10

o

'Ibid., p. 115; also see p. 112 for a concise statement of the presumptions against penal legislation.
10

Ibid., p. 116.
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Third, noting that Feinberg
gives three examples
"which drive him to the offense
principle: obscene billboards, speech abusive of minorities,
and public nudity,"

Bayles challenges the attempt to reach
normative conclusi ons
from intuitions in particular cases:

^

S UnSe: :tled in moral
P hil °sophy whether arguments
from Qexamples can ever justify adopting
normative principles. Accounting for strong intuitions
in particular
cases is probably a necessary but not
sufficient condition for adopting them. Hence, accounting
for intuitions is a relevant but not conclusive
consideration. 11
I

Therefore, Feinberg* s examples do not necessarily
"drive"
him to the offense principle, for it is not
obvious that
such a principle can account for his intuitions
concerning
them.
Fourth, although Feinberg gives two examples which

involve freedom of speech or expression, Bayles notes that
"he never brings into the discussion of these cases the gen-

erally recognized principle that restrictions on speech are

harder to justify than restrictions on actions."

Hence, on

Feinberg* s offense principle "there is a good reason for

prohibiting everything which is obscene in the ordinary
sense provided that [witnessing] it be unavoidable and an

alternative mode of expression allowed."

But this, of

course, does not imply use of the usual legal tests of

obscenity which are stricter than the common standards of a

given community.

n ibid.

l2

Ibid., pp. II6-I7.
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Fifth, Bayles holds that
the offense principle is
(like Devlin's legal moralism)
dependent on "cultural stan-

dards which constantly and
rapidly change. As we have seen,
this is one of Hart's criticisms
of Devlin's views. Thus,
twenty years ago so-called
short-shorts (today's "hot pants")
were generally considered
indecent and were also illegal
(Bayles thinks they still may be)
in New York City.
"Public
nudity is an especially puzzling
case because other cultures
have accepted it, and it might
be beneficial. It might help
people overcome psychological neuroses
13
about
sex."

Finally, Bayles reviews Feinberg's
examples to show
that they do not necessarily lead anyone
to adopt the offense

principle; rather, "it might be preferable
simply to expand
the private harm principle, if need be, by admitting
specific

interests as worthy of consideration."

Violations of such

interests might be treated as "minor harms" which are eval-

uated individually as to whether they provide a good reason
for legal interference.

"This technique does not commit one

in advance to the wholesale protection of the sensibilities
of a large majority without examining the merits of the par-

ticular sensibilities and their objects." 1 ^
If this course is taken, Bayles thinks that "the

minor harm involved in offensive conduct may only justify a
lesser sanction than punishment":
l3

Ibid., pp. 118-19.

^Ibid.,

p.

119.

7

20^

The choice is not between punishing offensive
and doing nothing. It may be regulated, that conduct
is,
restricted to certain times or places. ... Of
regulation is usually backed up by punishment for course,
failure to comply with the regulation. But
punishment need
not be invoked immediately. People may be
given an
opportunity to comply after it is pointed out that
their conduct violates a regulation. 15

On the harm to others principle alone, then, Bayles
suggests
that it is possible both to control publicly offensive
behavior and yet to avoid criminal penalties for the offender, or at least to reduce sanctions to nominal fines.

Indeed, he thinks "the most reasonable solution" is perhaps

simply to enact a statute permitting officials to remove

persons who offend the general populace from public places;
thus,

"only a persistent offender or one violating an auth-

oritative order would be punished."
Replying to Bayles' s criticisms, Feinberg has argued

in defense of his offense principle while accepting some of
his critic's objections. 17
'

Although he claims that "punish-

ment would not be inflicted for offending others so much as
for defying authority by persisting in prohibited conduct"

and that he "would never permit the state to restrict or

punish the expression of opinion on the grounds of mere
off ensiveness,

"

15 Ibid.,
1

his examples of both conduct and speech

p.

122.

l6

Ibid., p. 12^.

'Joel Feinberg, "Reply," in Issues in Law and Morality ed. Norman S. Care and Thomas K. Trelogan (Cleveland:
The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1973)».PP» 127,
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which are justifiably interdicted
on the cffense principle
show that he does "want the coercive
arm of the state to

protect passers-by (by the most economical
and humane means)
from being unwilling audiences for
such [offensive] performances." 18

Feinberg agrees with Bayles that the offense
principle is dependent on society's positive
morality, and

especially on its standards of public conduct which
constant
ly and rapidly change. Hence some offenders, he
says,

"will

be punished for what may be done a year later with
impunity-

and on my principle, rightly so":
Thus, I am in the uncomfortable position of justifying the punishment of, say, anti-war demonstrators in
1965 for parading a Viet-Cong flag (shocking!) while
denouncing the punishment of other protesters in 1970
for doing the same thing (yawn). ... My discomfort
in this position is at least mitigated by the thought
that martyrs to the cause of cultural change, on my
view, should never be subject to more than very minor
penalties or coercive pressure. 19

Even if others take unreasonable offense at someone* s public
behavior, they may still make a justifiable claim to legal
protection:

Providing that very real and intense offense is taken
predictably by virtually everyone, and the offending
conduct has hardly any countervailing personal or
social value of its own, .prohibition seems reasonable
even where the protected interests themselves are not. 20
Feinberg's offense principle is therefore another case of
18

l9

Ibid., pp. 130-34.
Ibid., p. I36.

20

Ibid., p. 138
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legal moralism with respect to public activity.
David Conway recently held that with respect to the

issue of public offense "we have two basic alternatives":
either we follow Devlin in accepting legal moralism complete-

ly so that all offensive (or "indecent" or "immoral" or "sinful") conduct

— both

in public and in private--is justifiably

proscribed by the criminal law, or we take the view of the
"extreme libertarian" that neither private nor public behav-

ior and speech may justifiably be criminalized for the sake

of preventing offense to others. 21

For Conway, the views of

Hart, Feinberg, and Bayles are inconsistent: If publicly

offensive practices are justifiably punished or even merely

regulated by the law, then why not private activities which
others find offensive as well?
We have already seen that Hart's views on public

offense are inconsistent with his views opposing legal moralism.

Feinberg*

s

and Bayles

1

s,

however, are not: Feinberg

treats the legal punishment of "offensive nuisance" as an

exception (by means of a separate offense principle) to his
views opposing legal moralism; on the other hand, Bayles

prefers to judge each case of public offense individually as
a "minor harm" done to others balanced against the harm of

legal prohibition and punishment.

Contrary to Conway, there-

fore, there are available more than just two alternatives to
21

David A. Conway, "Law, Liberty and Indecency,"
Philosophy 49 (April 197*0 1^6.
x
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the handling of publicly offensive
behavior and expression.
While I personally prefer Conway's
second alternative of the
"extreme libertarian," I am also
inclined to agree with
Bayles that in dealing with "hard cases"
of public offense
there is usually no clear, easily
applicable moral principle
"The search for such principles in hard
cases seems a hopeless task. Such cases are hard simply
because there is no

obvious solution." 22
The assessment of harm done to others by an offensive public action or expression as opposed to
the harm done

by legal prohibitions and punishments may sometimes be
difficult to make, but this should not drive us either to
Feinberg's offense principle or to Conway's either/or solution.

Like Hugo Bedau,

I

agree with Gilbert Geis that "the

most efficacious method of dealing with deviancy is to
ignore, to the furthest point of our tolerance, those items

which we find offensive." 2 ^

Only those activities which

actually do harm to others, beyond merely offending their
moral and religious (or even ethnic and patriotic) sentiment

^Bayles,
23

p. '12k.

.

^Gilbert Geis, Not the Law's Business? An Examination of Homosexuality, Abortion, Prostitution, Narcotics and
Gambling; in the United States Crime and Delinquency Issues,
A Monograph Series of the National Institute of Mental
Health (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
Quoted approvingly by Hugo Adam Bedau, "Are
1972), p. 261.
There Really Crimes Without Victims?" in Victimless Crimes:
Two Sides of a Controversy by Edwin M. Schur and Hugo Adam
Bedau (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 197^),
,

,

p. 99.
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should be considered fit candidates
for proscription by the
criminal law.

B. Legal Paternalism

As we have seen (Ch. Ill,

D,

3,

c),

Devlin thinks

that Hart's commitment to even a limited
form of legal paternalism implies an advocacy of legal moralism:

law ». that
a public morality, is a necessity
*
ft 5°SS
lor^
paternalism, otherwise it would be impossible to
arrive at a common judgement about what would
be for a
man s moral good. If then society compels a man
to act
lor his own moral good, society is enforcing
the moral
law; and it is a distinction without a difference
to
say that society is acting for a man's own good and
not
for the enforcement of the law. Does the avoidance
of
legal moralism mean no more than that a judge ought not,
when passing sentence, to mention that he is enforcing
the law but only that he is acting for a man's own good? 2 ^
>

,

For Devlin, then, legal paternalism enforces a society's
positive morality respecting common judgments about what is,
and what is not, in the moral interest of the individual
actor:

"Paternalism, unless it is limited in some way as yet

unstated, must

.

.

.

make all morality the law's business." 2 ^

However, recent writers tend to agree with Hart that

legal paternalism is distinguishable from legal moralism,
so that advocacy of the former does not entail the latter.

2k

Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 136.
2

^Ibid., p. I37.

26

Bedau, pp. 89-90; Joel Feinberg, "Legal Paternalism," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (September 1971): 1052k\ Rolf E. Sartorius, "The Enforcement of Morality," The
Yale Law Journal 81 (April 1972): 906, esp. n. 3^; and C. L.
Ten, "Paternalism and Morality," Ratio 13 (June 1971): 56-66.
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Most emphasize that paternalism
restricts a person's fre edom
in order to protect or promote
his own welfare (against th e

possibility of self-inflicted injury),
whereas legal moralism interdicts an activity merely
because it is generally
thought to be morally wrong. As
Michael Bayles
points out,

paternalism is logically distinct from
moralism in two
respects, even if it is defined to
include prevention of
moral self-harm to the actor: (1) the
moral injury to an
actor need not be defined by society's
positive morality,
and (2) even if it is, paternalism does not
proscribe all

activities which are forbidden by moralism, for the
latter
requires only that a practice violate positive morality,
not
that the actor be morally harmed by it. 2 ?

Contrary to

Devlin, then, paternalism and moralism are not synonymous,

nor does the former imply the latter.
A more interesting issue is whether legal paternal-

ism is a justifiable governmental policy.

Most of the recent

views agree with Hart and Devlin that it is, and assume that
penal legislation is an appropriate means to securing pro-

tection

.from

self-harm for an individual.

these views is based on two distinctions.

The analysis of
First, legal

paternalism may be achieved through either the criminal law
or noncriminal legal agencies, e.g

0

,

by regulatory means.

Second, both criminal and noncriminal paternalism may be
27
'Michael D. Bayles, "Criminal Paternalism," in The
Limits of Law; Nomos XV ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W.
Chapman (New York: Lieber-Atherton, 197^), p. I78.
,
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either strong or weak: the weak version
restricts a person'
actions only if they are both nonvoluntary

s

and injurious,

whereas strong paternalism interferes with
a person's actio ns
even when they are voluntary. John Stuart
Mill accepted the
weak version of noncriminal paternalism, as
we have seen
(Ch. Ill, D, 3,

c).

Most contemporary opinions favor crimi-

nal paternalism of either the weak or the strong
varieties.
Hart and Gerald Dworkin advocate that criminal laws

be used to prevent and punish the voluntary acts of
an adult

which result in self-injury, hence they argue for the strong

version of criminal paternalism.

The voluntariness standard

of Mill"s weak paternalism, Hart holds, generally has been

and should be abandoned.

His reasons are a decline in the

belief that a person knows his own interests best and a
greater awareness of the factors which prevent actions from
pO

being fully voluntary.

But the burden of this argument,

as Bayles points out, is that frequently men do not choose

and act voluntarily on account of clouded judgment, subtle

pressures, or psychological compulsion.

Hence "the only

conditions possibly compatible with voluntary choice and

action in which Hart wishes to restrict liberty are when a

person (1) does not adequately reflect or (2) pursues transi-

tory desires."

29
7

Dworkin argues that liberty may justifi-

pO

Oxford

H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (London:
University Press, 1963)1 PP» 32-33*

^Bayles,

"Criminal Paternalism," p. 180.
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ably be restricted in similar
situations, e.g., cigarette
smoking and fastening seat belts. 3°
By pursuing a transitory
desire, the smoker sacrifices his
long-range to an immediate
interest because he lacks the will
power to act on his

belief that he ought to stop smoking;
similarly, someone who
desires to avoid injury may risk serious
harm by choosing,
without adequate reflection, to forego
the inconvenience of
using a seat belt. In both cases a person
may be injured by
his own voluntary, and apparently
irrational,
actions.

But the difficulty with restricting voluntary
actions

in these situations is that it assumes
everyone has the same
values; for instance, each person is presumed
to prefer a

greater chance of living a long life to the minor
inconvenience of wearing seat belts or to the indulgence of a

slight-

ly pleasurable smoking habit.

Bayles thinks that this

assumes too much:
In a pluralistic society with persons committed to
various value schemes, many such persons may not be
choosing irrationally [by refusing to fasten seat belts
or to give up smoking]. They may simply have different
values. Hence, restricting such actions may involve
coercing large numbers of persons who have not chosen
irrationally. That is, fully rational persons with
these different values would not think the consequences
of the actions injurious or consent to the restrictions.
Thus, strong paternalism would prohibit (and, if criminal

Gerald Dworkin, "Paternalism," in Morality and the
Law, ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 107-26.
Bayles, "Criminal Paternalism," p. 181.

.

.
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paternalism, punish) the voluntary practices of
rational,

strong-willed persons with uncommon values for the sake
of
compelling those with ordinary values to behave as they
would voluntarily if they were not weak-willed or irratlonal
Joel Feinberg and C. L. Ten are proponents of the

view that criminal prohibitions and punishments may justifiably be used to prevent nonvoluntary self-harm of an
adult. 33

I

agree, however, with Bayles that not even this

weak version of paternalism is acceptable for criminal
legislation:
First, it is not obvious that the use of criminal laws
is an effective method for preventing such actions.
The actions will not be voluntary, so threats of punishment may not influence the actors. But the effectiveness of criminal laws as a deterrence is a complex
topic.
For the purposes of argument it may be assumed
they will deter
But even so, they will not always
do so.
Then sanctions will have to be imposed on those
who violate laws.
Of course many offenders may escape
punishment if mens rea is required, for they will be in
excusing conditions. But some offenders will have to
be punished or the laws will cease to deter. 3^
.

When the law reaches the point of applying punishments, however, even weak paternalism is unacceptable, for implement-

ing criminal paternalism of either type is inconsistent with

promoting the actor's welfare:

32 Ibid.,

p.

182.

-^Feinberg, "Legal Paternalism," pp. 120-2^; Idem,
Social Philosophy pp. 55-52; and Ten, pp. 6^-66.
,

-^Bayles,

"Criminal Paternalism," p. 183
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injury on them. 35

Answering those who claim that the motive of crimi-

patemalism is reformation of offenders and that hence
harm inflicted by punishment is the lesser of two evils,

Bayles holds, first, that "such a justification must show
that the injury inflicted by threat and actual imposition

of punishment on offenders is less than that avoided by

reform and deterrence," and, second, that "there must not be
any less injurious method of preventing actors from injuring
themselves.* 0

Even if the first requirement were fulfilled

this utilitarian justification of criminal paternalism would
fail, according to Bayles, because less injurious means of

achieving the same goals are almost always available, e.g.,

propaganda in the public schools and in TV commercials.

In my view, noncriminal legal paternalism may, in
some situations and respecting certain kinds of self-ham,

be a justifiable governmental policy.

But surely Bayles is

correct in thinking that criminal paternalism is not justifiable.

Indeed, given its inconsistency respecting the pro-

tection of an actor's welfare by means of punishing him,
35 Ibid., pp. 183-84.

36 Ibid.,

p.

184.

criminal paternalism seems a
contradiction in terms. Hence
I agree with Bedau's view
(which implicitly corroborates
Bayles) that "so long as they harm
only those adults who
knowingly and willingly choose to engage
in such practices
and are harmless to others, it is hard
to see why the criminal justice system should be used to try
to prevent and to
punish those who want to do them":

.

Let the hospitals take care of the sick,
whether drunks
or addicts or victims of automobile accidents
or cancer.
Let the police concentrate on protecting us
from the
injuries and violence which would be inflicted on
us bv
a small minority.
As for the rest, let us leave it to
the control and guidance of education and persuasion,
free of coercive criminal sanctions altogether .37
C.

'Victimless Crimes'

Because it is doubtful that some public offenses
create harm and that voluntary self- harm of an adult is a

proper concern of the criminal law, many who advocate the
repeal of certain penal laws rely on the claim that punishing "crimes without victims" is unjustifiable.

During the

last decade some scholarly authorities in philosophy as well
as in the social sciences have emphasized that at the core

of the concept of 'crime

1

is the notion of victimization:

in order for an activity to be criminalized -justifiably,

there must be a victim who is injured as a result of it.-^
-^Bedau, pp. 99-100.
J

The seminal work on the concept of 'victimless
crime' is Edwin M. Schur, Crimes Without Victims (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., I965); see also Idem,

"

215

Thus, grouped under the rubric
of 'victimless crimes' are
all of the illegal activities
which contemporary penal
reformers desire to see decriminalized.

The recent debate between the
sociologist Edwin
Schur and the philosopher Hugo
Bedau illustrates the separate issues of decriminalization
and victimless crime. 39
Schur defends the use of the concept
of 'victimless crimes'
to designate criminal statutes
which ought to be altered or

repealed on grounds that they create
"crimes without victims,
while Bedau challenges the usefulness
of
the concept as it

presently stands.
pro and con, for

I
I

will not rehearse the arguments both

think Bedau is correct in holding that

Schur and others have been using a confused concept
whose
"definition seems to rely on several distinct and noncoextensive criteria":
As a consequence, it is very difficult to draw up a
list in any definite or uniform way of all and only
those crimes which are victimless, and to distinguish
them from the crimes which do have victims. Likewise,
until the concept of victimless crimes is further
analysed, it is impossible to go through the penal
and Society; A Sociological View (New York: Random House,
1968), passim.; and Idem, Our Criminal Society: The Social
and Lega l Sources of Crime in America (Englewood Cliffs. N.J.
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), passim. See also, e.g., Jeffrie
G, Murphy, "Another Look at Legal Moralism," Ethics 77 (October I966): 50-56; Jerome H. Skolnick, "Coercion to Virtue:
The Enforcement of Morals," Southern California Law Review
41 (Spring I968): 588-641
and Alexander B. Smith and Harriet
Pollack, "Crimes Without Victims," Saturday Review k December 1971, PP. 27-29.
L_aw

;

,

^ 7 Edwin

M. Schur and Hugo Adam Bedau, Victimless
Crimes: Two Sides of a Controversy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 197*0.

:
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code of any jurisdiction and pick out
all and only
those criminal laws which should be revised
or repealed
because they create victimless crimes and
M
authorize
dUuaouze
punishment for them>0
Thus, the concept of 'victimless crimes',
as it is presently
used, "has theoretically unsatisfactory
features which make
it a less than perfect analytical category
in terms of which
to assess a variety of political, scientific,
and moral

questions related to the issue of decriminalization."^ 1
Like Bayles, Bedau thinks that both legal moralism
and criminal paternalism are unjustifiable— but not
neces-

sarily because these governmental policies would create
"crimes without victims."

Rather, Bedau holds that because

of the concept's imprecision "it is important to keep distinct the class of victimless crimes and the class of offenses thought to deserve decriminalization."

While it is true

that the chief use of and the major interest in the concept

of 'victimless crimes' derives from its connection with

decriminalization proposals, Bedau' s analysis shows that the
two concepts ('crimes without victims' and 'offenses deserv-

ing decriminalization') merely intersect: neither coincides

with or includes the other.

Bedau concludes that -Mill's harm to others principle

^Bedau,

p.

58*

^Ibid.,

p.

101.

Ibid., p. 60.
See also Madeline S. Caughey, "The
Principle of Harm and Its Application to Laws Criminalizing
Prostitution," Denver Law Journal 51. no. 2 (197*0: 235-62.
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gives "a much sounder basis [than the concept of
'victimless
crimes'] for understanding what is wrong with trying
to

enforce morality through the criminal law." 43

Like Mill and

Hart, Bedau considers individual freedom an
intrinsic good.

For him, then, it is theoretically sounder to rest
one's

opposition to legal moralism and criminal paternalism on the
notion of human rights rather than victimless crimes: "We
can avoid moralism altogether and paternalism where it is

inappropriate by relying on a conception of human beings
which accords to each of us an inviolable privacy, a freedom
from legitimate state interference." 44 Thus, only those
activities resulting in harm to others which is grave enough
to outweigh the harm and costs of legal prevention and pun-

ishment ought to be considered apt candidates for proscrip-

tion by the criminal law.
D.

Conclusion

We have seen that Devlin is an advocate of legal

moralism and criminal paternalism.

According to legal mor-

alism, both public and private activities which offend the

moral feelings of a given community may justifiably be made
criminal offenses.

Devlin justifies this view by an appeal

to moral populism, the doctrine that the moral preferences

of the majority should be enacted into criminal statutes,
and by holding the metaethical position that a given society's
43 Ibid.,

p.

101.

44

Ibid., pp. 101-02.
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positive morality is objectively valid,
hence demonstrably
worthy of legal enforcement. Starting
out by valuing legal
moralism as a means (to preserving society's
"existence"

and

traditional institutions), Devlin ends up by
valuing morals
legislation either for its own sake or to preserve
the

public's moral beliefs from change.

According to his crimi-

nal paternalism, activities which result in
self-harm (especially moral "injury" or corruption) may rightfully
be pro-

scribed by penal legislation.

Devlin therefore advocates

"complete" paternalism for the sake of protecting the actor

from self-inflicted physical and moral harm.

On the other hand, Hart opposes legal moralism, he
says, in all of its forms.

The chief reason he gives is

utilitarian: morals legislation would do more harm than good.

Other reasons are that the application of laws which punish
"mere immorality" would lead to certain injustices, unjusti-

fiably deprive individuals of freedom, and overextend the
powers of a limited democratic government.

However, it turns

out that there is only one situation in which Hart considers

legal moralism unjustifiable

— viz.,

with respect to the con-

sensual sexual practices of adults in private when these are

offensive to the moral feelings of others.

Publicly offen-

sive activities, be they sexual or not, are justifiably pro-

scribed by the criminal law, Hart holds, for the sake of

protecting the moral and religious sentiments of unwilling
witnesses.

To this extent, then, Hart agrees with Devlin's
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view that a public's moral convictions
should be legally
protected. However, this view is inconsistent

with Hart's

utilitarian theory which is incompatible with
legal moralism
even in its most limited form.
According to Hart, criminal laws are necessary,
not

only to prevent- and punish public offenses, but
also in some
instances to protect the individual from himself.
Thus, he

holds that it is morally right to criminalize conduct
which

produces voluntary self- harm of an adult.

But Hart's treat-

ment of paternalism is both misconceived and confused, for
the examples he gives do not fit the principle he advocates.

While Devlin defends "complete" paternalism, then, Hart
espouses a form of legal paternalism which is unclear--

although he presumably would reject Devlin's idea of using
the criminal law to protect an actor from self-inflicted

moral harm.
A closer study of Devlin's and Hart's normative

theories reveals, therefore, that they are not so different
after all.

Hart supports a limited form of legal moralism

respecting publicly "indecent" conduct, and he agrees with

Devlin that even the voluntary activities of an adult may
justifiably be interdicted by penal legislation in order to
protect him from self-harm.

Thus, the disagreements between

Devlin and Hart are much smaller than would at first appear.
Recent contributions to the Devlin-Hart controversy
have dealt with the issues of public offense, legal pater-
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nalism, and victimless crimes.

I

agree with Bayles and

Bedau, against Devlin, Hart, and
Feinberg, that public conduct should not be prohibited and
punished by the criminal

law merely because it offends others.

I also

agree with

Bayles and Bedau, against Devlin, Hart, G.
Dworkin, Feinberg,
and Ten, that criminal paternalism (but
not necessarily noncriminal legal paternalism) is both inconsistent
and unjustifiable.

Finally,

I

agree with Bedau, against Schur and

some others, that the concept of Victimless
crimes

1

is both

unnecessary to and sometimes incapable of justifying
proposals to decriminalize activities which are not shown to
be

sufficiently harmful either to the actor himself or to others
whom they affect.

Rather, Mill's principle remains a more

adequate basis for the evaluation of existing and proposed
criminal statutes.

Justifying a criminal statute on Mill's principle,
we should inquire whether there is a welfare interest which

can only or more effectively be secured through such legislation.

Is there a less costly or more effective means than

the criminal law to obtaining compliance?

Is criminaliza-

tion of the conduct in question practical?
effectively enforced?

Can the law be

Generally, we should inquire whether
'

a criminal law would do more good than harm.

Given the

dangers of restricting individual liberty, and taking into

account the potential for abuse of governmental power, we

should insist on adequate justification of recourse to penal
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proscriptions.

Thus, the onus of justification is on the

proponents of criminalization: they must demonstrate that
criminal statutes will do more good than harm.
legal moralists most certainly have not done.

This the
The same is

true, it seems to me, of those who advocate criminal
pater-

nalism.
I think,

then, that Mill is more right than Devlin,

or even than Kart.

That an activity results in harm to

others should be a necessary condition of its being made a
crime.

No action which is harmless to others should be cri-

minalized, and those which are criminally proscribed should
be decriminalized.

This does not imply that all actions

which harm others should be crimes: the harm caused may be

negligible or less than that caused by the law in prohibiting and punishing the action.

Moreover, even where there is

harm to others sufficient to justify intervention by the
law, penal legislation may be inappropriate because it would

be ineffective or prohibitively costly when compared to the

available alternatives.

Thus, harm to others is a necessary

but by no means sufficient, reason for criminalizing the

conduct which causes it.

Subscription to a moral principle means accepting
its consequences.

Do I really believe that no activity

which does not appreciably harm others should be made criminal?

There could be certain cases where

I

might argue that

activities which give public offense or cause self-harm may

222

justifiably be regulated by the positive law
(and in this
sense be made illegal), but not be made criminal.
Examples
of these might be exhibitionism and drug
addiction.
Thus,

adherence to Mill's principle in justifying uses of
the criminal law does not mean that society is defenseless
in the

face of public offenses or that self-inflicted
injuries must
be ignored. Rather, it enjoins the legislature to
enact

penal codes with care to justifying them as necessary
means
to the promotion of a public's well-being against
deliber-

ately inflicted harms.

Too often a society's first response

to a social problem is recourse to the positive law,

more often than

not— to

and—

the criminal sanction, in situations

which are either irremediable (such as prostitution— which
even St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas thought to be

intractable) or better dealt with through nonlegal means
(such as incest and polygamy).

Upholding a moral principle

which delimits the scope of governmental power and imposes

restrictions on the uses of penal legislation implies that
the government and its policies ought to conform to that

principle.

Only in this sense should the positive law

enforce morality.

,
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